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This dissertation examines the inner workings of large conservation organizations 
implementing marine conservation projects in Papua New Guinea (PNG). My motivation for 
examining conservation interactions at multiple scales was to better understand how 
environmental professionals and local communities shape marine conservation processes. My 
dissertation is the result of sustained engagement with conservation staff in a range of locations 
and venues, including in the field and at project implementation sites. My aim was to examine 
how conservation operates at multiple scales, from the international and national level, where 
policy and project design most frequently takes place, to the provincial and field level, where 
project implementation occurs. My approach draws on multi-sited ethnography in ways that are 
institutionally and regionally rooted; it privileges articulations of managerial contexts, 
subjectivities, and practices within marine conservation efforts in PNG.  
My interest in pursuing this study stems from my own experiences within the 
conservation world. My professional background with both an international and a national 
conservation NGO taught me different ways in which organizational structures and individual 
managers influence project decision-making. I observed the ways in which managers felt 
pressure to align their specific projects with broader organizational objectives and how this 
process produced both benefits and challenges, improving some project outcomes while 
extracting other costs. Similarly, I saw the ways in which our dependence on external funding 
influenced us to report project outcomes in a way that would emphasize success and ensure 
continued financial support for our projects. At the same time, this donor relationship positively 
shaped our program strategy; donor officials engaged our program staff in thought provoking 
discussions about program findings that eventually led us to develop a new program objective. In 
summary, my professional experiences convinced me that complex micro-level pressures and 
regulatory structures influence conservation processes. 
Scholarship on conservation describes many of these challenges that I experienced in my 
professional life. However, critics often highlight NGO’s failures to achieve objectives or reverse 
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biodiversity loss without careful attention to the reasons behind such difficulties. Popular 
critiques of large conservation organizations (Dowie 2005; Dowie 2008; MacDonald 2008) fail 
to show the individuals who make up these organizations and oversimplify the organizations as 
monolithic entities. While MacDonald (2008) does examine individuals in her account of the 
growing closeness between environmental organizations and corporations, her journalistic style 
criticizes individuals’ private lives and unrelated personal details without objectively analyzing 
the role of these individuals in the governance and management of the organizations. In my 
conversations with environmental managers, their commitment to conservation, to the 
communities in the areas in which they worked, and to a job that often stretched long past a 
typical 9 to 5 workday was immediately apparent. It is easy to call attention to conservation 
failure, but much more difficult to identify factors that explain such failure within a broader 
context. My dissertation more objectively considers the individual characteristics and interests of 
conservation professionals, alongside conservation successes and failures. 
Similarly, growing attention has been paid to the role of donor institutions in shaping 
conservation organizations. This attention to donor-NGO relationships emphasizes the reliance 
of NGOs on donor funding without moving beyond this critique to analyze the effects of such 
relationships (Wapner 1995; Wapner 2002a; Wapner 2002b; Dorsey 2005; but see Kilby 2006). I 
take it as a fact that NGOs are dependent on external financial support and that this dependence 
influences NGO accountability to donors (Benson 2012). To move beyond that primary 
understanding of NGO-donor relationships is to analyze what actually happens as a result of 
NGO-donor relationships and show the ways in which donors may shape internal NGO 
structures and program strategies. My conversations with environmental managers and donors 
highlighted not only the typical influence of donors on conservation priorities but also the ways 
in which donors may seek to facilitate innovative change and encourage reflection in their 
interactions with NGO managers. Still, despite donors stated interest in encouraging critical 
reflection, I found that managers at national NGO offices rarely encourage such reflection by 
their staff. Instead, they were more likely to internalize donor pressure and pressure their staff to 
produce project reports that emphasize success.  
Further, while excellent critiques of conservation and development exist, these criticisms 
rarely provide practical recommendations for individuals with the motivation and power to 
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address such critiques in their own organizations.1 In fact, many scholars explicitly state that 
their work “does not make a judgment about success, does not aim to explain outcomes in terms 
of design, to prescribe solutions to problems or to conclude with recommendations” (Mosse 
2005: x). While I appreciate the value of such critical scholarship, as an academic with 
practitioner experience, I also recognize the importance of closing gaps between conservation 
advocates and critics by presenting a more nuanced analysis and making recommendations 
aimed at improving the practices of environmental institutions and the relationships among 
conservation actors. Li (2007) believes that “the positions of critic and programmer are properly 
distinct” (2007: 2) and that such a marriage is not possible. In contrast, my purpose in this 
dissertation is to retain critical reflection while still allowing for what Mosse (2005) terms 
“managerial optimism.” At times, this work entails chronicling managerial efforts to reformulate 
programmatic priorities, in relation to needs and practices of partner communities in target 
conservation areas. Further, within those partner or target communities, I showcase voices of 
skepticism, alongside expressions of commitment to conservation; in the case of the latter, I 
explore the tensions between discourse and practice in rural communities, as these in turn shape 
the attitudes and aims of conservation professionals.  
Finally, I wish to emphasize the desire of environmental managers to improve both the 
work of their organizations and their own work. Reviewers who read my project proposals were 
skeptical that I would have access to individuals within conservation organizations. In contrast, 
my experience was overwhelmingly positive. Only a few individuals questioned my intentions or 
were unwilling to participate in an interview. On the whole, I was well received by individuals 
within conservation organizations and government departments, with many participants sharing 
their experiences long past our allotted time and asking for follow up appointments to continue 
our discussions. I found environmental managers eager to see the results of my work and truly 
interested in better understanding how communities viewed conservation organizations or to hear 
how their colleagues and peers perceived their projects and activities. I believe this interest 
stems, at least in part, from the limited time environmental managers have for critical reflection 
in their daily work, despite an expressed desire for such thinking. Managers described 
themselves as frequently caught up in the never-ending work of managing projects and staff, 
with little planned time for evaluation or reflection beyond the confines of donor or institutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 But see Ferguson’s (1990) epilogue “What is to be done?”	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reporting requirements. Many said that our discussions were an opportunity to think about some 
of their actions, activities, and strategies in a way in which they were usually unable to do. One 
jokingly referred to our discussions as conservation therapy and asked if he could have regular 
sessions. These conversations convinced me of the need to bridge critical reflection with 
practical recommendations, as a necessary step in moving towards more effective conservation. 
Balancing the academic rigors of a PhD with my desire to make this research meaningful 
to those with the ability to facilitate change has not been an easy task. I strove to illustrate the 
tension between senior managers and junior staff and between headquarter and field offices 
while trying not to overstate the differences among these levels or exaggerate the power of 
individuals or offices. I worried about offending well-meaning individuals who were kind 
enough to share their concerns or failures. I agonized over whether individual anecdotes would 
be recognizable to colleagues and how to ensure anonymity in my writing, ultimately deciding 
never to identify any of the conservation organizations or foundations. My intention is not to 
name or embarrass individuals but rather to use examples to illustrate some of the challenges 
faced by these organizations as individuals seek to minimize gaps between conservation 
intentions and achievements. While my effort will likely still concern some readers and fail to 
satisfy others, my intentions are to examine how conservation can work better and to illustrate 
newer, more nuanced methods for collecting information about and conceptualizing conservation 
organizations. I portray them as they are incessantly shaped, through internally varied and 
contradictory processes, by the donor communities and target or partner communities whose 
priorities must be ceaselessly reconciled with the biological and ecological outcomes that would, 
in a simpler world, be straightforward indicators of success or failure.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Conservation organizations have become larger, better funded, and more organized over 
time. However, at the same time that these organizations have increased their capacities and their 
resources, global biodiversity continues to decline. This mismatch between larger, more 
professional organizations and declining biodiversity suggests a gap between increased capacity 
and conservation outcomes. Some scholars place emphasis on variations between intentions and 
outcomes, illustrating how such gaps emerge in conservation policies, programs and projects 
(Carrier and West 2009). Despite scholarship that explores such gaps and mismatches, scholars 
have not fully addressed how and why such tensions continuously emerge and persist in 
conservation, a lacuna I seek to address by examining organizations implementing marine 
conservation projects in PNG. This dissertation explores the inner workings of conservation at 
multiple scales to examine how organizations, conservation professionals and local community 
actors shape conservation processes and outcomes.  
The conservation organizations that implement marine conservation projects in PNG are 
broadly representative of conservation organizations in general. The large, international 
conservation NGOs examined in this dissertation have annual budgets of hundreds of millions of 
dollars, employ thousands of people globally, and implement conservation projects around the 
world. Their organization structure is also representative of large, international NGOs: each 
organization analyzed in this dissertation has an international headquarter office that interacts 
with national and field offices, including the PNG national and field offices described in this 
dissertation. Further, these NGOs receive funding from foundations, governments, businesses, 
and private individuals. 
My dissertation argues that conservation effects vary from the intentions of managers and 
project staff, resulting in conservation projects and outcomes that continuously differ from 
imagined and intended effects. I consider this variation from multiple levels, from decision-
making and project design at international, national, and field offices to projects implemented in 
local communities. Investigating how marine conservation projects unfold across multiple 
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locations allows me to elucidate tensions between face-to-face and more remote interactions in 
conservation processes.  
Explaining the role of organizations and individuals in marine conservation is important 
for three primary reasons. First, it is important to investigate the relatively recent creation and 
expansion of marine protected areas (MPAs) and the fact that MPAs remain the primary global 
mechanism for conserving marine biodiversity despite concerns about their negative social 
impacts (West et al 2006; Christie et al 2003) and mixed ecological outcomes (Kareiva 2006). 
There is an urgent need for work that recognizes such limitations or contradictions in MPA 
management but that can document and understand successful governance arrangements, using 
them to design effective policy and extend such models into other regions. Second, as non-state 
actors increasingly implement conservation agendas in developing countries (Sanderson 2002; 
Agrawal & Lemos 2007), attention to relationships among environmental actors can shed light 
on the strategies and outcomes of environmental governance. Sutherland et al (2009) suggest 
understanding how organizational characteristics (for instance, the structures of governments vs. 
those of NGOs) shape the effectiveness of conservation interventions is one of the most urgent 
questions in biodiversity conservation.  
Third, a body of literature on Foucauldian governmentality presents a picture of powerful 
institutions that control power/knowledge to achieve their own aims. However, as noted above, 
conservation organizations have become increasingly professional, yet biodiversity continues to 
decline, suggesting a gap between organizational capacities and resources and conservation 
outcomes. This gap contrasts with Foucauldian visions of organizations as maintaining control 
and suggests the limitations of totalizing narratives or polarizing views of organizations and 
individuals. This dissertation takes an intermediary view, positioning the analysis between 
scholarship that characterizes these organizations as powerful entities that control outcomes and 
scholarship that critiques the effectiveness and work of such conservation organizations. It 
recognizes that the differences between visions of what such organizations claim to do and their 
actual practices are not unique tales of a particularly difficult project or an exceptional situation 
of a project with unintended effects. Rather, such gaps and inconsistencies have become “the 
normal state of affairs” and merit attention (Carrier and West 2009: ix). Therefore, this 
dissertation more closely examines conservation organizations, and the individuals within them, 
to explore the emergence of gaps between plans and outcomes (Ferguson 1994), between policy 
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and practice (Mosse 2005; Lewis and Mosse 2006), and between intentions and achievements 
(Carrier and West 2009).  
One pioneering study in this regard is Sivaramakrishnan’s descriptions of “zones of 
anomaly” in the forests of Bengal. Sivaramakrishnan (1996) shows how the forests of Bengal 
and its tribal population challenged central principles of British state-making and represent an 
exception to the colonial project of rule. He defines zones of anomaly as “geographic spaces in 
the terrain targeted by the Permanent Settlement where its application was thwarted” (1996: 
245); zones of anomaly represent places where the intentions of the British government did not 
work as expected and the population did not conform as anticipated.  
More importantly, Sivaramakrishnan (1996) shows how considering variations and 
limitations of colonial state power and relationships among colonial powers, regional elites, and 
the jungle mahals illuminates a broader picture in which these zones of anomaly not only existed 
but persisted. Sivaramakrishnan’s insights highlight an important but understudied issue in the 
study of conservation and development: what are the conditions that allow for the emergence of 
locations that do not operate in expected ways and the potential for such anomalies to persist? 
Accordingly, my analysis considers the emergence and persistence of anomalies in marine 
conservation efforts throughout Papua New Guinea, illuminating locations in which the 
intentions of a large conservation organization did not play out as expected during project 
implementation and showing how conservation professionals and local communities did not 
always behave as expected. By showing the disjunctures between intentions and achievements at 
multiple levels and locations, my dissertation illustrates how the anomalous is ubiquitous. 
This dissertation engages social science literature concerned with environment and 
institutions. More specifically, my research lies at the interstices of post-structural political 
ecology and Foucauldian writings on government and subject. My dissertation considers how 
Foucault’s notions of power (1991; 1988; 1979; 1977) produce environmental subjects (see 
Chapter Five in particular). A body of scholarship on governmentality—the “conduct of 
conduct” (Gordon 1991: 2; Foucault 1991)— examines how states maintain coherence and order 
(Scott 1998) and investigates the ways governments attempt to produce subjects best suited to 
the aims of government (see Rose 1990; Ferguson 1990; Dean 2009; Bryant 2002). 
Examinations of the effects of power explain why interventions persist despite continued failure 
(Ferguson 1990), show how communities may resist and subvert such power (Scott 1987; Scott 
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1992), and illustrate how communities position themselves to “practice politics” (Li 2007). 
Others illustrate how practices and technologies of management enable actors to create and 
implement particular institutional strategies (Mackinnon 2000).  
More recently, scholars have begun paying attention to governmentality in relation to 
nature and the creation of environmental subjects. Scholars explore how environmental 
organizations produce particular truths about nature (Bryant 2009; Hajer & Fischer 1999; Luke 
1999). Darier (1996) describes how Canada’s Green Plan was designed to change attitudes and 
produce a population of environmental citizens. Agrawal (2005) uses “environmentality” to 
investigate how power/knowledge, institutions, and subjectivities are constituted and shaped by 
each other within the context of Indian forest management. I consider power/knowledge, 
institutions, and subjectivities at multiple scales—from field offices to international 
headquarters, and from individuals to institutions, to illustrate how Foucauldian notions of power 
shape environmental professionals and communities as particular types of subjects, constraining 
or enabling actions. While power relations are uneven, I assume power operates both positively 
and negatively, recognizing that both the ruler and the ruled exercise power and have power 
exercised upon them. 
I draw on common property’s emphasis on institutions to position my research on 
environmental institutions. Common property studies are particularly relevant in PNG, where 
97% of land is communally owned and customary tenure frequently extends to the sea. Empirical 
common property analysis documents biophysical, institutional, and socio-cultural factors that 
influence ecological outcomes (McCay and Acheson 1987; Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 
2001). Melanesia’s long-standing customary sea tenure arrangements (Johannes 1978; Johannes 
2002) make PNG an appropriate location to investigate institutional factors that contribute to 
environmental outcomes. Anthropologists and others in Melanesia and the Pacific have long 
explored land (e.g., Brookfield and Brown 1963; Rappaport 1967; Crocombe 1971; Hirsch and 
Strathern 2004) and marine tenure (e.g., Carrier 1987; Aswani 1999; McClanahan et al 2006). 
Oceania “has the world’s largest surviving and thriving concentration of sea tenure 
regimes” (Aswani 2005: 287), making it an important location in studying the factors that lead to 
successful common property outcomes. In the Pacific and Melanesia, land rights correspond and 
extend to lagoons, mangrove swamps, reefs, shorelines, and oceans (Couper 1973; Schug 1995; 
Aswani 1999; Aswani 2002; Dalzell and Schug 2002; Lieber and Rynkiewich 2007). Marine 
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boundaries were often extensions of landholdings but could be influenced by physical features 
such as reef passages and holes or path reefs (Schug 1995; Dalzell and Schug 2002). The 
majority of Pacific Island societies had some form of traditional marine tenure, although the 
specifics of ownership varied among different societies and islands (Adams 1998). Studies from 
Oceania have “overwhelming shown that these [marine] institutions are diverse and dynamic and 
that they have emerged from the coalescenece of traditional and foreign practices” (Aswani 
2005: 289). 
Indigenous marine tenure is legally recognized in PNG, Fiji, Palau, Samoa, the Solomon 
Islands, and Vanuatu (Aswani 2005). In PNG, the Constitution and Fisheries Acts recognizes 
customary marine tenure rights (Cinner 2005; MacIntyre and Foale 2007). The PNG Fisheries 
Management Act states, “the rights of the customary owners of fisheries resources and fishing 
rights shall be fully recognized and respected in all transactions affecting the resource or the area 
in which the right operates” (cited in MacIntyre and Foale 2007:55).  
Despite PNG’s long-standing customary tenure, empirical evidence on the cultural, 
environmental, historical, and institutional factors that led to the durability of these customary 
sea tenure regimes in PNG is limited and Pacific scholars have long debated the existence of a 
conservation ethic among the populations that they studied (e.g., Carrier 1987; Eley 1988; Foale 
& Manele 2004; Wagner and Talakai 2004; MacIntyre & Foale 2007). Other scholars (e.g., 
Malinowski 1922; Hviding 1983; Polunin 1984) describe the use of customary marine tenure in 
preventing outsiders from exploiting resources. Eaton (1997), Cinner et al (2005a; 2005b), 
McClanahan et al (2006) suggest systems not designed for conservation can result in 
conservation outcomes. Other Pacific scholars provide case studies of marine conservation based 
on either customary sea tenure (Fa’asili & Kelekolio 1999; Malm 2001; Thomas 2001; Aswani 
2005) or a revitalization of historical sea tenure (Johannes 2002).  
Johannes attributes government or legal recognition of marine tenure, strengthening of 
traditional, local level authorities, growing perceptions of resource scarcity, increased 
conservation awareness, and increased support from governments and outside organizations as 
factors that contributed to the revitalization of customary sea tenure. Johannes concludes that 
community-based marine resource management “may be more widespread in Oceania today than 
in any other tropical region in the world” and documents increases in marine tenure for the Cook 
Islands, Fiji, Hawaii, Kiribati, Palau, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu 
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(2002: 318). While it is impossible to characterize marine tenure among all diverse societies 
within the Pacific, some common characteristics identified include local ownership of marine 
resources and locally regulated restrictions on fish seasons, reef areas, specific species or sizes of 
species, and types of fishing gear (Cinner et al 2005). Aswani (2002; 2005) identifies the 
following factors that have lead to the diverse and resilient nature of common property marine 
tenure in Oceania: exclusivity or excludability, subtractablity, transferability, durability, property 
rights, and security of title. Chapter Five provides empirical analysis that contributes to the 
common property literature while also advancing theory on institutional factors which contribute 
to environmental outcomes. 
Second, my dissertation builds upon insights from post-structural political ecology that 
explore the complex social relationships of conservation and development. I draw on Melanesian 
political ecology’s fine-grained analysis of human-environment relationships to situate the ways 
in which Papua New Guinean understandings of nature and culture influence local community 
interests in engaging with NGO actors. Melanesian scholarship demonstrates that social 
relationships are the core component of human-environment relationships and suggests mis-
interpretations can occur when extra-community actors ignore the economic, historical, political, 
and social contexts of their interventions. For instance, Jacka (2001) illustrates how differences 
in conceptions of land, commodity, and exchange can result in misunderstandings. Jacka 
explains how mine owners viewed land transfer as a completed, commodity transaction for 
which they had paid. In contrast, the Ipili viewed the transaction as a gift exchange; they “were 
not just selling their land, but buying an expected future of development and modernity that the 
township development company was to bring” (Jacka 2001: 4). Jorgensen (1997) also documents 
the complexity of land ownership in PNG, documenting how a long history of displacement, 
expansion, and warfare resulted in multiple and competing land claims among the Teleomofin, 
creating a situation in which it is impossible to give a single, clear answer as to who is a 
landowner.  
Similarly, West (2008) shows how failure to integrate local social histories into 
conservation management can hinder the implementation of otherwise well-intentioned 
conservation interventions. She emphasizes how conservation organizations simplify property 
and social relations, failing to recognize important economic, historical, political, and social 
dimensions in which the relationships between people and place are tied to “questions of 
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identity, group affiliation, changes in the landscape, changes in external sites of power, 
commodification of resources, and “development” in general” (West 217). In the past, West 
argues, social relations over land and other things maintained the social fabric of family and kin 
groups as well as the social relations among clans (2008: 211). Now, however, conservation 
organizations seek to identify one valid claim. West writes that “conservation purports to rely on 
some historic social relations, yet its policies and practices disregard other historical social 
relations,” contributing to a paradox between individual and clan ownership (2008: 218). 
Following this Melanesian scholarship, my dissertation recognizes the central importance of 
social relationships in human-environment relationships and uses these insights to explore how 
local community actors engage with conservation NGOs. Further, while this scholarship 
advances critical thinking on conservation and development and on institutions, it primarily 
focuses on extractive industries or terrestrial conservation. By illustrating the role of individual 
conservation professionals in marine conservation efforts in Melanesia, my dissertation 
represents the first multi-scaled analysis in the Pacific on marine conservation organizations, 
conservation professionals, and local communities. 
I also draw on post-structural political ecology scholarship that presents a view of 
powerful international institutions that create and maintain particular knowledge forms in order 
to justify particular interventions and create idealized, governable subjects. Such scholars also 
view development as desirable. For example, both Ferguson (1990) and Mitchell (2002) show 
how large institutions, such as the World Bank and the United States Agency for International 
Development, justified interventions in Lesotho and Egypt by depoliticizing issues and 
representing solutions as technical. Similarly, Li (2007) uses the term “rendering technical” to 
show how experts are trained to frame problems as explicitly non-political in a way that confirms 
the expertise and position of “trustees” who can then implement technical solutions. These 
studies significantly contribute to showing the ways in which institutions and elites produce 
knowledge.  
At the same time, a few scholars have begun to question the true discursive power of 
such institutions (Mosse 2005) and to critique this literature’s failure to explore agency within 
and between institutions at multiple scales. Rhee (2006) found that the Center for International 
Forestry Research (CIFOR), an international forest institution that is assumed by post-
structuralists to be representative of powerful institutions, “has less local influence” and a “more 
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fragile, negotiated, and constrained” position than the literature would suggest (Rhee 2006: 46-
47). My research builds upon this emerging scholarship by examining “agencies and ideologies 
of differently positioned actors” (West 2006: 26) within and between environmental institutions.  
While many social scientists discuss the NGO sector, systematic examinations of how 
“local and international organizations interact...and what ideas are implemented within this 
network” are limited at best (Brockington and Schofield 2010) and few studies empirically 
examine “the internal debates and politics of the organizations behind international 
conservation” (King 2009). Sundberg suggests that research that analyzes the “subject identities, 
discourses, and practices of NGOs” is also necessary (Sundberg 2006: 241). Corson highlights 
how the rise of “big conservation” is accompanied by a “move within conservation away from 
engaging local actors” (2010: 510). Sachedina (2010) supports this finding, concluding that the 
scaling up of the African Wildlife Foundation resulted in organizational practices that 
contributed to disempowerment and poverty. This body of work represents a much needed step 
in examining NGO practices: my research broadens and deepens this narrative by examining the 
internal practices, politics, and knowledges of NGOs that constitute everyday rule and shape how 
individuals think and act.  
Further, Heyman (2009) highlights these organizations as a social phenomenon that 
deserve attention and writes that while powerful managers and organizations “often, maybe 
always…fail in their overt mission” they still produce important effects (2009: 177). Heyman 
proposes studying environmental NGOs and the multiple layers of actors, micromanagement, 
power/knowledge frameworks, and social relationships. He suggests that such a study will 
require understanding “the effort by central offices to micromanage field employees and target 
populations,” an attempt that requires understanding how action and power operate at a distance 
through “a chain of organized actors and activities, from head offices through central field 
offices to specific field sites” (2009: 178). My dissertation addresses this lacuna by examining 
how “governance at a distance” management strategies produce project outcomes that differ 
from the types of marine conservation projects envisioned by managers and staff at headquarter 
and national offices (see Chapter Three in particular).  
Methodology 
 This dissertation draws upon data personally conducted in PNG and at international 
headquarter offices of NGOs. I conducted semi-structured interviews with NGO and government 
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officials, donor organizations, the dive, surf and tourism industry, academics and other 
stakeholders (n=120). I interviewed people from all bureaucratic levels, from organization 
directors to program staff, an approach that documents the multiple levels through which projects 
are shaped and influenced. I observed many NGO activities, from internal NGO staff meetings to 
NGO activities in communities, which allowed me to observe NGO decision-making processes 
and interactions among staff and between NGO staff and the communities in which they work. I 
also reviewed public NGO documents, such as press releases and website material, and internal 
documents, including strategic plans and workplans, and external project evaluations. I 
conducted interviews with conservation professionals in English, all of whom are fluent in 
English.  
I conducted household surveys in Riwo village, Madang province; Pere village, Manus 
province; and Nonovaul village, New Ireland (n=436). My survey included 164 questions 
grouped among 24 categories, including: household demographic data; attitudes towards the 
environment and marine conservation; fishing; the marine management area, including its 
creation, rules and enforcement; decision-making and community participation; interactions with 
government and NGO officials; and sources of information. In each village, I hired and trained 
local research assistants to help carry out the surveys. The household surveys were written in 
Tok Pisin, with the English translation written below. The surveys were primarily conducted in 
Tok Pisin or a preferred local language. For instance, in Pere village, my research assistants often 
conducted interviews using Titan to ensure a high level of understanding, although Tok Pisin and 
English were also used occasionally. 
Analytical framework 
Despite extensive scholarship documenting gaps between plans and outcomes, policy and 
practice, and intentions and achievements, understanding how and why such tensions 
continuously emerge eludes both scholars and practitioners. I argue that none of these 
explanations fully accounts for the multiple assumptions and conceptual lenses necessary to 
address how and why conservation intentions and achievements differ.  
My analytical framework draws inspiration from Graham Allison’s pioneering work on 
the origins and explanations of the Cuban missile crisis. Allison (1969) argues that scholars 
explain the Cuban missile crisis using their own lens, resulting in accounts that fail to address the 
major questions explaining the crisis. He points to “the influence of unrecognized assumptions 
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upon our thinking about events…[how events] must be affected by basic assumptions we make, 
categories we use, our angle of vision.” (1969: v). In contrast to singular explanations, Allison 
utilizes, compares, and contrasts three conceptual lenses, illustrating “what each magnifies, 
highlights, and reveals as well as what each blurs or neglects” (1969: v). This approach 
illustrates how alternative frames of references can emphasize different aspects of events and 
how comparing and contrasting perspectives allows a deeper analysis that uncovers greater 
insight. 
Following Allison (1969), I use multiple levels of explanation to structure my dissertation 
argument, recognizing that a focus on one level or one explanation facilitates an analysis of 
conservation that allows assumptions to drive conclusions. For instance, an organizational level 
explanation for why conservation managers envision a particular project that results in 
unintended effects during project implementation fails to appropriately account for the role of 
individual conservation professionals and local communities. Similarly, an individual-focused 
explanation may not adequately account for organizational, political, or structural constraints. 
Therefore, my dissertation proposes a set of linked explanations to show what each level of 
explanation reveals and blurs while also comparing and contrasting these explanations to 
illustrate how understanding multiple levels can lead to more complete understandings.  
The dissertation contains five chapters, each of which explores gaps between intentions 
and achievements in marine conservation efforts. Following this introduction, Chapter Two 
broadly explores how organizations shape individuals within conservation. It analyzes how 
organizational processes shape the actions and behaviors of conservation professionals through 
an examination of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes across multiple levels of an 
international conservation organization. This chapter illustrates how international managers’ 
intentions to implement M&E throughout the organization are not achieved because national 
managers and staff place different values on the importance of M&E. Chapter Three considers 
the emergence of gaps between intentions and outcomes by examining the effects of a 
“governance-at-a-distance” management style. Chapter Four tracks the decision-making 
processes of staff at international, national, and field offices who define and implement marine 
conservation projects to explore how their actions shape discursive practices, thereby shaping 
knowledge forms. Chapter Four illustrates contrasting staff preferences, suggests ontological 
differences in how individual conservation actors conceptualize objectives versus tools and 
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conservation versus development, and proposes three reasons why managers may produce 
ignorance and control knowledge. It highlights how disjunctures continuously emerge through 
marine conservation efforts and suggests that such disjunctures represent both failures and 
possibilities. Chapter Five focuses on individual community actors within conservation. It 
explores how individuals come to care about conservation and how their attitudes and beliefs 
translate into particular actions and behavior that support environmental protection. It shows the 
emergence of positive environmental attitudes among Pere villagers in Manus Province while 
also highlighting villagers’ ongoing challenges in enforcing management area rules. Despite the 
community’s stated intentions to effectively manage their marine area, this chapter shows how 
gaps may still emerge between what individuals hope to and intend to achieve and what they 
actually achieve. Finally, Chapter Six offers some overall conclusions that integrate the findings 
of each chapter and proposes additional theoretical approaches for future research analyzing 
marine conservation efforts in PNG and elsewhere.  
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CHAPTER TWO: Constructing conservation impact: 
Understanding monitoring and evaluation in conservation NGOs 
INTRODUCTION 
It concerns me at a personal level that here we are trying to save species that are 
dying out and are critically endangered, places that are being destroyed 
gradually...We have to be as well organized as some of the best armies out 
there…we have to be really, really coordinated...We have a lot of key, star 
soldiers…who can storm the fortress walls, get behind the fence lines and send 
fire…and create these wins…And all the soldiers…they do not know where the 
general is telling them to go or what battalion to support or when their supplies 
will be replenished…We have to be even more organized, I think, than the 
governments and private companies, given what we are trying to do, and, at the 
same time, balance it with a representative or democratic structure…[but] there 
was just this complete lack of coordination…the kind you really need between the 
different contributing offices and projects and programs when it came to the 
program strategy. So it is just sort of a whole lot of people throwing in their 
pennies over a wall and thinking it will all add up, and what was really achieved 
as a whole is completely unknown. 
--Conservation manager, World Conservation Organization 
It is surprising to hear that employees of a large conservation organization hope that 
small, individual project activities, “throwing many pennies over a wall,” will contribute to the 
conservation interventions that are necessary to solve increasingly complex environmental 
concerns (e.g., saving critically endangered species and conserving threatened habitats). This 
manager’s statement illustrates complex challenges faced by the World Conservation 
Organization2 (WCO) while also noting organizational failure to strategically address such 
challenges. When describing the “star soldiers,” she recognizes the ability and expertise of WCO 
staff. At the same time, she notes poor coordination among different offices, projects, and 
programs and emphasizes the lack of high-level, strategic leadership to provide organizational 
direction. Finally, this manager underscores WCO’s failure to clearly define how individual staff 
efforts and program activities will contribute to addressing conservation challenges. This chapter 
explores how WCO’s failure to clearly define, measure, and reflect upon outcomes, through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The name of this organization and of all individuals are pseudonyms. To further protect individual identities, some 
genders were changed.	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institutionalized monitoring and evaluation (M&E), led to the situation, described above, in 
which WCO could not illustrate how, or even if, its activities contributed to its broader mission.  
M&E represents a unique opportunity to examine how individual actors within an 
organization work together to achieve common objectives and produce larger impacts because it 
theoretically involves coordination, cooperation, and management across multiple levels of an 
organization. This chapter examines how WCO, a large, international conservation organization, 
coordinates M&E activities across its international, national, and local offices. I consider the 
perspectives of staff based at WCO’s international headquarter office and at their Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) offices to show how organizational processes and common routines work through 
individuals, shaping their attitudes and behavior and instituting norms and practices. This 
empirical analysis illustrates how individual attitudes and behavior towards implementing M&E 
vary among different WCO offices and shows difficulties in translating broad organizational 
goals into specific project activities, underscoring tensions in implementation. This analysis also 
illuminates how WCO and its staff construct effectiveness and impact, contributing to critical 
reflection on practices of evaluation and measurement within the field of conservation.  
This chapter is organized into five sections, including the introduction. The theoretical 
framework synthesizes insights from scholarship on political ecology, organizational theory, and 
audit cultures and M&E. Section three describes the research methodology. The results section 
analyses organizational culture at international and national levels. Section five presents the 
discussion and conclusion. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
My theoretical framework combines three fields of scholarship to examine how 
individuals coordinate and implement M&E across WCO’s international, national, and local 
offices. I use insights from post-structural political ecology and critical studies of conservation to 
shed light on the governmentality of organizations and projects. I use organizational scholarship 
to investigate how organizational processes shape individual action and behavior, particularly on 
institutional logics. Finally, my theoretical framework incorporates scholarship on accountancy, 
indicators, and trends in conservation evaluation to situate my analysis of M&E within 
scholarship that recognizes the potential consequences of such evaluation on governance and 
power.  
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Post-structural political ecology is useful for understanding how certain forms of power 
and knowledge produce particular discourses, and, in turn, how these discourses shape possible 
attitudes and behavior. In many cases, post-structural political ecology portrays institutions as 
producing forms of knowledge that position individuals as experts. This expertise depends on 
simplifications and abstractions that depoliticize knowledge, allow concepts to be represented as 
universal, and simplify the world (Mitchell 2002). Such a construction of knowledge, Mitchell 
argues, is necessary to position individuals as possessing expertise about a particular concept that 
these experts then use to propose managerial and technical solutions to justify interventions and 
to incorporate individuals into relations of dominance (Foucault 1979). While many scholars 
describe organizations as framing a particular worldview as desirable or as shaping knowledge 
about biodiversity (e.g., Escobar 1998; Goldman 2005), attention to the organizations themselves 
appears merely incidental, a side component used to illustrate how conservation and 
development function. As a result, this scholarship elides an understanding of how organizations 
shape power, knowledge and individuals, a lacuna I address by illustrating how WCO staff 
produce project knowledge.  
As Cooper and Packard note “we tend to treat [NGOs] in generic terms, not exploring 
their varied ideologies, [or] organizational forms” (2007: 27). These types of assumptions blur 
the role of individual agency within organizations, overlooking how individuals influence 
organizational culture and decision-making. Moreover, some studies over-emphasize local 
agency (e.g., Scott 1992; Li 2007) or fail to consider “agency within the institution and between 
the institutions and other social actors” (Rhee 2006: 46). Consequently, there is a need to 
empirically examine organizational intentions, practices, and outcomes (Sundberg 2006; 
Heyman 2009; King 2009). 
Recent contributions to what Mosse (2004) terms the “new ethnography of development” 
represent a promising avenue in considering the role of individual actors within institutions (see 
Mosse 2005; Rhee 2006). As West explains, “this new ethnography takes seriously the 
governmentality of projects—the fact that social lives, environments, and subjects come to make 
and be made by the productive power of structures created by projects...and the social 
interactions and transactions during all sorts of projects…which create new communities” (West 
2006: xviii). van Ufford (1988: 79) exemplifies such ethnographic scholarship: he analyzes “the 
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boards and NGOs as a whole, but also…the power balances between the directors, evaluators, 
and operating staff within the NGOs.”  
A rapidly expanding literature examines large conservation NGOs (e.g., Walley 2004; 
West 2006). Popular articles have also investigated conservation NGOs (e.g., Chapin 2004; 
Dowie 2005; 2008; Macdonald 2008). Studies focus on how individuals and organizations 
produce particular knowledge forms that influence conservation policy (e.g., Brockington and 
Scholfield 2010) and show the role of transnational networks of well-connected elites (Holmes 
2012) and conservation celebrities (Brockington and Scholfield 2009) in producing dominant 
attitudes and practices. Other studies highlight the negative consequences of “big conservation” 
on local actors and NGO missions (e.g., Neumann 2002; Corson 2010). Sachedina (2010), for 
instance, concludes the scaling up of the African Wildlife Foundation, and its focus on 
government and donor relationships, resulted in organizational practices that contributed to local 
disempowerment and poverty. These studies and others (e.g., Brosius and Campbell 2010) show 
how ethnographic methods can uncover the organizational practices through which conservation 
occurs. 
To examine how WCO coordinates M&E across its multiple offices, I draw upon 
organizational scholarship to explain dimensions of organizational behavior. Organizations 
represent central structures in society (Mills 1959) with the power to guide, enable, and constrain 
action (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1997); therefore, understanding their 
influences, operations, and structures can shed light on individual behavior. Organizations 
embody “social structures created by individuals to support the collaborative pursuit of specified 
goals” though definitions vary depending on disciplinary orientation and research motivation 
(Scott and Davis 2006: 11). Still, organizations generally have a common goal, established 
structures, and common routines for achieving their objectives. Organizations also create 
potential for accomplishing missions or tasks that would be impossible by individuals alone. For 
instance, conservation organizations facilitate the monitoring of fish spawning aggregation sites 
throughout PNG rather than the smaller number of sites that one individual could monitor.  
Organizations tend to follow rules or logics of “appropriateness” where organizational 
action and decision-making follows previous experience with similar situations (March and 
Olsen 1984; Alison and Zelikow 1999). Organizations typically have standard operating 
procedures that require individuals to act in particular ways in specific situations. Standard 
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procedures allow for quick, efficient decision-making so that any individual can perform 
individual tasks on any given day without consulting a chain of hierarchy; a marine scientist 
tagging whales according to an approved scientific protocol or a social scientist carrying out a 
participatory rural assessment, using an organizational handbook, exemplify such standard 
procedures. Further, organizations tend to reward staff who follow routinized and standardized 
practices, creating disincentives for other practices and limiting creativity and innovation, which 
can lead to broader organizational failure to adapt and change (Alison and Zelikow 1999).  
A large body of scholarship, particularly in organizational theory and sociology, 
investigates the influence of organizational culture 3  —the shared patterns of beliefs, 
expectations, and values—on individuals. Schein (1990) defines organizational culture “as (a) a 
pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it 
learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as 
the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (1990: 111). Schein 
(2011) emphasizes culture results in consensus and similar outlooks among individual 
employees. For instance, individuals may dress in a particular way, communicate concerns in a 
specific way, or raise new ideas following accepted patterns for sharing opinions. Similarly, 
O’Reilly and Chatman (1996) describe culture as a “social control system based on shared norms 
and values” that can influence focus, shape interventions, and guide attitudes and behavior 
(1996: 164). To these scholars, culture depends not only on rules and procedures but also on 
personal relationships and organizational hierarchies, representing a form of control based on 
scrutiny. In short, organizational culture constrains and shapes the action, behavior, and thought 
of individuals within an organization, defines the norms of acceptable behavior, influences 
organizational priorities, and shapes organizational interpretations of internal and external 
events.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Initial scholarship on organizational culture stemmed from an interest in explaining the relationship between 
culture and efficiency, using culture to explain why some corporations, such as Japanese firms, outperformed their 
competitors. This perspective emphasizes “culture [as] instrumentally developed so that employees internalize and 
accomplish specific company objectives” (Godwyn and Gittell 2011: 304). Similarly, Kreps (1990) stresses 
corporate culture must be consistently and simply communicated for employees to learn and follow it. 
Organizational theorists now recognize culture as one factor influencing organizational efficiency and performance. 
In contrast, neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) identifies legitimacy as important for 
organizational success (Thornton and Ocasio 2008).	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Sociologists refer to such norms as institutional “logics,” a set of organizing principles 
that provide actors in an organization with a sense of identity and vocabulary while still allowing 
for individual agency for individuals and organizations to elaborate upon, interpret, and 
manipulate these logics (e.g., Alford and Friedland 1985; Friedland and Alford 1991). Through 
logics, institutions shape behavior (Thornton and Ocasio 2008) and constrain individual and 
organizational action (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Friedland and 
Alford 1991). Thornton and Ocasio (2008) explain “institutional logics provide a link between 
individual agency and cognition and socially constructed institutional practices and rule 
structures” and stress institutional context “regularizes behavior and provides opportunities for 
agency and change” (2008: 101-2). Actors internal and external to an organization may shape 
organizational action, particularly in terms of status and legitimacy (see Suchman 1995). I use 
the concept of institutional logics to examine the potential for individuals to shape organizational 
norms and practices and for organizations to influence individual attitudes and behavior.  
Despite recognized benefits of M&E, including accountability and improvement, some 
scholars have problematized the idea of an “audit culture” (Strathern 2000), suggesting that these 
seemingly “good practices” of evaluation and measurement are not neutral. Instead, Strathern 
(2000) and others argue these practices have social consequences for governance and power. 
Power (1994) explains such audits facilitate Foucauldian ‘conduct of conduct,’ writing that 
“governments…have discovered that if they make explicit the practices whereby people check 
themselves, they can ostensibly withdraw to the position of simply checking the resultant 
indicators of performance” (cited in Strathern 2000: 4). This perspective suggests how audits 
shift responsibility to the performer, who complies with coercive pressure to “self-check.” 
Correspondingly, Shore and Wright assert that an “audit is essentially a relationship of power 
between the scrutinizer and the observed” (1999: 558). Further, the ways in which organizations 
themselves are accountable, such as to donors or boards of directors, can also influence 
individual behavior. 
 Scholarship examining the role of donor funding in shaping NGOs attributes the 
construction and maintenance of project success to donor pressure. For example, many scholars 
recognize the accountability of NGOs to their donors (Tendler 1982; Derman 1995; Wapner 
1995; Wapner 2002a; Wapner 2002b; Ebrahim 2003; Dorsey 2005; Kilby 2006). This 
scholarship has raised concerns about NGO accountability to local populations and unease about 
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the potential influence of donors in shaping NGO agendas and activities (see Benson 2012). 
Scholars identify mismatched timeframes between short-term donor projects and the comparably 
longer time necessary to achieve conservation objectives as additional challenges.  
More recently, scholars have drawn attention to quantitative indicators, rather than 
qualitative narratives, in evaluating performance. They question the type of knowledge such 
indicators, and the program that rely upon and evaluate them, produce (Merry 2011; Høyland et 
al 2011). Such indicators, as “technologies of global governance,” shape actions and decision-
making and have the potential to influence the distribution and exercise of power, producing 
knowledge and governance effects. Merry (2011) argues such effects transform civil society 
organizations by demanding quantification of their accomplishments. Though such 
accountability is valuable, its social processes and effects are still uncertain. In examining M&E 
processes, I consider M&E as potentially valuable for improving conservation practice while 
simultaneously investigating its potential for producing particular subjectivities and 
representations of reality and recognizing M&E has social consequences for governance and 
power. 
Such a study is particularly relevant in the field of conservation, which adopted project 
evaluation methods in the 1990s, relatively late in comparison to sectors such as education, 
poverty reduction or public health (Ferraro and Pattanayak 2006; Stem et al 2005). As one 
review article notes, “most conservation practitioners rely largely on anecdotal evidence, fashion, 
and gut feelings to select which strategies and tools to use” (Salafsky et al 2002: 1477). There are 
a few reasons why the field of conservation lags behind in evaluation. First, conservation 
evaluation involves natural and social aspects, requiring more complex forms of evaluation than 
single disciplinary evaluations. In addition, conservation evaluation is tricky because “the units 
acted on are often not the units conservation projects want to ultimately influence…conservation 
projects are often designed to influence individuals, governments, or societies but their impact is 
measured in terms of species and ecosystem health” (Margoluis et al 2009: 92). Conservation 
organizations also struggle to define indicators; they tend to focus on biodiversity condition as 
the conservation target and to measure success as the change in species numbers in a particular 
area. Such indicators may fail to account for external threats, such as consumer demand for fish 
or changing government policies. Further, such biodiversity-focused indicators may not be 
appropriate, cost-effective, or even feasible (Salafsky et al 2002). In addition, conservation 
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evaluation often fails to consider counterfactual outcomes to evaluate what types of interventions 
work and when (Ferraro and Pattanayak 2006). Finally, the size of conservation organizations 
represents a challenge. The capacity of organizations to systematically learn about the 
consequences of their actions generally decreases as the organization increases in size (van 
Ufford 1988) because of the number of individuals involved in such processes. Correspondingly, 
large conservation organizations with multiple offices may face greater challenges in 
implementing M&E.  
 Despite these challenges, conservation organizations have begun to recognize the 
importance of M&E for two key reasons: accountability and improvement (Margoluis et al 
2009). Accountability-focused evaluation serves to ensure that organizations account financially 
for their activities and implement promised activities and usually stems from a formal process 
required by donors. Improvement-focused evaluation aims to improve implementation and 
organizational, management, or project effectiveness. This improvement-focused evaluation is 
the focus of this chapter. I define M&E as the process through which organizations evaluate their 
practices and outcomes according to their mission and objectives.  
METHODS  
 This chapter relies on data from interviews personally conducted at WCO’s international 
headquarter office—“WCO Global”—in January 2010 and in PNG between January and 
December 2010 (n=13). I conducted semi-structured interviews at large, international NGOs 
(n=18) and smaller, national or local NGOs based in PNG (n=10). I also conducted interviews 
with donor organizations funding marine conservation projects in PNG (n=5). This chapter 
draws primarily on 36 interviews with staff from large, international NGOs and donor 
organizations.  
 I interviewed people from all bureaucratic levels, from organization directors to program 
staff, an approach that documents the multiple levels through which projects are shaped and 
influenced. Similar to the ways in which Corson (2010) and Sachedina (2010) conducted 
ethnographic research at both central organization offices and village levels to examine the inner 
workings of conservation, I conducted research at international, national and local offices to 
analyze if and how the attitudes and behavior of WCO employees to M&E varied. I observed 
many WCO activities, from internal WCO staff meetings to WCO activities in communities, 
which allowed me to observe WCO decision-making processes and interactions among staff and 
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between WCO staff and the communities in which they work. I also reviewed public WCO 
documents, such as press releases and website material, and internal documents, including 
strategic plans and workplans, and external project evaluations.  
 WCO is a large, international conservation NGO. It has an annual budget of hundreds of 
millions of dollars, employs thousands of people globally, and implements conservation projects 
around the world. Similarly, WCO’s organization structure is representative of large, 
international NGOs: it has an international headquarter office that interacts with national and 
field offices, including the WCO PNG national office and field offices described in this chapter. 
Like many international conservation NGOs, WCO Global receives funding from foundations, 
governments, businesses, and private donations. WCO PNG receives financial support from 
WCO Global for country specific activities and for regional initiatives and also raises its own 
project funding. To maintain anonymity, I use pseudonyms for the organization and its staff. 
 Figure One shows the multiple scales of WCO. WCO Global interacts with regional and 
national offices around the world, including the Asia-Pacific office and the Papua New Guinea 
national office and the Madang and Manus field offices shown on the left. WCO Global also has 
strategic program areas, such as its M&E unit, a marketing unit, and a conservation unit, that 
interact with regional, national and field offices around the world. Some of these strategic 
program areas have their own focus areas as well; for instance, the conservation unit includes 
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Figure One. WCO Organogram. 
 
RESULTS 
I present the results by first describing how individuals at multiple offices contribute to 
M&E processes. I next elucidate the assumptions that individuals at international and national 
offices make about M&E strategies and project design. I then describe efforts by staff at the 
international office to develop an M&E framework. Next, I identify two factors at the national 
level that resulted in failure to integrate M&E as an organizational process. Finally, I describe 
how these factors created an environment that discouraged critical reflection and emphasized 
maintaining an image of organizational and project success. 
At WCO Global, individuals define the ways in which organizational M&E processes 
should operate, sometimes in cooperation with regional offices. National offices have staff 
responsible for coordinating M&E among national projects and reporting to regional and 
international staff. Project and field staff are responsible for integrating M&E into their 
workplans, implementing activities that advance WCO goals, and reporting upon achievements. 
In theory, each individual within this M&E process helps to ensure that field level activities 
contribute to WCO’s mission and objectives.  
WCO’s approach to M&E shares a basic assumption of organizational scholarship, that 
collections of individuals will follow regular, defined procedures and routines to achieve a 
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common objective. WCO Global senior employees assume that individual staff incorporate 
M&E into project design and generally advance WCO’s overall goals by aligning their activities 
with organizational aims. During interviews, WCO Global staff described these assumptions.  
Tanya Russo, WCO’s Conservation Monitoring Manager, explained that WCO’s system 
allows offices “to say what enabled them to perform well and what hindered them from 
performing well…to show the relationship between good program design and achievement at the 
other end; so if [we aren’t] following best practices in how we design, does that translate into 
poor performance…” Liam Sullivan, WCO’s Monitoring and Evaluation Manager, agreed, 
stating that WCO’s guidelines “ask people to consider [intended goals and impacts] right up 
front.”  
Some WCO Global managers incorporated M&E at the beginning of projects. Sian 
Weeks, a WCO Global project manager, described how her project defined evaluation indicators 
from the start. The project developed a monitoring framework through a process where offices 
involved in the project worked with the WCO Global team to identify goals and priorities. 
Another WCO Global project manager described a project that began by “developing a strategy, 
looking at the key outcomes we want,” therefore defining its potential impact before carrying out 
project activities. Both projects exemplify the types of participatory, ex ante processes for 
incorporating M&E into project design that WCO Global managers assume occurs at its offices 
throughout the world. 
In contrast to WCO Global, WCO PNG managers viewed M&E as an activity to measure 
project outcomes after project completion. WCO PNG’s Conservation Director, Sally van Vliet, 
explained “at the end of each project you assess what has been achieved and what is the way 
forward and how does it fit in the broader framework of the program of the organization.” While 
she recognizes the importance of assessing project impacts within an organizational framework, 
she emphasizes ex post evaluation rather than ex ante evaluation. This national level assumption 
is typical of most evaluation, which means that organizations lack baseline data to evaluate 
change over time (Margoluis et al 2009). Conservation organizations often use this lack of 
baseline data to justify the need for conservation in the locations where they work. Such 
justification can become problematic when individuals experience pressure to produce 
evaluations that may not accurately reflect projects, a point I return to in the discussion. 
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WCO Global managers assumed WCO had a well-defined framework for ensuring that 
national offices contributed to WCO’s broader mission. WCO Global senior managers created 
the Conservation Strategy and Evaluation Office in 2008 to track national office performance 
and ensure an objective basis for evaluation. The unit’s six staff develop organizational standards 
on conservation achievements and financial performance and seek to ensure national offices 
follow M&E standards. Tanya Russo develops monitoring systems for WCO’s key global 
initiatives and helps national offices develop M&E strategies. Liam Sullivan assists national 
offices in designing strategies and planning their work. For example, he worked with WCO PNG 
staff to develop their 2008-2012 strategic plan. Liam’s role is to ensure national offices and 
individual staff reflect upon how activities and projects contribute to broader organizational 
goals. 
When Tanya Russo began investigating how WCO monitored its progress, she 
discovered “we have no reporting framework to design our programs, to tell us what we are 
really achieving.” WCO lacked a systematic planning framework that connected individual 
actions, project achievements, or national level outcomes to WCO’s performance. WCO’s 
national offices created their own strategic plans and workplans and national managers did not 
necessarily connect project activities to WCO’s mission and objectives. This structure resulted in 
a monitoring approach that Tanya described as everyone “doing their own thing” without coming 
together as a cohesive whole. Contrary to assumptions by WCO Global staff, WCO lacked an 
organizational planning and reporting framework and failed to ensure an overall, organizational 
strategy.  
Tanya explained the broader implications of this situation:  
it goes into this much bigger design or planning issues that needs to be addressed 
in the network, because we do not go about things in a systematic way when we 
plan our programs, so we do not connect a lot of the pieces together in a coherent 
framework: project to goals to program and goals. So at the end of the day we just 
have a lot of small and medium sized wins, and it is getting worrisome that we 
can’t say that this program in its entirety is going to achieve x and then we find 
out up to three years later we couldn’t do that, we couldn’t achieve x…Right now 
we have tiny little project achievements and outputs: stakeholder workshops, we 
have a commercial on tv. And you add it up and you think, ‘What did this 
program do?!’ 
This last comment underscores an important finding: WCO fails to achieve broader objectives 
because it has “small and medium sized wins,” such as a television commercial that raises 
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awareness on endangered species, that may not contribute to larger wins, such as reversing the 
endangered status of a species. Tanya further explained that WCO has well-trained, well-
educated staff but that coordinated communication among offices, programs, and projects was 
missing. She concluded WCO’s M&E processes did not ensure an overall strategy, nor did these 
processes contribute to understanding WCO achievements as a whole. Further, in the absence of 
a M&E framework to measure outcomes, managers and staff had no basis on which to identify 
and then address problematic results.   
When Tanya reported on this lack of coordination to WCO Global senior staff, she said 
they were shocked by the results. Their surprise confirms that senior staff assumed WCO had 
standard M&E operating procedures for measuring and evaluating its outcomes and guiding staff 
attitudes and behavior. One staff member admitted, after Tanya’s documentation of WCO’s lack 
of standard M&E procedures, he discovered WCO has “ended up falling about twenty years 
beyond the curve of M&E” without realizing it.  
The international perspective highlights how WCO Global staff believed well-defined 
frameworks were an important component in achieving WCO’s goals. As the findings of the 
Conservation Strategy and Performance Office underscore, however, these assumptions were not 
systematically matched by individual behavior of measuring and evaluating outcomes nor were 
these assumptions communicated to employees or presented as standard operational procedures 
or organizational norms throughout WCO. Communication of organizational assumptions is 
critical for a shared institutional logic on the importance of M&E to develop, as organizational 
scholars have demonstrated.  
To illustrate how the absence of shared logics on M&E processes produced particular 
attitudes and behavior towards implementation, I draw on interviews and observations from 
WCO national and local offices. Two factors at the national level illustrate why individuals did 
not integrate M&E processes into their daily routines. First, an organizational environment at the 
national level emphasized time in the office. Second, WCO PNG managers created an 
organizational environment that discouraged critical reflection and resulted in an environment 
where staff internalized organizational norms on producing images of success. 
The National Office Environment: Busy being busy 
The organizational environment in the WCO PNG office was one of busy, dedicated 
conservation officers working at their individual desks. Senior managers arrived at the office 
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before 7 or 8am many mornings, stayed late to connect with WCO Global staff or staff in other 
regions, or came in over the weekends to catch up on emails and paperwork. These managers set 
an expectation of long hours at the office, an expectation reinforced by occasional comments to 
staff when they left the office after 8 or 9 hours a day. On a typical weekend day, two to five 
managers or senior staff might be in the office. Junior staff described periodically being called on 
Saturday mornings and asked to come in for informal meetings with their supervisors who had 
not had time to meet with them during the week.  
Thomas McDermott, the former country director, described such expectations in terms of 
job commitment: “you make yourself available and you do not count your time.” He clarified, 
“You do not say sorry, it is half past 4, I am going now. And if someone calls you at 10 at night 
or to meet on a Sunday, you deal with that because that is part of the job.” This environment 
emphasized the total amount of time spent at work rather than recognizing efficiency or 
rewarding productivity, in part because managers can more easily observe and measure 
employee inputs, such as time, than subjective outputs such as productivity. Additionally, as 
several junior staff stressed, the country director was highly unorganized and unable to prioritize 
tasks. His long hours did not necessarily equate with productivity or outputs but rather with a 
failure to efficiently organize and prioritize work. In summary, the organizational environment 
encouraged long hours at the office, including coming in on evenings or weekends, and lacked 
an emphasis on efficiency or prioritizing activities, including M&E, which contributed to a 
façade of success that I address in the discussion. This emphasis on input (time spent in the 
office), rather than on output (efficiency or prioritization), is common at NGO offices in PNG. 
Further, in the absence of a focus on prioritizing tasks, many busy staff did not make time 
for M&E or prioritize it as part of their everyday work. Fredah Donigi, WCO’s Community 
Forestry Officer, who is also WCO PNG’s M&E coordinator, explained “everyone is so caught 
up in ‘I have to do this and this’ and not enough [reflecting] is done and sit down and look at 
what we have done and should we continue doing this or should we change our approach or why 
are we not doing this…and why are we not achieving this...” Similarly, Indira said the office was 
“constantly producing lessons learned reports” and other internal and donor reports without 
focusing on learning or examining their “conservation paradigms and ways of working” to 
evaluate if they were effective. These comments illustrate how staff fail to reflect upon how their 
tasks contribute to larger WCO aims.  
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Tanya Russo’s concerns about tiny project achievements underscore how project staff 
may be busy without necessarily contributing to broader goals. For instance, a project may 
organize a village soccer tournament as part of its community engagement activities. Project staff 
might spend one month or more busily coordinating the tournament: double-checking the list of 
players, visiting community facilitators, ensuring sufficient refreshments, or reporting to their 
supervisors about progress. If the managers and staff viewed M&E as a priority, one of the first 
steps would be to consider how a soccer tournament contributes to conservation goals. A soccer 
tournament may be an effective way to improve trust between communities and WCO and to 
raise awareness about conservation, but such activities could just as easily fall into Tanya’s 
classification of “what did this project do?!” 
Such an organizational environment exemplifies a working style one WCO Global 
manager described as employees who are “busy being busy.” Liam Sullivan explained “people 
are busy being busy and one of the key priorities for me is to shut down their busyness because I 
do not know that they are busy on the right things.” His statement aptly characterizes the WCO 
PNG office: individual employees stay at their desks for long hours, meeting their supervisors 
expectations, without necessarily focusing their efforts or contributing to larger conservation 
impacts.  
Further, many staff felt their responsibilities consisted of two or three full time jobs. For 
instance, one staff member managed a site-based forest project and the climate change, payments 
for ecosystem services, and REDD initiatives, which involved policy engagement at the national 
level. There are a few reasons why staff may have, or feel they have, multiple responsibilities. In 
the first case, WCO combined two job responsibilities, a decision reflecting multiple institutional 
desires and insufficient funding for two employees. In other cases, staff responsibilities may 
develop into larger workloads. Finally, as in many types of organizations, staff with a 
commitment to the organization and its mission often took on responsibilities they felt were 
necessary and not being done by others. For example, one employee rewrote WCO PNG’s HR 
policy because he discovered it lacked necessary safeguards and the HR staff had not taken the 
initiative to revise it. Such efforts can place strain on individual workloads and force staff to 
make choices about activities on which they spend time. Because WCO PNG managers did not 
communicate M&E as a critical responsibility, busy staff members did not choose to devote 
significant effort to it. 
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Paul Smith, a former Terrestrial Manager, exemplifies such an employee. He explained 
he appreciated WCO Global’s M&E and strategic planning staff, who encouraged staff to 
integrate M&E practices into their everyday work, but “I was doing three jobs and I was so sick 
of reporting and of [WCO Global] changing the reporting formats every five minutes so you 
have to redraft.” For him and other national staff with competing responsibilities, M&E reporting 
was often seen as burdensome, particularly in the absence of explicit incentives for critical 
reflection.  
Incentives and Motivations 
 While WCO PNG’s organizational environment encourages time spent at the office and 
does not emphasize M&E as a standard operating procedure, the gap between WCO Global’s 
desire for a cohesive M&E framework and WCO PNG’s limited attention to M&E is also related 
to WCO’s structure and the social interactions between WCO PNG managers and staff. Many 
employees said WCO does not reward employees for critical reflection. For example, Annamaria 
Barrera, a WCO Global marine manager, said  
There are no incentives to take time to reflect, forget planning, look at M&E and 
there is no incentive to reflect and learn from mistakes in an explicit 
organizational way. If someone does it, it is because they are conscientious and 
they want to learn and they want to adapt and improve…the incentives are to 
wrap up the project and package it for your donors and get some more money. 
WCO PNG staff agreed there was little encouragement to reflect on activities or evaluate 
achievements and said that WCO PNG managers did not communicate M&E as a priority. Paul 
Smith said the PNG office “didn’t have enough M&E for our projects and programs.” Similarly, 
Indira Bhatnagar, a WCO PNG project manager, believed WCO PNG did not prioritize M&E. 
She said “we do not spend enough time [evaluating whether projects achieve their goals]…it is 
not built in at the beginning of the workplans…no one has ever said that [M&E indicators] 
should be in the workplan, or here is the M&E structure that you should look at.”  
At the same time, senior managers also expressed concern that WCO was failing to orient 
its activities towards larger goals. Sally van Vliet said one challenge was “getting the local [staff] 
to think not just about their small, specific area but to think more broadly about the program, so 
the difference between the more regional planning versus local, site specific.” These comments 
illustrate that WCO PNG staff and managers recognized the absence of M&E approaches: staff 
describe managers who do not encourage them to prioritize M&E in their daily work while 
managers feel staff do not think broadly enough. Together, these perspectives suggest an 
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organizational environment where M&E was not a regular routine and motivation for critical 
reflection was absent, which resulted in differences between WCO Global M&E intentions and 
WCO PNG practices.  
Failure or Modest Gains? Pressure against critical reflection 
While staff agree critical reflection is absent at the national level, busyness and limited 
incentives only partially explain organizational failure to evaluate how national activities 
contribute to broader WCO goals. In contrast with the findings of scholarship on NGO-donor 
accountability, my interviews with NGO and donor staff show pressure to emphasize success 
also comes from within conservation organizations. Indira described the emphasis senior 
managers placed in appearing successful to donors:  
I feel a lot of pressure to put positive spins on things. Definitely. And that is 
institutionalized as well. When you sit with your boss who has 25 years of 
experience and he changes the wording in your workplans to make it sound more 
positive when you should say this is total disaster…you need to say it did not 
work because of this and this, rather than say we achieved some modest gains in 
this part of the workplan, which is complete bullshit, sometimes…the kind of 
annual or quarterly reports we have to do on progress, they have to be channeled 
through the conservation director and sitting down with him to go through some 
of the reports, a lot of the wording was changed, the way progress was stated or 
not stated in the process. So, rather than words like failure, which sometimes is a 
perfectly acceptable word to use, it is changed into, you know, only modest gains 
were made…I think it is, well, it is not true actually and it is a pretense that 
everyone carries on…it is sort of institutionalized lying. 
Indira said she believed managers promoted a “total lack of reflexivity” in WCO because 
“people are desperately trying not to tell the donors we are doing a bad job.” Further, when her 
managers removed language that described implementation challenges, they actively discouraged 
critical reflection. Such actions result in minimal motivation for junior staff to reflect upon 
challenges or to describe activities that did not go as expected. This situation illustrates how 
more powerful, senior employees shaped the type of knowledge produced by WCO PNG, 
promoting particular project interpretations and eliminating others in both internal WCO and 
donor reports. Further, by describing “modest” gains in the project, managers articulated just 
enough progress to argue for further action and continued funding. This type of behavior hinders 
M&E processes because information provided to WCO Global, donors, or others may not 
accurately reflect projects.  
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 One donor official stressed her organization tried to encourage “honest, reflective 
conversation” with its grantees. Mathieu Rousseau, another grant officer in PNG, agreed, saying 
“there is this transparency, we know that things change and sometimes you have to be flexible, 
flexible in terms of activities you have foreseen to do.” Jane Hopkins, another donor official, said 
pressure to present a successful organizational image “comes down to this element of donor 
pressure to get things done but also internal pressure to get things done.”4 Jane further elaborated 
how internal organizational politics shape potential organizational success:  
The biggest challenge we are having with how effective our grants have been is 
that the organizations themselves have to get their own internal problems and 
challenges sorted out. Until they get the right staff in place, that stay for more 
than a year, that are happy, they are working in a place where they are supported, 
until they have a leader that they respect, all of that, until that gets put in place, we 
will not be able to be successful because they are going through all of these 
problems…at the end of the day, if the organization cannot deliver in the 
management activities and with the community, then we are not going to achieve 
the conservation we want. 
While organizations still experience donor pressure to achieve successful outcomes, my 
findings show conservation organizations have internalized pressure to demonstrate success and 
that managers place pressure on their employees to report success. This organizational culture of 
constructing and maintaining success can shape individual behavior to report success, as Indira 
described. Further, these organizational politics also shape potential conservation success, as 
Jane’s statement underscores. 
 It is important to note, however, that attitudes towards reporting success vary within 
different WCO offices. At WCO PNG, Indira described how her supervisors changed her reports 
to describe “modest gains” rather than challenges or failure. In contrast, WCO Global staff 
expressed interest in learning about mistakes. Liam Sullivan said, “when I am working with 
teams, training or designing, we learn a lot more from mistakes than successes. So I say, how 
about we hear about everything, I want to know all about it…” Liam’s belief in the importance 
of sharing challenges and failures contrasts with the approach of WCO PNG’s Country Director 
and the Conservation Director. These differing attitudes at international and national offices 
suggest the emergence of competing institutional logics within WCO, a point I return to in the 
following discussion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 These statements represent the perspectives of individuals in the donor communities of themselves and their 
actions; grantees may not share this perspective of donors as welcoming honest, reflective conversations.	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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This chapter identifies and analyzes the lack of coordination and shared institutional 
logics among international, national and local WCO offices on M&E practices. WCO Global 
managers valued M&E processes as a method of performance evaluation, tried to integrate M&E 
into WCO’s overall structure, and welcomed critical reflection on project challenges. In contrast, 
WCO PNG managers possessed different institutional logics: they valued the time their 
employees spent in the office and their job commitment and explicitly discouraged discussion of 
challenges in project and donor reports. In addition, when WCO PNG managers described 
program evaluation, they described it as ex post evaluation that happened after the project 
occurred, rather than the type of ex ante evaluation that WCO Global preferred. These different 
institutional logics, rather than a single, common belief on M&E practices, illustrate the 
heterogeneity of beliefs within WCO and underscore WCO’s failure to communicate an 
organizational culture of valuing M&E. As organizational scholarship suggests, organizational 
culture must be taught to staff for shared values and norms to develop; in the absence of WCO 
Global leadership on and communication about such norms, WCO Global failed to ensure that 
employees valued M&E as an important organizational process.  
These different institutional logics have two implications for WCO’s conservation 
practice more generally. First, they illustrate the challenges of translating WCO Global’s 
priorities into WCO PNG projects and activities. The involvement and decisions of WCO 
managers and staff at so many levels allowed competing logics to develop, resulting in 
implementation challenges. Second, these different institutional logics have consequences for the 
power and influence of WCO Global. WCO PNG staff said they pay more attention to the 
expectations and priorities of their immediate supervisors than to those of WCO Global, which 
means that WCO Global managers’ beliefs on the value of M&E have less influence with WCO 
PNG staff, particularly because WCO PNG managers do not emphasize the value of M&E to 
their staff. 
WCO’s M&E processes have additional social consequences for governance and power. 
First, when WCO PNG managers changed descriptions of project challenges in internal WCO or 
donor reports, these managers simplified project knowledge to emphasize success and justify 
WCO’s particular approaches and positioned themselves, rather than project staff, as experts. 
This action shaped staff attitudes and behavior on the types of knowledge they were expected to 
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produce and placed staff in a relation of dominance, limiting their autonomy. Second, when 
managers pressure staff to produce reports that emphasize success, describing “modest gains” 
rather than challenges or failure, these reports produce incomplete pictures of project 
achievement, or “institutionalized lying,” and facilitate partial understandings of conservation 
practice and impact. By failing to effectively measure, much less address, how its project 
activities contribute to larger impacts, WCO misses an opportunity to use M&E to learn from its 
activities and improve organizational, management, or project effectiveness.  
Foucault (1977) demonstrates that oversight produces individuals who regulate their own 
behavior and eventually conform to the norms of conduct desired by institutions or supervisors. 
From this perspective, when conservation managers place pressure on staff to produce positive 
reports, staff are likely to begin constructing such reports, even in the absence of external 
coercion, becoming the self-checking evaluation performers that Power (2005) describes. Indeed, 
over time, WCO staff described how they limited descriptions of project challenges in their 
reports and instead produced reports that they knew would meet their supervisors’ expectations, 
even if these reports were not actually true. This finding suggests that organizational and 
managerial pressure to report success is greater than donor pressure, a finding that expands 
understandings of NGO-donor dynamics.  
The social production of success is also shown through the focus on time, rather than 
impact, in WCO’s PNG office. When WCO PNG senior managers encouraged long office hours 
without emphasizing efficiency or productivity, they created an organizational environment that 
valued busy, dedicated staff without simultaneously communicating the importance of M&E, 
prioritizing conservation outcomes, or encouraging staff to define or measure desired outcomes 
or to reflect on whether or not their conservation approaches worked. As one staff member 
described, WCO PNG tended to continue to do the same activities and write similarly worded 
reports without considering alternative ways of working or alternative conservative paradigms. 
More broadly, this analysis elucidates how M&E processes can become technologies of 
global governance that “convey an aura of objective truth” (Merry 2011: 84) while 
simultaneously concealing the politics of their production. For instance, when WCO managers 
and staff choose which information to include in project reports, they decide what information is 
shared and what information is excluded in a way that demonstrates impact and effectiveness 
using clear, seemingly objective indicators and measurements. Managers’ desire to present a 
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positive representation of WCO to donors and others in order to secure WCO’s reputation as a 
successful organization likely influence decisions about included information, as Indira 
suggested. Further, as Merry (2011) points out, when WCO selects information to include in 
their reports (or even lies about its accomplishments), they also define how their 
accomplishments and effectiveness are measured. This finding suggests how M&E, which the 
field of conservation originally promoted to ensure accountability and improvement, may result 
in entirely different effects, such as selective or even inaccurate constructions of knowledge and 
subjective measurement. This finding also underscores some limitations of M&E; when 
managers and staff selectively choose what information to include, their reports become a 
particular representation of a project that they wish to present, rather than a M&E report. In this 
way, the practice of M&E does not necessarily accomplish accountability-focused or 
improvement-focused M&E and instead results in the social production of success. 
NGOs face an additional disincentive to report on their challenges and failures because of 
competition for funding among NGOs, even if donors say they are receptive to more honest 
reporting. For instance, if WCO produced donor reports describing their failure to achieve 
marine conservation objectives and another NGO reported to the same donor that it was 
successfully managing marine areas in partnership with local communities, the donor would be 
more likely to continue to support the “successful” organization, even if WCO provided 
legitimate explanations for its challenges. This pressure to remain competitive with their peers is 
likely another contributing factor that explains why NGOs construct effectiveness and impact. 
Another reason WCO PNG managers may have discouraged critical reflection is to 
minimize evaluations that challenge underlying organizational or project assumptions. 
Problematic evaluations that threaten a project’s successful image may not be looked upon 
favorably, as other scholars have demonstrated. van Ufford (1988) concluded it was important 
for all actors within Dutch donor agencies to show a common rationality and demonstrate that 
everything was going well: “showing that a consistent policy had been executed was in the 
interests of all concerned: project staff, directors, government. If together they could construct an 
image of a well-organized machine, they could count on continued autonomy with regard to 
decision-making…It was in everyone’s interests that a picture of smooth development 
administration be presented by the staffs to their directors, by the directors to the Ministry and in 
turn by the Ministry to Parliament” (1988: 91). Similarly, Mosse (2004; 2005) showed how the 
	   33	  
success of a UK Department for International Development (DFID) agriculture project in India 
depended not on its activities but on constant translation by project brokers who ensure project 
coherence. Project policy changes were the result of ruptures in the project’s social relationships: 
“the alliances, the mediators, the chains of translations, interests, and agendas that are tied up in 
the project...the failure in interpretation is a social failure” that occurred when the project’s 
brokering networks and group of believers fell apart (Mosse 2005: 184). This anthropological 
scholarship underscores how organizations depend on networks of individuals to present a 
cohesive picture of a project or policy. In the case of WCO, varying staff attitudes and behavior 
towards M&E resulted in competing logics among different WCO offices and failure to ensure 
organizational coherence on the value of M&E. 
At the same time, M&E, as a technology of global governance, has the potential to 
transform conservation practice by orienting organizations towards defining and quantifying 
their accomplishments. WCO aims to address complex conservation challenges, such as saving 
critically endangered species and conserving threatened habitats, but appears to lack high-level 
leadership to communicate its aims and intended norms to its employees throughout its multiple 
offices. M&E represents one mechanism through which WCO could coordinate its multiple 
offices, programs, and projects to focus on activities that will address key conservation 
challenges. If, however, managers fail to recognize the potential for M&E to produce particular 
representations of reality and do not encourage critical reflection among staff, M&E is more 
likely to become a technology of global governance that fails to make organizations such as 
WCO more accountable or more effective. 
 Although the data in this chapter illustrate varying attitudes and behavior towards M&E 
and competing institutional logics within WCO, these data does not necessarily assume that 
WCO did not achieve success in its projects or that WCO’s activities consistently failed to 
achieve larger impacts. As Ferguson’s (1990) seminal work highlights, and Mosse (2005) 
confirms, a project that does not achieve its stated aims still has important effects and 
consequences. Rather, this chapter shows how WCO failed to communicate a common logic on 
prioritizing M&E practices across its multiple offices, which has implications for WCO’s long-
term success as well as conservation implementation more broadly. Without senior-level 
prioritization of M&E and incentives for critical reflection, such reflection is less likely to occur, 
which means WCO also misses an opportunity to identify and address problematic outcomes. It 
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is possible, as the WCO Global Marine Manager points out, that an employee may reflect upon 
his mistakes, because he is conscientious, interested in learning, or recognizes a need for 
improvement. As WCO’s Conservation Monitoring Manager says, however, at an organizational 
level, “star soldiers” need direction in how to storm fortress walls: this chapter illustrates this 
lack of senior-level direction in coordinating M&E across WCO’s international, national, and 
local offices, resulting in broader failure to measure progress and reflect upon outcomes. 
Moreover, this chapter advances critical reflection on evaluation and measurement within the 
field of conservation by showing how staff at a large, international conservation NGO construct 
effectiveness and impact and highlighting some of the limitations of M&E.  
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CHAPTER THREE: The implications of governance-at-a-distance: 
Understanding individual decision-making in conservation projects 
INTRODUCTION  
Manus is the northern most province in Papua New Guinea (PNG). To travel from Port 
Moresby, PNG’s capital, to one of the World Conservation Organization5 (WCO)’s project sites, 
you first fly to Los Negros island, which adjoins Lorengau, the capital of Manus province. Then, 
you take a bus from Los Negros towards Manus Island. At “The Lonely Bridge,” you board a 
boat for an eight-hour trip to Mbuke Island. If you leave Port Moresby in the morning, you have 
a chance of arriving at the project site just after night falls. When I visited WCO’s project site in 
Mbuke, I learned that no WCO manager based in Port Moresby had ever visited this project site. 
I later learned that few WCO staff even visited WCO’s project in Madang, a more easily 
accessed location on PNG’s north coast. 
I was the only person to visit both of WCO’s marine project sites in Madang and Mbuke, 
according to field staff, a situation which illustrates the limited extent to which WCO project 
managers visit field sites. Instead, managers increasingly rely upon modern forms of 
communication to manage conservation projects and stay informed on developments in the field. 
Whether it is phone calls between national and field staff, Skype calls among staff in different 
countries, or email communication among staff, managers at large, international conservation 
NGOs6 typically rely on means of communication that allow them to mange projects from a 
distance, a management style that I term “governance-at-a-distance.” As one staff member put it, 
“the conservation director and the country representative have not been to all of the projects that 
they are supposedly running, so there is really no connection between management and project 
staff. How are the messages meant to get up from the field to the management level?” This 
chapter examines the prevalence and effects of such governance-at-a-distance management styles 
to better understand managers’ intentions and project activities and outcomes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The name of this organization and of all individuals are pseudonyms.	  
6 Here, I specifically refer to managers at large, international NGOs, sometimes referred to as BINGOs or Big 
International NGOs. This trend is not applicable to the national NGOs in PNG, which tend to operate more locally.	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This chapter analyzes governance-at-a-distance management strategies using a case study 
of WCO’s marine project in Mbuke’s community managed marine area, which includes a marine 
turtles protection component. This project is staffed by one Mbuke villager and managed by the 
Marine Manager, who is based in Madang, with overall oversight by the Country Director and 
Conservation Director, both of whom are based in WCO PNG’s national office in Port Moresby. 
To investigate the consistency between what project managers believe is occurring, what field 
staff claim to be doing, and what marine conservation projects accomplish in practice, I describe 
how managers envision this project at the national level and then examine marine conservation 
efforts in Mbuke.  
I identify and describe five factors that emerge when managers employ governance-at-a-
distance strategies. First, I suggest governance-at-a-distance allows managers to envision Papua 
New Guineans as ideal partners in conservation efforts and to develop a vision of Papua New 
Guineans as model environmental subjects, who will actively participate in conservation efforts 
based on their environmental convictions. Second, I describe how socio-cultural and 
communication differences between managers and field staff limit honest dialogue and complete 
understandings of project activities. Third, I show how governance-at-a-distance also results in 
social distance. Fourth, I illustrate inconsistencies between managers’ stated beliefs about the 
importance of understanding field realities and their actions. Finally, I address personal choices 
that affect staff availability, as well as more general constraints, such as time and resources that 
contribute to the prevalence of governance-at-a-distance management strategies. These factors 
illustrate some of the difficulties and misperceptions managers may encounter when they employ 
governance-at-a-distance management strategies. 
This chapter is organized in five sections, including the introduction. The theoretical 
framework considers political ecology, governmentality and environmentality, scholarship on 
disjunctures between intentions and actions, and development scholarship on the social lives of 
professionals. The methods section describes the data collection and analysis. The results section 
identifies and describes the five above-mentioned challenges that arise when managers employ 
governance-at-a-distance management styles, highlighting the entrenched nature of some of 
these challenges. I then propose two explanations for why managers govern from a distance: to 
maintain a national presence and to avoid addressing field complexities. The final section 
presents conclusions.  
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter builds upon political ecology, governmentality and environmentality, 
scholarship on disjunctures between intentions and actions, and development scholarship on the 
social lives of professionals to understand how organizations shape the actions, assumptions and 
motivations of individual conservation professionals. Political ecology scholarship explores the 
complex social relationships of conservation and development and places emphasis on how local 
people may articulate specific indigenous identities to benefit from, engage with, and contest or 
negotiate conservation or resist and subvert power and authority.7 This scholarship also shows 
how the subjects of such interventions learn to redefine the original intentions of conservation or 
development programs to suit their own interests or even renegotiate programs if their interests 
change.8 Tsing (1999), for example, illustrates how Meratus Dayaks in Indonesia represent 
themselves as “tribal elders” to conservationists and other ‘green development’ actors by 
utilizing globally circulating categories in their own way.9 These collaborations between tribal 
elders and green development actors allow for political agency of both sets of actors, 
underscoring Tsing’s point that the Dayaks, or similar communities, may “mold their own 
actions strategically” (1999: 159). On the whole, this scholarship highlights the ways in which 
local communities may position themselves to benefit from conservation, an insight that I 
consider when examining the actions of Papua New Guinean villagers. 
Second, a body of scholarship on governmentality—the “conduct of conduct” (Gordon 
1991: 2; Foucault 1991)—examines the practices through which subjects are governed and the 
ways governments attempt to produce subjects best suited to the aims of government (see Rose 
1990; Ferguson 1990; Gupta 1998; Dean 2009; Bryant 2002). Agrawal (2005) uses the term 
“environmentality” to investigate how power/knowledge, institutions, and subjectivities are 
constituted and shaped by each other. I draw upon the concepts of governmentality and 
environmentality to examine how conservation managers attempt to shape Papua New Guinean 
villagers to be interested in and supportive of marine conservation efforts. I also consider the 
ways in which Foucault’s notions of power enable and constrain individuals (1991; 1988; 1979; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See for example Sundberg (2006); Doolittle (2006); Dove (2006); Hirtz (2003); Li (2000); Tsing (1999); Moore 
(1997); Scott (1990). 
8 Scott (1989) emphasizes the limitations of speaking truth to power, urging scholars to be aware not just of public 
transcripts, the “open interaction between subordinates and those who dominate,” but also more elusive, hidden 
transcripts, or “power spoken behind the back of the dominant.” 
9	  Other scholars caution that such indigenous articulations must be carefully navigated (e.g., Dove 2006).	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1977). For instance, conservation managers have the power to make management decisions, but 
the range of their decisions may be constrained by factors such as organizational objectives or 
donor agendas.  
Third, some scholars have begun to observe differences between what organisations 
claim to do and their actual practices. Carrier and West (2009: ix) suggest such gaps and 
inconsistencies have become “the normal state of affairs” rather than evidence of particularly 
difficult projects or exceptional situations. Mosse supports this perspective, writing “the 
disjuncture between policy and practice is not an unfortunate gap to be bridged between intention 
and action; it is a necessity, actively maintained and reproduced by knowledge systems (2004: 
97). I build upon this scholarship on disjunctures between intentions and achievements to 
investigate how well designed projects can unfold in entirely unexpected directions.  
Finally, while scholars of conservation have paid little attention to the relationship 
between institutions and individuals and to how institutions produce particular types of 
individuals (but see Agrawal 2005), a growing number of development scholars have begun to 
consider the social lives of development professionals and to write about the experiences, 
motivations, and worldviews of these actors (Fechter and Hindman 2011; Mosse 2011).10 Lewis 
(2008; 2011), for instance, uses life history methods to investigate how work histories influence 
individual motivations to work in government or non-government sectors and how individual 
backgrounds result in particular worldviews. Lewis (2011) found “weakening social and family 
networks” influenced workers’ decisions to leave international field postings and return home 
(2011: 189). These workers explained that, after a long time away, they sensed weakening ties 
with their friends and family “back home” and wanted to “go back home and start investing in 
personal relationships” (2011: 190). Such scholarship suggests how individual interests can 
influence managers’ decisions as well as showing how these interests may change over time. 
This scholarship also illustrates pressures individuals may face from their organizations 
or superiors. Eyben (2011), for instance, documents the pressure development workers faced to 
have a presence in the capital in order to maintain good relationships with other donor 
representatives. Eyben writes “the importance of ‘being there’ resulted in development workers 
who spent the overwhelmingly majority of their time in capitals, working and socializing with an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Similarly, sociologists show how business schools produce particular types of individuals likely to make similar 
decisions (Khurana 2010) and illustrate how managers learn from each other (Jackall 1998).	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insular community of donor representatives and a handful of Bolivian consultants and 
government officials, rather than getting to know the country and its people in any broader 
sense” (2011: 141). She highlights the effect of this pressure on the perspectives and actions of 
development professionals: they “stay on the edge, rather than fully engage with diverse cultural 
experiences…[becoming] internally ‘monocultural’” because of their failure to socialize outside 
of their own small world (2011: 152). Similarly, Rajak and Stirrat note the typical social lives of 
expatriate workers limit external perspectives because these workers do not engage in the daily 
life of the country but rather create a “social cocoon, socializing with each other and 
reproducing…differences between the expatriates and the host community” (2011: 169). 
Eyben also describes how development professionals avoid reality checks to minimize 
knowledge or information that contradicts dominant knowledge within the donor community. 
She writes “the local is messy because it reveals complexities and particularities that obscure the 
simplicity of the targets” (2011: 154). In one instance, Eyben discovered the local situation 
challenged the current aid policies and wrote a summary of her field visit for her supervisors. 
She never received a response and speculated her supervisors “did not want to know about the 
complexity of the local that contradicted pre-established global policy objectives” (2011: 153). 
Her experience suggests field visits may be uncommon because these visits present professionals 
with insights that challenge or contradict current approaches or priorities. Likewise, Rajak and 
Stirrat write “field trips are carefully orchestrated by counterparts at various levels…only very 
rarely does the field visit throw up new knowledge or new issues” (2011: 173). In addition, 
managers may not gain an understanding of project complexities during a short field visit, which 
can resemble “development tourism” (Chambers 1995). I build upon these development studies 
within the field of conservation to advance understanding on the role of professionals in 
conservation interventions and to analyze the organizational pressures that shape the actions, 
assumptions, and motivations of conservation professionals.  
METHODS 
Interview sample 
This chapter uses data from semi-structured interviews personally conducted in PNG 
between January and December 2010, at NGO and government offices, as well as with other key 
stakeholder groups. Table 1 illustrates the number of interviews I conducted by sector. NGO 
interviews include representation from both large, international NGOs and smaller, national or 
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local NGOs based in PNG. All donor organizations interviewed fund marine conservation 
projects in PNG. While each interview informed my understanding of marine conservation 
efforts in PNG, this chapter draws primarily on interviews with staff from large, international 
NGOs (n=31) and from interviews and discussions with Mbuke island villagers. As in the 
previous chapter, all names are pseudonyms and some genders were changed to protect 
individual identities.  
 To understand WCO goals and priorities, I also reviewed public WCO documents, such 
as press releases and website material, and internal documents, including strategic plans and 
workplans, and external project evaluations.  
Table One. Number of Interviews conducted by sector. 
Sector         Number 
Headquarter offices of NGOs  13 
International NGOs in PNG 18 
National or local NGOs in PNG 10 
National Fisheries Authority 22 
Department of Environment and Conservation 9 
Provincial government 13 
Other government 7 
Donor organizations 5 
Dive, surf, and general tourism industry 12 
Academics 5 
Other stakeholders 6 
Madang, Manus, and New Ireland villagers 436 
 
Analysis 
Using Nvivo9, I coded my interview data and field notes to identify overall categories 
and themes that I used to develop a codebook. I then coded each interview based on the 
identified themes. I developed my coding methodology following qualitative coding methods 
(Auerbach and Silverstein 2003; Corbin and Strauss 2008; Richards 2009; Saldana 2009).  
Management strategies and styles emerged as an important category of discussion in 
interviews with NGO staff from all over PNG. I identified 14 distinct types of management when 
coding my interview data (Table 2). I define management strategies as strategies managers 
utilize to achieve specific conservation outcomes when overseeing projects and working with 
staff. These strategies are distinct from organizational strategies, which represent a more broad 
strategy promoted by the organization. To ensure accurate identification of management 
strategies, I recoded each interview while only looking for reference to management. I coded text 
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from interviews when managers described their own strategies and when staff described their 
managers’ styles and strategies.  
Managers may utilize more than one management strategy since not all strategies are 
mutually exclusive. For instance, a manager may employ a top-down management style but also 
promote a performance-focused style. Other strategies, such as top-down management and 
inclusive management, are not complementary. Further, some types of management, such as 
non-adaptive management or micro-management, may not be an intended strategy by managers 
but were discussed by managers or staff in interviews. Therefore, the table below describes both 
intended and unintended management strategies. 
Table Two. Management styles and representative quotes 
Management Styles Data (Illustrative quotations from interviews) 
adaptive management: uses 
management as a tool for learning, 
experimenting, and monitoring  
 
“There are always things which are changing, the important thing is 
to adapt, so we have absolutely no objection to modifying, to 
adapting the project in the course of its implementation…we are 
pretty flexible.” 
non-adaptive management: 
failure to adapt management style 
to the situation; pre-determined or 
rigid management  
“I am not sure that we learn particularly well from what we have 
done in the past…sometimes we do the same things… adaptive 
cycle of program management should theoretically be built in…but 
it often isn’t. 
building personal relationships: 
explicitly implementing strategies 
to include staff or to ensure staff 
happiness; trusting staff opinions; 
relying on personal relationships 
“I have been focusing on the staff…making sure their work is going 
well and keeping them happy …focusing on their needs and getting 
them going, establishing relationships.”  
community focused: prioritizing 
communities and people  
“Our agenda is to help people conserve their land and we have to be 
very conscious with the communities…if the community has 
another problem that is more immediate, then let them work on that 
and then we can do conservation later.”  
 
“Conservation is 10% and 90% is about community 
relationships…if you get your community relationships right, things 
will fall into place so I give priority to that.” 
ensuring best practices: defining 
goals based on evidence, either in 
field site or from conservation 
literature; ensuring professional, 
goal-oriented planning 
 
“My strategy here [is]… to facilitate a process where project aims 
can be put into paper, into goals, milestones, objectives, log 
frames.” 
 
“We tried to conceptualize a program management approach… to 
develop best practices that could be then really applied by every 
[WCO] project and program…a standard that is a 
recommended…from defining goals and objectives and coming up 
with operational plans.”  
field presence: ensuring or 
prioritizing individual or 
organizational presence at the local 
level 
“My strategy here…is to go out to the guys, to the marine guys and 
really get the information.” 
 
“You need to have presence on the ground...you need a visit…so 
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 people know you exist, that you are interested in them and you 
reassure them that you know that they exist.” 
 
delegation: opposite of field 
presence relying on other 
organizations to provide 
information about field situation  
“We will really be playing the coordinating role, we will not be on 
the ground doing the implementation. Our job will be made easier 
by our partners on the ground and we will just coordinate the 
information…we have this new structure that is really going away 
from the field focus.”  
 
inclusive management: soliciting 
staff opinions and involving staff 
in decision-making; including 
consultative processes 
 
“Everything has to be really consultative in [WCO]…everything 
needs to have buy in and I went through this long consultative 
process from project staff to senior management staff and all these 
offices.” 
 
“My biggest thing is to work really hard on creating space, so that 
the staff feel ownership of the project and [contribute] their ideas 
and thinking…I do that in a bunch of ways…I don’t come up with 
the ideas, but I often manage the process so that everyone’s ideas 
can come out.” 
“make myself redundant”: an 
intention to build staff capacity and 
work his way out of a job  
“When I walk away, I [want to leave] behind me a team of local 
people…my objective here is to make myself redundant… you have 
a duty to build capacity in the places that you go to.” 
 
management at a distance: 
managing a project via email, 
phone, Skype without visiting or 
observing the project  
“We just pay Samuel’s salary and no management or 
oversight…there is no money to go there.” 
 
“The on the ground management was absolutely appalling…[the 
director] had no connection with [field staff]. He refused to leave 
[the city].” 
 
“We try and do a lot of our work virtually for both carbon footprint 
and for cost reasons, so some travel, but most of it is from here, we 
do big video conferences, telephone calls, emails.”  
micro-managing: managing every 
aspect of a project; checking on 
staff to ensure that even small tasks 
are done in specified manner 
“[My manager] will deal with [everything]…she is first in 
line…she is very much a micromanager.”  
 
“He didn’t let the staff go to the project site…He did not trust his 
staff enough even though he had employed them. He was doing 
everything by himself.” 
performance focused: defining 
project aims using specific 
objectives and goals; emphasizing 
end results 
 
“What [WCO] is doing in general..is looking more at how small 
sites can expand their impact…to have a larger impact.” 
 
“There is a big push to make sure that we remain on track and find 
the most strategic intervention points…that will achieve bigger 
wins… you have a results chain and it is the modus operandi for the 
project… it requires setting sensible goals and targets.”  
 
“roll up your sleeves”: active 
project involvement; providing 
direction but also demonstrating a 
willingness to work and interact at 
“You have to roll up your sleeves and if the team falls apart you get 
in there and do some of the work” 
 
	   43	  
all levels, as necessary  
top-down management: opposite 
of inclusive management; 
explaining policies and objectives 
without soliciting staff input or 
opinions 
“The director had to check with the [national] office and the 
[international] office and then he came back and said no, [they told 
me] we can’t do that…”  
 
“It is a top down thing so whatever policies are manufactured at the 
top have to be transferred down. And if you want to do some 
changes, it still comes down to whatever the head office says.” 
 
The most common strategy identified by both managers and staff is a management style I 
term “governance-at-a-distance” (n=34 interviews; 88 references), which refers to the ways in 
which managers located at international or national offices assume they can rely on email, phone, 
and other “distance” forms of communication to stay up to date and informed about field-based 
projects without visiting the projects. This type of management style is therefore the focus of this 
chapter. 
RESULTS 
To illustrate some of the assumptions managers’ make about the environmental 
convictions of Papua New Guineans, I first describe WCO priorities as outlined in WCO 
documents. For instance, the fifth guiding principle in WCO’s strategic plan suggests a vision of 
an inclusive marine program: “involve local communities and indigenous peoples in the planning 
and execution of field programs, respecting their cultural as well as economic needs” (WCO 
2010). The first objective of WCO’s Western Melanesia Conservation Program Framework 
2009-2014 recognizes the importance of community participation in WCO’s marine program: 
“Voices of coastal communities in governance of environment, food security and development 
planning are strengthened.” These documents illustrate general WCO assumptions that Papua 
New Guinean communities are interested in participating in WCO projects and that they will be 
ideal conservation partners. 
One component of WCO’s global program framework is its marine turtles protection 
strategy, which includes goals and objectives on protecting turtle habitats, creating marine 
protected area (MPA) networks, and eliminating illegal harvest and trade. This document’s 
success column notes that five communities in the South Pacific region have declared their 
beaches as protected nesting sites and further notes two goals: “1 critical turtle nesting site in 
Manus, PNG effectively managed” and a “management plan for 1 critical turtle nesting site in 
Manus, PNG approved by local communities.” WCO’s global marine turtle strategy and its Coral 
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Triangle Initiative (CTI) documents articulate similar goals. The CTI is a six-country initiative 
designed to simultaneously promote sustainable fisheries management and ensure food security 
through marine conservation. It represents one of WCO’s 13 global priorities and an ideal 
opportunity for WCO to expand current projects into a broader marine program with the 
potential for greater impact. Consequently, WCO PNG managers face pressure to successfully 
conserve and manage areas of high marine biodiversity in the CTI region such as Madang and 
Manus. 
These WCO documents illustrate one way in which organizational priorities shape and 
constrain individual managers’ intentions. However, despite the inclusionary discourse described 
in WCO documents, inclusion happens very differently in practice, as the following sections will 
show. Table Three illustrates how organizational pressure to conserve and manage places like 
Manus travels up and down organizational hierarchies and underscores opportunities for goals 
and activities to be re-worked and re-packaged by individuals throughout this process. When 
managers employ a governance-at-a-distance management strategy, they rely on these upward 
and downward flows of information to design, implement, and report upon projects. Each of 
these three WCO offices have their own distinctive institutional logics and working cultures, as 
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Table Three. Key responsibilities and information flows among WCO offices. 
 Selected  
Responsibilities 
Downward Flow of 
Information 
Upward Flow of 
Information 
WCO Global Develops 
organizational 
priorities that align 
with organizational 
mission and objectives 
Communicates 
organizational objectives 
and strategies to WCO 
PNG managers, often 
through organizational 
documents 
Reports on WCO 
Global activities and 
achievements 
(including ones from 
country offices like 
WCO PNG) in annual 
reports, to board of 
directors, etc. 
WCO PNG Designs national 
activities that align 










goals into national 






project goals to field-
based staff 
Reports on national 
and field activities to 










between role as NGO 
staff and community 
member 
May describe activities 
to local communities 





May write or 
contribute information 
for WCO or donor 
reports 
 
The following sections identify and describe five challenges that arise when managers 
employ governance-at-a-distance management styles related to: managers’ assumptions about 
Papua New Guineans environmental convictions; socio-cultural differences; social distance; 
managers’ assumptions about their own actions; and personal versus professional choices. 
Environmental convictions  
As noted above, WCO PNG managers envision Papua New Guineans as ideal 
conservation partners who will be interested in and supportive of WCO’s marine conservation 
efforts. WCO’s Conservation Director, for example, described his discussions over the phone 
with Samuel Parkop, who serves as WCO’s only Mbuke staff, about Mbuke’s community 
managed marine area, saying that Samuel felt such areas “will work in his place” and expressing 
optimism about Samuel’s work. Similarly, Thomas McDermott, WCO’s former Country 
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Director, said “there are reasons we can have success up there [in Mbuke]…we have a good guy 
up there in [Samuel].” Although Thomas had never visited Mbuke, he explained how he and 
others had talked with Samuel over the phone and through email communication about WCO’s 
marine activities in Mbuke, including managing marine areas, protecting turtle habitats and 
eliminating illegal turtle harvest and trade. In this section, I describe three examples of villagers’ 
actions that challenge these WCO managers’ assumptions about the environmental convictions 
of Papua New Guinean villagers.  
While in Mbuke, I spoke with villagers about the three-year no-take zone they had 
implemented to improve the island’s surrounding marine resources, including turtles. As I talked 
to a Mbuke man involved in the village’s conservation effort, a dying turtle lay at our feet. I 
asked about the turtle and he explained that he had caught it the night before, along with several 
others. He continued talking about his work with WCO in Mbuke, describing his perception of 
how fish numbers improved following the creation of the village’s no-take zone. A young boy, 
perhaps 10, came towards us as we sat on a tree trunk and talked about conservation. The boy 
carried a soccer ball that he began throwing at the turtle’s head. The turtle let out what I, from 
my environmentalist bias, can only describe as a yelp. The boy continued bouncing the ball on 
the turtle’s head. The turtle moved its front paws slightly, made some agitated sounds, and 
eventually fell still and quiet. The Mbuke villager continued talking about his commitment to the 
environment, not blinking at the young boy’s treatment of the turtle.11  
During my visit, Samuel described how villagers protected a nearby island because of its 
importance as a wild fowl nesting area. He explained village regulations prohibited the collection 
of wild fowl eggs except on specific days each month when villagers were allowed to harvest 
eggs. When visiting this island with Samuel and several others, I saw one of the Mbuke men 
placing several eggs into his canoe. Samuel justified this man’s taking of the wild fowl eggs to 
me by explaining that this man’s family did not have enough food. As we toured the island, I 
observed our boat skipper helping himself to three eggs. 
My third morning on Mbuke, Susan, a Mbuke villager, took me snorkeling in the 
management area. We paddled out in her canoe and jumped in the water. The management area 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Turtles have served as a source of protein in Manus villages for centuries (Spring 1981). On several occasions, I 
witnessed turtles for sale in the provincial Lorengau market and I recognize turtle consumption is culturally accepted 
in many Pacific communities. I use this anecdote to highlight the inconsistency between WCO assumptions of Papua 
New Guinean environmental convictions and villager actions, not to criticize turtle consumption. 
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lacked the characteristics of other no-take zones I had observed in PNG: the few fish we 
encountered were scared, and there were few shells and only one bêche-de-mer.12 As we paddled 
back to Mbuke, Susan paused and took out a plastic bag filled with tin cans: “Diana” tuna cans 
and “Ox and Palm” corned beef cans. I watched without comment as she threw the tins into the 
middle of the management area. She explained a few Mbuke women had asked her to bring their 
trash out to the sea. I could not stop myself from asking if dumping trash was allowed in the 
management area. Susan assured me it was not a problem and we could do it. 
Separately, these three examples merely illustrate individuals who do not follow the 
community management rules. Collectively, however, these vignettes begin to show a gap 
between project rhetoric of a committed community managing its conservation area and 
contributing to turtle conservation and village behavior that contrasts with this project rhetoric. 
While villagers themselves described their enthusiasm for engaging in projects with WCO and 
their commitment to conservation, their actions show a community that is not supporting WCO’s 
vision of conservation.13 This situation exposes contradictions between the conduct of Mbuke 
villagers and the vision of marine conservation expressed by WCO PNG managers. 
Simon Foale (2001) addresses a similar dichotomy between intended turtle conservation 
and villagers’ actions in the Solomon Islands. He argues that Melanesians do not share Western 
assumptions about biodiversity conservation, despite “appear[ing] to embrace the goals of 
achieving [marine] sustainability,” and elaborates that an appeal “to rural Melanesians not to kill 
leatherback turtles on the grounds of the importance of these species to marine ecosystem 
functions, and ultimately to the long-term food security of local human populations, would entail 
a certain level of disingenuousness” (2001: 51). Foale then relates the following story: “When a 
Vonavona Lagoon [Solomon Islands] fisherman was asked what he would tell his grandchildren 
if he discovered that he was responsible for killing the last hawksbill turtle on earth, he answered 
‘I’ll tell them how good it tasted’” (Foale 2001: 51). As this narrative suggests, the likelihood 
that WCO will convince Mbuke villagers to support their vision of protecting turtle habitat and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Bêche-de-mer is known as sea cucumber in English, pis lama in Tok Pisin, and bonai in the local Titan language. 
Papua New Guineans previously harvested bêche-de-mer for sale to export markets. However, following a 
noticeable decline in bêche-de-mer numbers, the National Fisheries Authority implemented a three year ban on its 
collection, beginning in 2009.	  
13 I recognize there may be reasons why the Mbuke community represents themselves in this way, including 
potential financial gain or other benefits from such behavior.	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eliminating “illegal” harvest and trade on the basis of biodiversity and ecosystem functioning 
seems unlikely, particularly given WCO’s absence of community education programs in Mbuke. 
The ways in which the Mbuke villagers position themselves as committed 
conservationists is reminiscent of broader theoretical discussions on self-positioning and the 
ways in which individuals may seek to represent their community in a way that attracts external 
actors and benefits, as described by Tsing (1999) and others. When I asked Samuel about his 
motivation for becoming involved with conservation organizations, for instance, he initially 
mentioned an interest in looking at issues in his village. Next, he explained how Mbuke received 
funding as a result of this interest and described how the village was then able to buy a boat and 
a motor. Samuel elaborated that Mbuke villagers appreciated tangible benefits: “if you work with 
NGOs and you are receiving some money, you are okay. But if you are not receiving an 
allowance or something like that, then you see that people do not commit themselves… they can 
see that partnering with the NGOs can do something.” Samuel’s statements suggest that some 
individuals in Mbuke realized that positioning themselves as a community concerned about and 
committed to conservation would enable engagements with conservation organizations, such as 
WCO, that could result in tangible benefits. At the same time, WCO needed a community who 
could participate in their turtle conservation project and help them achieve their stated CTI goals; 
Mbuke represented themselves to WCO as an ideal community to implement such a project. 
Despite these seemingly compatible WCO and Mbuke goals, the vignettes above 
highlight inconsistencies between what managers believe to be occurring and what actually 
occurs in Mbuke. This situation underscores the potential effects of governance-at-a-distance 
management styles, which are generally employed by managers who are based in the capital and 
are therefore less likely to observe the behaviors of Papua New Guineans. Consequently, 
managers are likely to continue to make assumptions about Papua New Guineans as ideal 
conservation partners. Further, if managers do not visit project villages, they miss opportunities 
to raise awareness about conservation, as understood by WCO, or to recognize a need for 
environmental education.  
Moreover, when WCO managers govern-at-a-distance, they rely on field staff, such as 
Samuel, to inform them about project activities and local challenges. If field staff do not 
contradict managers’ assumptions through direct communication or project reports, such 
assumptions persist, which contributes to incomplete and unrealistic understandings of project 
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realities. As previously noted, WCO’s CTI document asserts that WCO has “carried out 
substantial site-based work” and sets a goal of effectively managing one turtle nesting site in 
PNG, with a management plan approved by local communities. WCO PNG managers believe 
such activities are achievable and Samuel has assured them these activities are underway in 
Mbuke, as Ryan Harrington, WCO’s former Marine Manager, describes in the section below. 
However, the vision of WCO PNG managers, reinforced by Samuel’s statements that he can 
deliver on WCO objectives in Mbuke, contrasts with Mbuke villager actions. This disjuncture 
between managers’ assumptions about the environmental convictions of Papua New Guineans 
and villagers’ behavior is one factor that contributes to gaps between managers’ intentions and 
project outcomes when managers employ a governance-at-a-distance strategy. The following 
section elaborates on how managers who accept field staff claims about community commitment 
or project achievements or at face value risk incomplete understandings of project situations. 
Socio-cultural differences 
This section expands upon how communication differences between managers and field 
staff limited honest communication about project activities, further contributing to disjunctures 
between managers’ intentions and field activities. Ryan Harrington explained how WCO PNG 
managers believed Samuel Parkop’s promises about his ability to carry out conservation 
activities in Mbuke. When I asked Ryan how WCO selected Manus as a project site and why 
WCO staff had not been to visit the project, he explained: 
talking to someone does not imply an equal relationship and that is what the 
Moresby staff do not understand. They thought if they talked to [Samuel] 
straight…they do not understand that [Samuel] will tell them what they want to 
hear. So they believe in this myth that [Samuel] is an island person and knows 
everything about his place. So they think okay, [Samuel] told us he can save all 
the turtles. And I know that [Samuel] knows he cannot do that and I talked to him 
and said why did you say that. And he is like well...so as a manager, they need 
to…be aware and they need to work to create a process to breakdown where the 
staff feel free…but [Moresby managers] do not understand that and they just talk 
to the staff without considering hierarchical dynamics. And those relationships 
[are] very important, especially in the Pacific because people do not…[speak] 
outside of the boundaries.  
Ryan’s perspective on the willingness of WCO management to accept Samuel’s 
statements about his ability to implement marine conservation strategies suggests that WCO 
PNG managers did not consider larger socio-cultural issues and power dynamics at play in 
manager-field officer communications. Ryan emphasized WCO managers assumed that because 
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Samuel is from Mbuke he “knows everything about his place.” He stressed how WCO 
management accepted field staff reports at face value, without considering the possibility that 
staff “will tell them what they wanted to hear.” Ryan also described how managers assumed that, 
as “an island person,” Samuel would understand and be able to translate Mbuke’s interest in 
turtle conservation to WCO staff, a statement that reflects an assumption by managers that a 
Papua New Guinean will understand the culture in a particular project site, even if he or she does 
not have a social science background or training. Such assumptions that a “native” villager is 
well positioned to act as a liaison between his community and NGO staff, without any training, 
are common among conservation organizations in PNG. A further challenge, that I return to in 
the discussion, is that, as a Mbuke villager, Samuel must navigate tensions between his 
responsibilities as a WCO staff member and his identity as an Mbuke villager. 
Indira Bhatnagar, a WCO PNG manager, supported this perspective that WCO PNG 
managers fail to contextualize Papua New Guinean staff perspectives or to consider differences 
in how Papua New Guineans communicate with supervisors or senior staff. She explained 
“[national staff] do not speak up in group meetings because they do not feel it is appropriate. 
And it makes it difficult because it looks like people are happy and they are not and you only 
find that out in quiet conversations in the coffee room afterwards.”  
Part of this misunderstanding arises from dynamics between expats and national staff. 
For instance, in the WCO meetings Indira refers to, expats compose the management team while 
Papua New Guineans make up the majority of the junior positions; consequently, the meeting 
dynamic is not just between senior and junior staff but also between senior expat and junior 
national staff. A further challenge, as some staff suggested, is that expats and national staff may 
have different ideologies or values. 
Education and access to information also influence meeting participation. Kevin Kuk, 
WCO’s Forest Research Coordinator, explained that he used to feel shy at meetings because he 
felt he did not know enough to contribute. Now, however, he said he has more experience and 
uses the internet to learn new information and consequently feels more comfortable sharing his 
thoughts. At the same time, Kevin said he makes choices about what he shares, explaining “there 
are some things the local people tell me that I do not tell [expats] and things [expats] tell me and 
I do not tell [locals].” 
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Lauren Pomat, a Papua New Guinean conservationist who runs a national conservation 
NGO, suggested national staff do not feel they have the power to share their opinions. She 
explained such a situation “is quite common among [big international] NGOs, that you might 
have a very good local person but they may not have the decision-making powers or the power to 
intervene. And sometimes that can lead to projects falling apart or not achieving [their] full 
potential.”  
One WCO Global manager described communication differences among her team, none 
of whom are native English speakers and emphasized that such differences had to be actively 
addressed to ensure good communication. However, she said conservation practitioners “do not 
teach ourselves those sort of human interaction things up front in the conservation movement, we 
only do that when we come across problems,” a statement that suggests recognizing and 
addressing such differences is a skill that has to be learned.  
Overall, these comments suggest the potential for WCO managers to misunderstand the 
cultural context in which staff share opinions. Consequently, managers may unintentionally 
enable an atmosphere where they are likely to make assumptions about staff agreement or 
misunderstand wider contexts. When managers govern from a distance, they rely on staff to 
inform them about the situation on the ground; if managers do not understand how cultural and 
communication differences can affect such information, they are more likely to have a partial 
understanding of the project. Conversely, managers who employ governance-at-a-distance 
strategies while also recognizing the potential for staff to report what they assume their superiors 
want to hear can take steps to encourage honest communication with their staff and to minimize 
such communication issues. 
An expat manager at another international NGO described her efforts to minimize 
cultural communication differences and ensure cultural sensitivity. She said:  
it takes an effort…in PNG, people are reticent to give you their opinions…we are 
not used to that long silence that [Papua New Guineans] are used to. And you get 
the silence and it does not mean that they are not answering, it means that they are 
still thinking about things…I bite my tongue long enough to get their opinions. 
She emphasized learning to be comfortable with silence in order to allow Papua New Guinean 
staff time to express their opinions. 
Peter Nelson, a Papua New Guinean manager at a national NGO, described how his 
organization tries to place statements within an appropriate context. He gave an example of a 
	   52	  
community who approached his organization for help with their water supply. He explained how 
a staff member responded “‘what is the problem with water?’...because [the community was] 
asking for a water pump and they need to know if that is the real problem. Then, the community 
told them that the water is dirty. And [we] asked why is it dirty? And they said ‘oh, the pigs are 
crossing the river.” The organization asked “do you need a pump or do you need something 
else?” The employee explained that the NGO then worked with the community to set up fencing 
to keep the pigs away from the water, rather than responding to the initial request for a water 
pump. He used this example to illustrate a wider issue: the “need to dig down and find out what 
the real problem is, you might otherwise address the symptoms.” As Nelson suggests, if the 
NGO had accepted the community’s first request, the NGO might have provided a water pump 
without realizing the community needed fencing to prevent pigs from contaminating the water 
supply. His story illustrates how effective communication between an organization and a 
community can ensure project activities address community needs. 
This sub-section illustrates some of the many socio-cultural disconnects in PNG between 
senior and junior staff, expat and national staff and between national NGO staff and 
communities. Melanesian scholarship also addresses ontological and epistemological differences 
between expatriates and Melanesians.14 Such communication challenges are likely to persist 
because socio-cultural differences cannot be solved by expat managers from Port Moresby 
simply encouraging Papua New Guinean staff to share their perspectives or managers visiting 
field projects more often. Further, as one manager put it, some social and cultural differences are 
entrenched and overcoming such communication challenges can be a slow process. 
Social distance 
In addition to creating physical distance, governance-at-a-distance also results in social 
distance among staff. I regularly interacted with NGO staff who worked in field locations of 
varying remoteness from the national office, many of whom expressed a desire to have a closer 
connection to their organization. For example, Samuel Nickson, a field staff with another 
international NGO, explained his distance from the larger organization: “[two of our offices] are 
staffed by only one person each, it has always been pretty sad. I sit here everyday staring at the 
four walls and at times no one disturbs me.” Samuel felt isolated from the NGO in his daily 
activities but also emphasized the close connections he had with staff over email, which kept him 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See for example Gegeo 2001; West 2005, 2006; Kirsch 2006; and Halvaksz and Young Leslie 2008. 
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feeling connected to the organization. He elaborated “we feel that we are a part of this family…I 
came down [to the office] feeling so good because my friend [a co-worker] called…he said if 
you ever need help, or doing a survey and you need [help], I can always make time to assist 
you.” His comments illustrate how managers can govern at a distance and still make an effort to 
connect with field staff to minimize social distance and feelings of isolation.  
Two examples further illustrate how social distance can contribute to a lack of 
understanding about how individuals contribute to organizational goals. Samuel Pakop, the 
WCO employee in Mbuke, said “I [do not really know] most of the other activities that WCO 
do[es] across the planet. I am not really sure about the main objectives of WCO. What is the 
main objective of WCO Global, I am not really sure what is their purpose.” Similarly, John 
Kepore, who replaced Ryan Harrington as WCO’s Marine Manager, said he was not clear on the 
goals of WCO’s Madang office or on WCO’s position on proposed changes in PNG’s 
Environment Act, which would potentially impact WCO’s Madang project site. He elaborated 
“what is happening in Madang right now, we do not have a clear position on all of these 
developments coming…what is WCO’s position?” John emphasized that he had tried to clarify 
WCO’s mission and vision with WCO PNG staff in Port Moresby during several different 
discussions but had been unsuccessful, saying “I would like to have a clear vision on where we 
are going, we cannot be working in the dark, somebody needs to tell me what to do.” He further 
explained that, because he was based in Madang, he missed opportunities to participate in 
strategic discussions with senior managers to understand WCO’s broader goals. Indira 
Bhatnagar, a WCO PNG project manager, recognized this gap, saying “[less] than 10% of WCO 
staff could [accurately describe WCO’s mission and goals], not even close.” She suggested that 
“maybe that is why there is a big disconnect between [our international office] and the country 
offices.”  
Such disconnects also existed between WCO and the communities in which it worked. 
Ryan Harrington described how he discovered community members did not understand WCO’s 
goals and mission. He said:  
Like with [a Riwo villager], he has been working with [a WCO-affliated 
researcher] for 15 years and the other day he was like, I never knew why I count 
fish and all of this stuff. And he said he really never knew why he was doing it 
and he said now I know why…you get glimpses of empowerment…They are hard 
to capture in project talk, like what are you going to say, x number of people 
empowered to think critically?  
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Ryan’s point underscores the importance of project staff and community members 
understanding how their activities contribute to overall organizational goals. His comment also 
raises the difficulty of capturing such moments in ways that can be shared with managers and 
donors as positive project achievements.  
This section briefly illustrates two ways in which governance-at-a-distance can contribute 
to social distance. First, staff who are physically distant from the organization can feel socially 
distant. When staff are physically distant, they are less likely to be involved in discussions about 
how their activities contribute to the larger work of the organization or to participate in project 
planning. Consequently, these staff described their lack of understanding about the overall work 
of WCO and how they contributed to it. Further, it is also important to note that social distance 
can also emerge even when staff are not located in physically remote areas. 
Managerial assumptions 
A fourth factor in understanding governance-at-a-distance management strategies is 
managers’ assumptions about their own actions. The majority of WCO managers described their 
belief in the importance of observing field projects and understanding field perspectives. Thomas 
McDermott, WCO’s former Country Director, explained that he consistently encouraged senior 
managers from WCO Global to visit projects in PNG, saying “for the people in the head office, 
you have to get them out of the head office at least once a year to get a field reality.” His 
statement suggests that he recognizes the importance of senior managers visiting field offices to 
understand on-the-ground realities. At the same time, his stated belief was not matched by his 
actions: this manager had not visited any WCO marine projects during his tenure in PNG.  
When explaining why Elisa, an expat manager conducting a review of WCO’s marine 
program, did not visit Mbuke, one of WCO’s two marine project sites, Thomas said “we had a 
restricted budget… Elisa was able to talk to [Samuel] anyway [on the phone] and meet with the 
marine team but she could not go to all of the places…we just did not have enough money…we 
had to get Elisa to focus on the key players…and it is not easy to get to Manus...That was the 
bottom line and for the cost it would incur, we would not have got as significant benefit…you 
have to make choices…” Thomas’ statement illustrates how the high cost of traveling to project 
sites in PNG and limited time force managers to make decisions about the level of field 
engagement necessary to understand and manage a project. Although Thomas said he believed 
staff needed to visit the field, he then said such visits are not always possible. He further implied 
	   55	  
that phone communication can replace in-person visits. This example shows an inconsistency 
between his stated belief about the importance of understanding on-the-ground realities and his 
commitment to ensuring that such visits occur. 
Similarly, managers may make assumptions about their understanding of and rapport 
with field staff. Elisa described her ability to listen to and talk with field staff as her biggest 
accomplishment when working at the field level. She said  
I am connected through the personal friendships to the guys in the field…being 
able to read a bit between the lines of work plans and stuff…[my] ability to listen 
patiently, because I am from the outside…this was a big thing that I managed to 
get the people talking to me and providing me with information…that is, for me, 
the biggest achievement.  
Elisa’s comments suggest a rapport with field staff and an awareness of the need to “read 
between the lines” to understand the broader picture, similar to the two managers above who 
emphasized the importance of listening. Yet field staff remembered their interactions with Elisa 
differently from the way she described them. One said Elisa never asked staff questions about the 
field situation and never listened to what was happening at the project level. Two field staff said 
Elisa came to the office but never visited the communities. Patrick Tanou complained about her 
approach, saying “She came here to do the strategic plan, how do you know about fishermen if 
you…are just in town?” 
These differing perspectives on the same manager-field staff interaction suggest 
individuals may remember situations in different ways. Elisa had good intentions: she described 
her goals to build a relationship with the field staff and believed she was able to understand field 
level dynamics and realities, describing this understanding as her biggest achievement in PNG. 
At the same time, field staff did not consider their relationship with Elisa to be a good one and 
felt she lacked an understanding of the project context. Overall, these examples suggest 
managers may believe they act in one way but that their actions may either not be consistent with 
their stated intentions or may be perceived differently. 
Personal choices 
Staffing concerns and a reluctance among many qualified individuals, both expats and 
Papua New Guineans, to be based in field locations also contribute to governance-at-a-distance 
strategies. Managers explained that individuals with field experience reach a point at which they 
start to prefer an office job to a field job, which results in difficulties finding experienced staff 
who are also willing to manage field projects. WCO’s Country Director described this problem 
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in the PNG office, saying “it is a problem in biodiversity conservation, it is the young, 
unattached people who go out and do fieldwork but they have no experience. And the guys with 
experience are now married with a family and they need to have an office job, probably not in 
that country anymore and the wife does not want to stay there…”  
One expat manager described this change in himself: “what has changed, as I have gotten 
older, I used to spend long periods out in the bush and now I want to be at home with my wife 
and my baby…the reality for me now is different.” Similarly, another expat WCO staff based in 
Port Moresby, who oversaw a project with a difficult to reach field location, described how he 
tried to minimize his trips to project sites because he felt guilty leaving his family for such long 
periods.  
Managers also described how such locational preferences affected their hiring. For 
instance, Thomas McDermott explained that he recruited someone for one of the WCO marine 
projects who then “decided he would not come to Moresby and they [instead] stayed in the US to 
start a family.” WCO’s preferred candidate was unwilling to live in the field location so WCO 
then offered the position to their second choice candidate. Such situations can result in 
organizations having to accept less qualified staff for field positions.  
Additionally, supervisors may relocate experienced field staff to the capital to utilize their 
field experience in shaping policies or organizational strategies. A senior government officer 
described how he was promoted to an office job and required to focus on administrative and 
management tasks because no one else in his department had the necessary field expertise and 
knowledge. He said he missed the field visits and participating in on-the-ground activities: “since 
I got in this job, I have never gotten my hands dirty, I have never worn my wetsuits…” When 
supervisors move staff from field locations to the capital, they lose experienced staff in the 
locations where conservation activities are implemented.  
Overall, these comments suggest individuals may reach a time when they are no longer 
willing to make personal sacrifices for their professional lives, resulting in a situation in which 
individuals gain experience over time, but then leave field positions because they feel they have 
become too distant from home. This situation further limits the pool of qualified, experienced 
individuals, both expats and locals, willing to live in rural, field-based locations where 
conservation projects frequently operate, suggesting that governance-at-a-distance management 
styles are likely to persist. 
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Additional constraints 
Other factors, such as limited time,15 financial resources, and high transport costs,16 some 
of which were alluded to above, represent further challenges that contribute to governance-at-a-
distance management styles. In addition, it is possible that a community-based marine and 
coastal marine conservation project implemented by Conservation International has influenced 
other NGOs to limit their field visits or approach community components with greater caution. 
An independent evaluation described the CI project, which had a substantial community 
component,17 as encountering “failure in overall management, in financial management, in 
monitoring and internal evaluation and in technical backup” and it ended prematurely (Baines et 
al 2006: iii; see also Dowie 2008 and Balboa 2009). One individual who served as an adviser to 
the project described how the project expended significant financial resources and effort on 
community components without focusing its effort. She said 
One of the activities was to map out an area, a tiny little island with a small bit of 
coast on the mainland and I saw pictures of something like eight, ten, all this 
satellite gear hooked up here, there, and everywhere, and there were 40 people 
trampling around everywhere, GPS for every crab hole…these results were 
presented to use with all this wonderful GIS data…I asked the question, could you 
show us a map that indicates the types of land use… and they said we actually, we 
do not have that data. And I said, you have crab holes and Panduau trees, but you 
do not have land use? So I said, where are the settlements…they frowned…and 
they said we did not put in settlements and I said what is the point?...[the project] 
was that sort of thing, it was ridiculously technical, but did not give relevant 
information in a lot of cases. 
This individual, and other conservation practitioners, suggested that this well-known and 
very expensive failure contributed to increased caution among NGOs in implementing 
community activities in PNG. 
Finally, it is important to note that PNG is an extremely expensive location: in a 
comparison of the cost per locally managed marine areas in the Pacific, PNG represents the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 I recognize that, as a doctoral student, I had the luxury of spending significant time in villages without the 
demands of project management, organizational and donor reporting, and other office responsibilities. Such 
extended stays are likely impossible for senior managers; instead, there may be other strategies managers can use, 
including partnering with researchers or more closely collaborating with local or grassroots organizations. It is worth 
noting that two international NGOs did explicitly seek to engage with me on my research findings, saying that the 
information I collected in the village would be helpful for them in understanding their programs. More collaboration 
of this nature could be valuable.	  
16 Managers also increasingly cite climate change and concern about the organization’s carbon footprint as a limiting 
factor in staff travel.	  
17	  This project’s community component generated a large amount of community data, with the aim of establishing 
community-based marine conservation areas. The evaluation notes that “a considerable body of the required data has 
been amassed” without achieving any community-based marine management areas (Baines et al 2006: iv).	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expensive cost per site. The average cost per site in PNG18 was $14,544, compared to $2,506 in 
the Federated States of Micronesia, $2,854 in the Solomon Islands, $6,580 in Fiji, and $8,348 in 
Palau (Govan 2009: 60). While time and expense represent real challenges in PNG, these factors 
represent common challenges that affect any organization operating in PNG and therefore do not 
explain how gaps and inconsistencies between project intentions and outcomes emerge and 
persist. 
Discussion: Explaining Governance at a distance  
There are many reasons for governance-at-a-distance management strategies, including 
the difficulty and expense of getting to project sites, particularly when organizations have limited 
budgets and staff have limited time. PNG’s mountainous terrain and limited road infrastructure 
means that WCO managers cannot drive from the WCO PNG office to any of WCO’s field sites. 
The effort required to get to these remote field sites in PNG likely intensifies governance-at-a-
distance management strategies in PNG because of the barriers (and even mental efforts) 
managers must overcome to reach these sites. This chapter argues that such governance-at-a-
distance strategies are likely to persist, especially given that senior staff indicated a reluctance to 
be based in project areas, and the difficulty of finding qualified field staff. Even if WCO 
increased its field presence and decreased its reliance on a governance-at-a-distance strategy, my 
findings illuminate some entrenched challenges that are likely to persist. These include 
managers’ assumptions about: the environmental convictions of Papua New Guineans; accepting 
field staff reports at face value; or the ability of a native villager to represent the interests of his 
village to an NGO.  
As I alluded to in the results, a villager who works for an NGO while being based in his 
native community faces several challenges. As a WCO staff member, Samuel is responsible for 
implementing project activities, delivering on project aims, and ensuring villager compliance 
with turtle protection, wild fowl harvesting, and dumping trash in the management area. As an 
Mbuke villager, Samuel has ties within the community that he could jeopardize if he enforces 
community management rules. This finding highlights a limitation in arguments for a field 
presence, underscoring how managers or staff who are based in a community may lack 
incentives to enforce management rules or to convince villagers to adopt different behaviors 
because of their personal ties to the community. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 These calculations included eight sites in PNG, which include the locations in my study. 
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The results also show the multiple implications of a governance-at-a-distance strategy, 
from the physical distance between managers in Port Moresby and field staff in project sites to 
the cultural and ideological distances that emerge in communication and interaction among 
senior vs. junior and expat vs. national staff as well as the social distance created when staff do 
not feel connected to the organization. These multiple meanings of distance illustrate how there 
is a literal difference that can be bridged by visiting projects as well as socio-cultural differences 
that are more entrenched and less simple to bridge. 
I suggest two explanations for why managers govern from a distance. First, national 
managers must balance many tensions, including the pressure to maintain a presence in the 
capital, as described by Eyben (2011) and Rajak and Stirrat (2011). While managers who visit 
field sites likely gain an increased understanding of the projects they manage, other dynamics 
exert pressure on these managers to remain in the capital.  
For WCO’s senior managers, “being there” is Port Moresby, rather than Madang or 
Manus. One WCO staff described Port Moresby as a “conservation clique: you live, work with, 
play with your expat conservation community, very intense, intellectually and emotionally.” 
These managers meet with their counterparts at other large international NGOs or visit 
government ministries in an attempt to engage with their peers and government officials and to 
raise their organization’s profile. For example, Department of Environment and Conservation 
staff rarely pick up the phone and many cubicles are often empty. A manager who tries to 
collaborate with Department of Environment and Conservation staff by calling the office or 
visiting during a short visit to the capital is unlikely to interact with staff. While capital-based 
NGO staff may still face challenges in meeting government officials, managers in the capital 
have more flexibility and opportunities. Port Moresby is a small town and NGO staff are likely 
to informally interact with their peers or government officials in town. I regularly ran into 
conservation practitioners and government staff at the grocery store, markets, yacht club, and 
airport.  
At the same time, this commitment towards coordination in Port Moresby comes at a 
cost: it compromises managers’ ability to fully understand field activities, as the example of 
Mbuke shows. Some managers recognize the tradeoffs in balancing their national and field level 
presence. Paul Smith, a former Terrestrial Manager, for example, explained that his initial 
responsibilities were technically focused. However, when he was promoted, he focused more on 
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“project management and all that sort of stuff…it is funny, it is important to get into the bush and 
I have been doing less and less of it.” His comment suggests that he knows the importance of 
spending time in the field and observing local realities but his management responsibilities 
prevent this type of engagement.  
Second, managers may evade field visits to avoid confronting the reality of problems that 
occur in the field. If managers remain in Port Moresby, they can continue to reassure their 
superiors and donors that everything is going well, based on field staff reports. However, if 
managers visit the project and discover inconsistencies, such as local villagers killing the turtles 
that field staff claim they are protecting, managers must then confront these problems. 
Governing-at-a-distance allows managers to avoid addressing these complexities.  
WCO’s Conservation Director’s visit to Madang exemplifies how short field visits may 
not give staff a complete picture of project activities. After spending a morning visiting one 
project village with field staff and an afternoon on a boat touring the conservation site, he 
returned to Port Moresby optimistically describing villagers’ interest in working with WCO on 
marine conservation. He said he felt field staff reports on local villagers’ attitudes towards WCO 
were overly pessimistic in comparison with his observations. This manager used his field trip to 
reconfirm his own assumptions rather than to investigate why field reports differed from his 
observations. Both these explanations highlight the limited incentives that exist for managers to 
visit field sites, a finding that I explore further in the conclusion section below. 
CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter uses a case study from Mbuke village, PNG, to illustrate how disjunctures 
between what project managers believe is occurring, what field staff claim to be doing, and what 
marine conservation projects accomplish in practice emerge when managers employ a 
governance-at-a-distance strategy. The results show five factors that contribute to the types of 
disjunctures that occur when managers employ such a governance-at-a-distance strategy and 
suggest several entrenched challenges that are likely to contribute to the persistence of 
governance-at-a-distance. Managers’ stated their intentions to develop projects that contribute to 
WCO priorities and outcomes, such as successfully conserving and managing areas of marine 
biodiversity in the CTI region. The CTI is one of WCO Global’s priority areas, which likely 
influenced managers’ decisions to work in Mbuke, despite their limited knowledge of the area. 
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As this chapter shows, however, by employing a governance-at-a-distance management strategy, 
WCO PNG managers encountered several difficulties in achieving their intended aims in Mbuke.  
Second, the findings underscore the dangers of the assumptions managers may develop 
when they govern from a distance. For instance, WCO PNG managers desired PNG communities 
who could represent ideal conservation partners. When the Mbuke field staff assured managers 
that Mbuke represented such a community, he reinforced managers’ assumptions about the 
environmental convictions of Papua New Guineans. However, the vignettes in this chapter show 
how Mbuke villagers positioned themselves as ideal targets of conservation programs while 
continuing to act in a completely different manner, a finding that underscores how local people 
may articulate particular identities to benefit from conservation, similar to political ecology 
scholarship on how local communities may position themselves in particular ways to benefit 
from conservation. The absence of WCO managers or other WCO staff from outside Mbuke also 
meant that villagers could not be held accountable for their behavior. Further, it is worth noting 
that, in some cases, local communities may have more experience with conservation organization 
staff than the conservation organization staff have had with communities, which means that such 
communities have significant expertise in engaging with, and potentially manipulating, NGO 
staff. Additionally, in the absence of community awareness raising programs, or other similar 
mechanisms, managers failed to shape Papua New Guineans into environmental subjects 
interested in and supportive of marine conservation efforts. This situation further suggests how 
making assumptions about the commitment of local communities can result in projects that 
unfold in unexpected directions, contributing to gaps and inconsistencies between intentions and 
achievements.  
Third, this chapter provides insight into some of the personal choices and motivations of 
conservation professionals by advancing scholarship on the social lives of conservation 
professionals. Similar to Eyben (2011) and others, my results suggest that managers may avoid 
or limit field visits to avoid the “messiness” of the local situation or to minimize knowledge that 
challenges already defined objectives. Further, personal preferences for office jobs, rather than 
field positions, mean that governance-at-a-distance strategies are likely to persist in the future, 
raising questions about how conservation organizations can address the challenges that result 
from such a management style or even whether the operating mode and structure of large 
conservation organizations are conductive to achieving effective, on the ground conservation.  
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This chapter identifies real constraints that contribute to governance-at-a-distance 
strategies, such as tensions between office responsibilities and field time, pressure for managers 
to have a presence in Port Moresby, challenges in recruiting skilled staff for field positions and 
resource limitations. Managers who are based in the capital but responsible for field projects will 
likely always experience tension between a national and a field presence. However, such 
challenges can be addressed by planning for field visits in the project budget and finding staff 
who are interested in living in field locations or providing incentives for staff to live in such 
locations. In contrast, more entrenched challenges such as socio-cultural differences in 
communication and power asymmetries will not be solved by managers simply visiting project 
sites or interacting with field staff. This chapter also suggests limitations in arguments for a field 
presence by showing how field staff based in project locations may still not be able to address 
certain challenges, particularly if staff are from that particular community.  
In conclusion, this chapter argues that governance-at-a-distance is broadly characteristic 
of all large conservation organizations and is likely to persist in the future, particularly given 
some of the entrenched challenges that I highlight above. In the example described in this 
chapter, governance-at-a-distance contributed to disjunctures between intentions and 
achievements that resulted in WCO PNG failing to achieve the types of marine conservation 
outcomes, such as turtle conservation, that they wished to achieve. This chapter therefore 
illustrates a case where governance-at-a-distance does not work. An important next step in 
understanding governance-at-a-distance is identifying situations in which governance-at-a-
distance works and situations when it does not work. 
	   63	  
 
CHAPTER FOUR: Producing Knowledge and Ignorance: 
Understanding varying conservation approaches among 
conservation professionals 
INTRODUCTION 
On paper, you look at Madang, the infrastructure, the number of organizations, 
and you think, wow, this is a place where conservation should be able to work and 
in reality is completely the opposite. And all of the factors have come together 
and things have not been working there, I think it is an eye opener. 
--Conservation manager, Papua New Guinea 
Conservation organizations have become larger, better organized, and more professional 
over time (Uphoff 1993; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Zaidi 1999; Wapner 2002). As the number 
and type of conservation NGOs has expanded and their expenditure has grown (Oates 1999; 
Brockington and Scholfield 2010b; Holmes et al 2012), their size and influence has also grown 
(Brockington and Schofield 2010a). However, despite both the growth of conservation NGOs 
and increasing international commitments to conserve biodiversity, such as the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’s Aichi Targets, global biodiversity continues to decline (Butchart et al 
2010). To better understand the challenges faced by conservation NGOs in conserving 
biodiversity, I explore how conservation professionals shape discursive practices and define 
conservation goals, thereby shaping knowledge forms. This chapter addresses lacunae in three 
inter-related bodies of literature: first, that on the inner workings of conservation NGOs; second, 
that on conservation as political and economic processes; and third, a growing body of work on 
gaps between discourse and practice in conservation projects. My study advances discussions 
about the role of development in conservation through a case study from Madang, PNG.  
While many social scientists discuss the NGO sector, systematic examinations of how 
“local and international organizations interact...and what ideas are implemented within this 
network” are limited (Brockington and Schofield 2010: 570). Few studies empirically examine 
the internal debates and politics of the organizations behind international conservation (King 
2009). Development scholars have produced institutional ethnographies that examine the internal 
workings of development agencies to show how actors shape discourses and produce particular 
policies (e.g., Cooper and Packard, 1998; Bebbington et al 2004; Mosse 2005). For example, 
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Lewis et al (2003) analyze the influence of organizational culture on World Bank development 
projects in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, and Peru. In contrast, conservation scholars have paid 
comparably less attention to analyzing conservation project formation and implementation. 
Analysis of conservation NGOs that shows how internal deliberations at various scales shape 
individual approaches, thereby producing particular project and organizational priorities is 
needed. This chapter tracks the decision-making processes of staff at international, national, and 
field offices who define and implement marine conservation projects.  
Second, this chapter pays close attention to the “agencies and ideologies of differently 
positioned actors” at multiple scales to analyze how individual conservation actors shape 
organizational practices and outcomes (West 2006: 26). This approach draws upon seminal 
institutional ethnographies that examine how development “brokers” (Mosse 2005) translate and 
transform project knowledge, converting organizational goals into local activities, and 
interpreting local activities to represent success to higher level authorities and maintain project 
coherence. This approach also illuminates possibilities for deviation and alteration: Heyman 
(2009), for instance, draws attention to the role of middle managers and field staff in reworking 
goals from the top to the field and transforming their actions into particular representations of 
success that appear to contribute to organizational goals. Dove (1992; 1994) illustrates how 
Pakistani foresters’ beliefs about farmers’ preferences were universally inaccurate and resulted in 
misguided development assistance. He showed how this misguided assistance persisted because 
foresters’ continued to insist on the accuracy of their (inaccurate) beliefs even when presented 
with evidence to the contrary. Dove’s analysis underscores how attention to beliefs—and the 
persistence of beliefs—can uncover the roles of individuals in producing particular effects and 
interventions, including what Matthews (2005; 2011) terms the production of ignorance, a 
situation in which forest bureaucrats may deliberately produce a public fiction about forestry to 
achieve their own aims. This chapter considers how conservation professionals produce 
knowledge and ignorance (a lack of knowledge), responding to appeals (e.g., Sundberg 2006; 
Heyman 2009; King 2009) for analyses that examines the internal workings, debates, and politics 
of conservation organizations.  
While some conservation scholars have drawn attention to differences in perceptions of 
biodiversity and ideals of management, such scholarship tends to describe differences between 
“Western” and “non-Western” culture, between urban professionals and rural subsistence users 
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(e.g., Grove 1990), or even between national and international conservation scientists (Lowe 
2006). In contrast, I seek a less dichotomous analysis, with the aim of examining individual 
understandings of conservation among a range of conservation professionals at multiple levels. 
One such pioneering work is Sachedina’s (2010) ethnography of the African Wildlife Foundation 
(AWF), which shows how geographic distance between staff in urban areas and staff in field 
areas contributed to marginalization and exclusion among AWF field-based staff: “Community 
conservation officers were usually junior in hierarchy and disempowered, undercapitalized, and 
marginalized from AWF’s management. It was virtually unheard of for community officers to 
attend AWF program or annual meetings, yet these fora were where AWF’s thinking and 
conservation learning took place” (2010: 612). Sachedina (2010) underscores how the location of 
individual staff affected their influence within AWF. Hardin (2008) also shows differences 
among individuals at different levels, arguing such differences occur because of varying 
engagements with place. She illustrates that some hunters and conservation biologists, despite 
divergent agendas about how wildlife should be managed, share an intimacy with place or 
particular species that consultants or administrative experts lack (see also Remis and Hardin 
2009). Similarly, I illustrate different approaches and understandings among rural and urban 
conservation staff with varying levels of mobility and site-specific knowledge (see also Chapter 
Three). 
Third, a growing number of scholars have drawn attention to differences between what 
organizations claim to do and their actual practices, using examples from both conservation and 
development organizations. Ethnographies of development agencies in such varied sites as 
development in Lesotho (Ferguson 1990) and Egypt (Mitchell 2002), green neoliberalism within 
the World Bank (Goldman 2005), and conservation and development improvement schemes in 
Indonesia (Li 2007) have shown how policies and programs are depoliticized to be amenable to 
technical solutions and acceptable to development practitioners and elites. Similarly, using a case 
of water management in Brazil, Lemos and Oliveria (2004) illustrate how actors may justify 
technical interventions to circumvent local party politics. This scholarship generally concludes 
interventions will continue to fail to address dominant political or economic structures and power 
asymmetries among development practitioners, elites, and the subjects of their interventions, 
which allows elites and technocrats to continue to implement interventions and survive changing 
politics. Despite such failures, these projects still have important outcomes: for instance, the 
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World Bank livestock program in Lesotho does not achieve its aim of eliminating poverty but 
does expand bureaucratic state power. Ferguson (1990: 254) emphasizes: “what is most 
important about a ‘development’ project is not so much what it fails to do but what it does do,” 
suggesting “its real importance lies in ‘side effects,’” the “instrument-effects” that are exercises 
of power.  
More recently, Carrier and West (2009) have emphasized that disjunctures between 
intention and action are not rare instances of particularly difficult projects or exceptional 
situations, but instead are “a necessity, actively maintained and reproduced by knowledge 
systems” (Mosse 2005: 97). This perspective shares with Ferguson the recognition that 
instrument-effects, or disjunctures, produce dynamic effects. To understand such disjunctures, 
Lewis and Mosse (2006) propose comparing the worlds that development actors aim to achieve 
with gaps between intentions and outcomes.  
Some studies document how such disjunctures emerge in practice. Filer (2009), for 
instance, details how the different working groups of the UN Millennium Assessment possessed 
a preconceived conceptual framework on the relationships among people, ecosystems, and 
knowledge systems and then created “virtual communities” to match this technical, apolitical 
vision of environmental management. Van Helden (2009) describes how managers and donors 
promoted a particular vision in two integrated conservation and development projects but had 
little control over field level implementation, leading to disjunctures between the vision and 
outcomes of the project at the head office and the field level. This chapter builds upon this 
scholarship by recognizing such instrument-effects and disjunctures as ubiquitous. This chapter 
therefore moves past accounts of conservation failure as instrumental or critical and instead 
illuminates how and why such disjunctures continuously emerge through marine conservation 
efforts.  
Moving beyond conservation versus development  
A proliferation of scholarship exists on the linkages between conservation and 
development. Here I briefly review the key arguments of this literature to situate my analysis on 
how individual conservation actors conceptualize the relative importance of conservation and 
development in their own approaches. Scholars and practitioners alike promoted integrated 
conservation and development projects based on the premise that conservation could be achieved 
through sustainable development. Still, many scholars continue to question the ability of such 
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projects to achieve their aims, describing their premise as “inherently flawed” (Oates 1999: 44) 
and drawing attention to the “ill-conceived and untested assumptions about their sustainability 
and appropriateness to local conditions” (Barrett and Arcese 1995) as well as to problematic 
conceptions of homogenous communities (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Many critiques highlight 
the failure of such conservation and development projects to meet their stated objectives (Wells 
et al 1992; Terborgh 1999; Hulme and Murphee 2001; McShane and Wells 2004; van Helden 
2009) and recognize that “making a link between conservation and development…was almost 
impossible” (West 2006: 35).  
Similarly, conservation inquiries have devoted significant attention to anthropocentric 
(e.g., Adams and McShane 1997; Brosius et al 2005) versus biocentric (e.g., Wells et al 1993; 
Oates 1999) approaches. Others suggest “‘pure’ conservation is just a form of development” 
(Brockington et al 2008: 159). Some conservationists view development or poverty reduction 
activities as critical components of core conservation (e.g., Ghimire and Pimbert 1997; Hulme 
and Murphee 1999; Neumann 2002; Roe and Elliot 2004). Those who support this perspective 
then advocate for including development priorities or tackling poverty as part of conservation’s 
core agenda. Other conservationists view such development activities as distracting attention 
from conservation’s core aim of protecting biodiversity, arguing that it is not possible to 
simultaneously achieve conservation and development (Oates 1999; Adams et al 2004) or 
suggesting that poverty alleviation aims have supplanted biodiversity conservation (Sanderson 
and Redford 2003). Despite such polarizing opinions, most large conservation NGOs, even those 
that prioritize scientific approaches, now recognize community conservation approaches as an 
important component in their work. For instance, Conservation International, whose founding 
staff left the World Wildlife Fund to pursue a scientific, rather than a community, approach, now 
recognizes social concerns in its work (Dowie 2004; MacDonald 2008). Still, organizational 
recognition does not necessarily translate into staff acceptance, as this chapter will show. 
This chapter questions whether the challenges faced by conservation organizations stem 
from the types of instrument-effects identified by Ferguson and others; from the prioritization of 
immediate human needs over wider, longer-term changes in ecological systems, as Oates and 
others argue; or whether these challenges result from different perspectives among conservation 
professionals. To address these questions, this chapter analyzes the perspectives of individual 
conservation actors within the complex institutional landscape of an organization I term, as in 
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previous chapters, the World Conservation Organization (WCO). As staff struggle to align field 
projects with organizational strategies in order to achieve organizational objectives, disjunctures 
emerge among actors at each level. By incorporating data from WCO’s multiple offices, this 
chapter presents a multi-leveled perspective on marine conservation efforts.  
I begin by describing the study area and methodology, illustrating why insights from 
PNG, what some describe as a “marginal out-of-the way” place (Tsing 1993), have important 
implications for conservation theory and practice globally. Like many other seemingly out-of-the 
way places, Madang Lagoon represents a place that shapes processes at local, national, and 
international scales. Its high ecological diversity and inclusion in the regional Coral Triangle 
Initiative (CTI), a multilateral partnership on coastal and marine conservation among Indonesia, 
Malaysia, PNG, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, and Timor Leste, mean that Madang 
Lagoon is a location of interest and importance for conservation practitioners, Further, given the 
importance of social relationships in human-environment interactions in PNG, WCO’s project in 
Madang Lagoon is a particularly appropriate location to investigate these research questions. The 
results section then describes the decision-making processes, internal debates, and discursive 
practices through which certain conservation strategies become prioritized over others, 
producing organizational objectives, project outcomes, and local level consequences. I conclude 
by highlighting different perspectives among WCO staff and propose three reasons why 
managers may invite ignorance on organizational activities and outcomes.  
DESCRIPTION OF STUDY AREA 
WCO is an international organization with a headquarter office, regional staff based in 
national offices, semi-autonomous national offices, and field offices. In some regions, including 
the Asia-Pacific region, a national office acts as a regional hub for administrative staff and 
thematic experts. National offices are expected to contribute to global objectives and strategies 
but also maintain some independence in defining national strategies. In the PNG national office, 
managers based in Port Moresby, the capital of PNG, regularly communicate with staff at 
headquarter and regional offices and with staff in other national offices who provide financial 
support or strategic guidance. WCO has multiple field offices throughout PNG that are located 
close to project sites. The level of interaction between these field offices and the national office 
varies among field offices and individual managers. As Figure One shows, each level of WCO 
produces a strategy for organizing and focusing their work. In the sections below, I will show 
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how WCO PNG managers manage project knowledge to ensure that the Madang workplan and 
national strategic plan contribute to WCO’s global program strategy. 
Figure Two. Schema of WCO Offices and Their Strategies.  
 
This chapter focuses on WCO’s marine conservation efforts in Madang Lagoon, an area 
several conservation organizations identify as significant for global biodiversity. PNG’s reef 
ecosystems are among the richest on earth (Chin et al 2008) and Madang Lagoon is the most 
ecologically diverse lagoon on PNG’s north coast and contains coral reefs, mangroves, and 
seagrass habitat. Madang Lagoon’s rich reef diversity represents 57 percent of reef species in 
PNG and 14 percent globally (Jenkins 2002a; 2002b). WCO played a role in creating and 
registering four marine Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) in Madang Lagoon, representing 
27 percent of the area.  
More recently, WCO has emphasized Madang Lagoon’s biodiversity when identifying it 
as a key priority within the regional CTI. Potential threats to Madang Lagoon’s marine habitats 
(and to WCO’s conservation efforts) include commercial and industrial interests, such as inland 
logging concessions, the in-progress Pacific Marine Industrial Zone, and the Ramu Nickel mine 
(see Havice and Reed 2012). Additional threats include an average annual population growth rate 
of 3.7 percent (NSO 2002), water pollution, and climate change impacts, including coral 
bleaching and ocean acidification. Madang Lagoon is typical, and therefore generalizable, of the 
scale and space in which conservation interventions occur globally. 
Madang Lagoon is a particularly appropriate location for considering tensions between 
conservation and development because social relationships are the core component of human-
environment relationships in PNG, as Melanesian scholarship demonstrates. Bamford, for 
instance, illustrates how the Kamea track “social relations over time...based on human-
environment relations (2007: p. 62). Jacka (2001) highlights how Paiam and Western 
conceptions of land differ, resulting in divergent interpretations of the same events. Jorgensen 
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(1997), West (2006), and others document the complexity of land ownership in PNG. This 
scholarship illustrates how misinterpretations can occur when extra-community actors ignore the 
economic, historical, political, and social contexts of their interventions and further stresses the 
challenges that can arise if external actors ignore social relationships. This chapter therefore 
recognizes that attention to social relationships in human-environment interactions is critical in 
understanding Papua New Guineans engagement with conservation. 
METHODS 
 Between January and December 2010, I conducted semi-structured interviews at NGO 
and government offices and with other stakeholders in Port Moresby and administrative centers 
in Madang, Manus, and New Ireland provinces. These NGO interviews include representation 
from large, international NGOs and smaller, national or local NGOs in PNG. Accordingly, my 
data include staff perspectives from diverse types of institutions. This chapter draws primarily on 
28 interviews with WCO employees: 17 employees at different offices in PNG and 9 employees 
at headquarter and regional offices. I conducted multiple interviews with some employees. I also 
conducted interviews with donor officials funding WCO’s work (n=5) and with government 
officials, NGO staff, and other stakeholders familiar with WCO’s operations, which informed 
my analysis. I observed many WCO activities, from internal WCO staff meetings to WCO 
activities in communities. I also reviewed public WCO documents, such as press releases and 
website material, and internal documents, including strategic plans and workplans, and external 
project evaluations.  
 As with the analyses in previous chapters, I coded my interview data and notes, using 
Nvivo9, to determine categories and themes that I used to develop a codebook. I then coded each 
interview based on identified themes. I developed my coding methodology following qualitative 
coding methods (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003; Corbin and Strauss 2008; Saldana 2009). To 
protect individual identities all names are pseudonyms and some genders were changed.  
Additionally, I draw upon 436 household surveys that I conducted in Madang, Manus, 
and New Ireland provinces, including 224 households in Riwo village in Madang, one of the 
villages adjacent to Madang Lagoon, which hosts three out of the area’s four WMAs. This 
chapter uses these household surveys, as well as village focus groups and participant 
observation, to evaluate WCO staff opinions about conservation and community needs from the 
community’s perspective. 
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FINDINGS 
Envisioning Marine Conservation: Aligning Organizational Strategies 
I first describe WCO Global staff perspectives on the relationship between international 
and national offices in achieving global strategies. WCO prioritizes key areas and species that 
the organization defines as critical in conserving and protecting biodiversity. WCO’s website 
includes statements describing the threats to biodiversity, the urgency of conservation work, and 
the need to focus on large-scale conservation efforts with the most potential for positive impacts. 
Through its focus on key global initiatives in priority areas, including the Coral Triangle region, 
WCO positions itself as an organization capable of addressing critical threats. WCO describes its 
CTI conservation activities through six strategies: sustainable live reef food fish trade; 
sustainable tuna; fisheries bycatch; marine protected areas; marine turtles; and climate change.  
WCO Global staff play a key role in ensuring that national offices and programs 
prioritize activities in these six areas and contribute to global initiatives, such as the CTI. Tanya 
Russo, WCO’s Conservation Monitoring Manager, explained that the “different [national] 
offices are supposed to join together to deliver the [global] program objectives.” Hunter 
Thompson, the Marine Initiatives Manager at WCO Global, described WCO’s global initiatives 
as a way for national offices to “coalesce around common, shared goals…based on capacity, 
interest, and conservation need.” For instance, he said, the PNG office “needs a coherent marine 
program that plugs into the Coral Triangle” and described his role in ensuring that WCO PNG 
contributes to global initiatives.  
When asked how WCO evaluated whether national programs contribute to the 
organization’s marine goals, Hunter responded “when I can see [their budgets and work plans], I 
will be satisfied that we have changed internally [to be more effective and successful]…by 
getting those things theoretically you have more joined up work plans…” Similarly, Tanya 
considers whether “the offices in the network…mov[e] together, this is the process that we are 
going through, what we call an alignment towards a new strategic plan, priorities that take it all 
the way down…I need to ensure the projects…fit in the bigger picture and to make sure that 
there is a clear goal and objective.” Their colleague, Liam Sullivan, WCO’s Monitoring and 
Evaluation Manager, also emphasized clear, coherent strategies. He further stressed the 
importance of fisheries strategies in PNG, explaining that, because fishing is important for the 
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population, WCO PNG’s strategy contributed to WCO fisheries related goals, including CTI 
strategies on sustainable tuna and fisheries bycatch. 
Liam’s comment reflects an inherent staff assumption about the importance of fisheries in 
conserving Madang Lagoon that is also present in WCO PNG project documents. For instance, a 
2000 report designed to guide the marine program over the next 5 to 10 years states: “the 
majority of Melanesians live a subsistence lifestyle in coastal villages and are highly dependent 
on local harvesting of inshore marine products for food and cash” (WCO 2001: 52). The report 
recommends creating a Madang marine park to “provide for long-term management, 
development, and conservation of an inshore marine area that is of national and international 
significance for marine biodiversity conservation, but that is also used intensively” (WCO 2001: 
56). This assumption that a marine park benefits local populations is also evident in a 2005 
report that describes Riwo villagers’ reasons for supporting WMAs: “because it improved fish 
stocks (36 percent), it restored the beauty of the reef (27 percent), it benefited the community in 
a general sense (19 percent), and it kept outsiders away (6 percent)” (Jenkins et al 2005: 4). On 
the whole, WCO project documents advance the assumption that WMAs are important for a 
local population “highly dependent” on fisheries in a biodiverse area that is “used intensively.” 
In the following sections, I evaluate how the perspectives and assumptions of WCO managers 
correspond to field realities. 
Building Toilets to Save Fish: Reviewing the project  
WCO Global staff envision coherent global strategic plans that inform and shape national 
strategies for contributing to global initiatives, as outlined above. WCO staff based at national 
and field offices then play a role in ensuring that national strategies and local activities contribute 
to WCO priorities.  
In 2009, the WCO Madang staff decided to review a decade-long marine project. Ryan 
Harrington, WCO’s former Marine Manager, said the staff decided: 
To review the work that had happened before, why the assumptions were made, 
why people decided to do this…looking at the politics and social and economic 
and cultural reasons why everything went the way it did. And that was agonizing 
and that took like a year of renegotiating, asking the people in the 
villages…asking what happened…trying to make some sense of what they were 
saying and WCO’s role. And we emerged with a different vision or idea. 
Ryan also directed a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) that Madang staff and village 
youth carried out in the villages surrounding Madang Lagoon. This PRA complemented data 
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from a WCO Madang household survey that sought “to determine the socio-economic drivers of 
environmental change in Madang Lagoon” (Yen 2010: 2). As part of the PRA, participants 
identified “solid waste, human waste, climate change induced environmental impacts, oil spillage 
by ships, shortage of natural resources, and land contamination by plantations” as their 
environmental concerns (WCO 2010: 21). Participants did not list concerns related to fishing, 
although they identified fishing as one of several livelihood strategies. The PRA also identified 
agriculture as the primary livelihood strategy in Madang Lagoon. These findings contributed to 
Ryan’s belief that WCO’s approach of creating WMAs to increase fish catch was not aligned 
with community priorities.  
As a result of this review, the WCO Madang staff concluded the project had not included 
significant community involvement in the WMAs. Staff recognized these communities felt they 
had not benefitted from the WMAs, which contributed to tension between villagers and WCO’s 
Madang office. Ryan described WCO’s past approach of short village visits as “ticking them off 
a box…for the project framework,” an approach that achieved WCO’s objective of setting up 
WMAs. In contrast, Ryan believed long-term engagement between WCO and the villages was 
necessary to understand village dynamics and generate community support, which he thought 
would then help to ensure long-term project sustainability.  
Following this review, the WCO Madang staff said they “emerged with a different 
vision” that recognized agriculture-based livelihood strategies in Madang Lagoon and broadened 
the marine project’s approach to include livelihood and social development components. The 
Madang staff believed that, after a history of tensions between the communities and WCO, it was 
important to first regain the communities’ trust. Consequently, Madang staff focused on 
improving WCO’s relationship with villagers and began working with different groups within 
the communities, including women, youth, and church groups. Ryan believed if the project 
regained community trust and addressed social and livelihood concerns, WCO would be better 
positioned to engage villagers on conservation issues over the long-term.  
As part of this broader approach, the Madang office proposed addressing sanitation 
issues. Ryan explained the PRA “evidence shows water quality is the biggest issue, it is a lagoon 
issue. They wash in saltwater, near toilets. That is a great link, health and environment, so if you 
do not move toilets and if the coral reefs are declining because of the water quality…” The 
Madang staff shared Ryan’s belief that sanitation efforts would address water quality issues, 
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which would eventually contribute to conservation. Ryan justified his broad approach to project 
activities: “you may have to build toilets to save fish…and build up the name of your work, build 
up the trust and people with a shared vision for this work.”  
The WCO Country Representative and Conservation Director, both of whom are based in 
Port Moresby, did not support this broader approach, and told Ryan “no, we shouldn’t work on 
toilets.” Ryan explained his managers ignored the PRA results that demonstrated agriculture as a 
community priority and continued to pressure him to promote organizational strategies on 
WMAs that assumed increased fish catch would benefit the community.  
WCO senior managers in Port Moresby said they felt the Madang project’s community 
engagement focus represented a departure from WCO objectives and did not support the 
project’s sanitation component. For instance, Sally van Vliet, the Conservation Director, stressed 
the importance of ensuring individual projects contribute to the organization’s conservation 
aims:  
in the end, you need to check [is] the work you are doing contributing to 
conservation…to take the Madang project, whatever they are doing and it does 
not matter if it is…a football tournament or removing toilets…but in the end you 
need to say what has this [activity] contributed to our core business, which is 
conservation. And that was missing sometimes…and that is what we are trying to 
address, whatever [activities are] done, we [need to] see how it contributes to 
conservation.  
Sally explained her view that the project was not contributing to larger, WCO marine 
objectives: “We were doing marine projects, but it was not put into a larger project and a larger 
framework where there is a connection” to WCO’s global objectives. The process through which 
WCO tried to integrate the Madang marine project into its larger global framework, described 
below, further illuminates varying individual approaches within the organization. 
Emphasizing Conservation: Realigning the project through the strategic plan 
As it became apparent that field staff visions differed from the preferences of their 
superiors in the Port Moresby office, WCO’s Country Director and Conservation Director 
proposed a technical solution: to revise the strategic plan. All of the Madang staff supported this 
decision and agreed the strategic plan needed to be revised because the marine components were 
not well connected to PNG project activities. Consequently, WCO organized a marine program 
strategic planning workshop in February 2010. 
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At the workshop, Port Moresby managers prioritized ensuring that all WCO PNG 
strategies, objectives, and goals contributed to existing WCO Global strategies and objectives. 
Managers stressed that all activities must fall under one of six CTI strategies. This approach 
meant that WCO managers defined national priorities according to previously defined global 
priorities, rather than first considering how the project location could contribute to larger 
conservation goals, or even investigating whether the project location could contribute to such 
goals.  
Staff participants described the workshop as top-down, with PNG managers from Port 
Moresby leading discussions and representatives from the Madang and Manus offices, the two 
locations where WCO carries out marine projects, rarely speaking. Ryan described the tone 
senior managers set at the workshop: “they said to me and [the Manus marine staff member] that 
your work is outside of WCO’s work. They said 80% of your work is outside…they say that I 
am irrelevant and we have to get with the program.” 
Another staff member said there “are entrenched structural, hierarchical issues within the 
organization and they [were evident in] our strategic plan” discussions. WCO’s national office in 
Port Moresby sent six representatives to the meeting while only one staff member from the 
Madang office and one representative from the Manus office attended. The dominance in Port 
Moresby-based staff, in both numbers and voice, suggests an attempt by senior managers to 
regain control over the marine project and ensure the marine strategy met organizational 
priorities. 
When I discussed the strategic plan with Patrick Tanou, one of the Papua New Guinean 
WCO Madang staff, who did not attend the workshop, he said local actors and the local situation 
did not drive the strategic plan. Rather, he said the strategic plan 
is from people, they come from someplace in the world. They do not know what 
is going on here and they do the strategic plan and you should get the people on 
the ground to be doing the plan...how can you expect people from another place 
who do not know anything about your place [to write your plan]...and then after 
all of these expats go back to where they came from, you are just there with their 
‘smart’ ideas, you have to work on them.  
Patrick’s comment underscores his frustration over his exclusion from the strategic 
planning process, despite his knowledge of the “on the ground situation.” He suggests a sense of 
place is important in gaining knowledge about particular locations and that non-local actors who 
“come from someplace” else lack such knowledge. Patrick feels he knows Madang Lagoon, the 
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communities, and what will and will not work. Consequently, when he and other Madang staff 
were not included in the planning process, this exclusion contributed to frustration that their 
knowledge of Madang, gained from their position on the ground, was not understood or valued 
within WCO.  
This limited participation of field-based staff in conservation decision-making is not 
limited to WCO’s strategic planning process but is representative of conservation decision-
making globally. Strategic planning meetings and other decision-making fora tend to take place 
in the organization’s capital location, rather than in the field offices. Further, because 
conservation professionals who work in the field tend to be more junior while senior staff are 
generally located in capitals, junior staff may also have less opportunities to participate in 
shaping conservation strategy.19 This geographic distance therefore can limit the decision-
making power of field-based staff, as Sachedina (2010) also demonstrates by describing how 
rural community conservation officers at the African Wildlife Foundation were excluded from 
annual or program meetings that were held in urban locations.  
Following the workshop, three senior staff finalized the marine strategic plan without 
involving Madang or Manus staff. WCO’s Conservation Director, who had arrived in PNG one 
month earlier, and a WCO Austria employee on secondment to the region worked with WCO’s 
Singapore-based Asia-Pacific Director to finalize the strategic plan. The Conservation Director 
described WCO’s efforts to think more broadly about project contributions to larger 
organizational objectives as the key difference in the new plan, which represented a successful 
outcome to her. She explained it “is going away a little bit from the small project approach and 
trying to use that to have a larger impact.”20 In contrast, Ryan viewed the final version as 
excluding his approach and those of his Madang and Manus colleagues, stating “whatever [part] 
we had managed to put in there, struggled to put in there, in that [strategic planning] process, 
they cut all of it out…and they came back with their new light version.” To Ryan, the strategic 
plan represented a failure to convince his superiors to support a broader, more long-term 
approach. 
Curiously, despite the emphasis senior managers placed on the marine strategic plan, 
none of the marine staff had the final version. Ryan said “I am the marine manger and I do not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Chapter Three on personal and professional choices contributing to this divide. 
20 Linking local activities to larger outcomes is a challenge for conservation generally. The Coral Triangle Support 
Program Year 3 report recognizes this challenge for the region. 
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have a copy of the strategic plan.” John Kepore, a Papua New Guinean who became the Marine 
Manager in September 2010, also said he had not seen the strategic plan. None of the other 
Madang staff, nor Samuel Parkop, the Manus staff member, had a copy. This limited staff 
participation in the strategic planning workshop and lack of access to the final marine strategic 
plan contrasts with the importance that senior managers placed on project realignment. This 
disjuncture suggests that senior managers used the strategic planning process as a public exercise 
to demonstrate their efforts to ensure project alignment, rather than as a participatory process that 
reflected multiple staff perspectives.  
To further illustrate how each PNG strategy corresponds with a global strategy, 
objectives, and goals, I describe the WCO CTI and WCO PNG strategies here. The four WCO 
PNG strategies in the revised marine strategic plan are: coastal management and inshore 
fisheries; offshore fisheries; marine species (turtles); climate change and tourism (WCO internal 
document n.d.). Each strategy then contains specific objectives. For example, WCO’s coastal 
management and inshore fisheries strategy has six objectives: integrating ecosystem based 
management into sectoral policies and legislation; financing spatially managed marine areas; 
establishing comprehensive and ecologically representative marine networks; achieving and 
showcasing effective management of spatial area networks; achieving and showcasing effective 
long-term community-based management; and incentivizing good practice in commercial 
inshore fisheries (WCO internal document n.d.). By 2014, WCO aims to have: 1) marine 
management area ordinances and community bylaws passed for 10 communities in two 
provinces and 2) community-based organizations in two provinces effectively managing local 
marine area networks. These WCO PNG strategies are similarly worded to the WCO CTI 
strategy, with identical language in some places, a similarity that illustrates how WCO PNG 
managers succeeded in aligning the marine project with WCO Global strategies and objectives.  
WCO’s strategic planning process illustrates how senior managers rejected the 
reorientation proposed by the Madang staff, marginalized or ignored field staff opinions, and 
instead focused on ensuring the Madang project aligned with organizational goals. By promoting 
the coastal management and fisheries objectives and not including WCO Madang’s proposed 
sanitation or agriculture components in the strategic plan, WCO PNG prioritized global 
strategies that would achieve internationally and nationally desired goals of creating WMAs. 
This decision allowed Port Moresby managers to continue to emphasize aligning field-based 
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projects with WCO global and national strategies rather than addressing field staff concerns or 
community priorities. Such a process further illustrates how WCO PNG managers produced 
official knowledge on the WCO Madang office that excluded WCO Madang knowledge, 
therefore producing ignorance about WCO Madang manager and staff preferences. 
Figure Three illustrates the process through which WCO PNG ensured that their 
preferred approaches were prioritized, resulting in particular organizational objectives and 
intended project outcomes. This figure also depicts the limited participation of the Madang and 
Manus staff in the strategic planning process, showing how six WCO PNG staff participated 
while only one staff each from WCO Madang and Manus participated.  
Figure Three. WCO Approaches and Internal Decision-Making Processes. 
 
This is the template: Ontological differences and Organizational pressure 
In this section, I suggest the varying approaches towards project reorientation and the 
strategic planning process do not result from miscommunication or personality differences but 
are emblematic of more fundamental ontological differences among conservation professionals. 
As noted previously, Port Moresby-based managers expressed concern about Ryan’s interest in 
addressing the social aspects of conservation. Thomas McDermott, WCO’s former Country 
Representative, described a conversation with Ryan where he told him: “you have a tendency to 
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move away from conservation.” Thomas advised Ryan to be cautious about influencing his staff 
to favor social approaches, disregarding Madang staff support for this approach and again 
emphasizing that the marine project needed to realign with WCO’s goals, particularly on WMAs.  
Ryan described how managers pressured him to create additional WMAs:  
The biggest problem is that WCO wanted to do WMAs. I was put under massive 
pressure to put in WMAs and I did not do it because it was not working…And 
you get [WCO managers] who keep going on WMAs…but a community has no 
need of them…[yet] I was pushed to launch new WMAs within 3 or 4 months of 
arriving. 
Ryan stressed that “the LMMAs21 and the MPAs are the management tool, they are not 
the objective…your objective should never be to create 10 WMAs, what does that mean?” This 
comment underscores ontological differences in how Ryan and his managers viewed WCO’s 
objectives and conceptualized objectives versus tools. Ryan’s field experience shaped his 
perspective that the WMAs were “not working” and were not an effective tool for achieving 
WCO’s objectives. He felt his managers’ emphasis on WMAs created an inappropriate focus on 
additional areas rather than on management of existing areas or support for livelihood 
components that could bolster local support for the WMAs. In contrast, staff based in Port 
Moresby and elsewhere continued to recommend establishing and promoting WMA networks, 
consistent with WCO and CTI strategies on coastal management and marine protected areas. 
Further, Ryan suggests his managers assume creating WMAs is a reasonable objective in itself 
while Ryan considers WMA creation to be a mechanism or tool towards other ends. Such 
differences elucidate ontological differences among individuals at different levels within WCO 
on how to implement conservation, underscoring tensions on the role of social or development 
activities in conservation efforts.  
Donor or organizational pressure may also influence individuals to implement particular 
organizational strategies. Ryan explained WCO’s “original proposal [to its funders] promised 
[additional] LMMAs or WMAs,” which he suggested influenced his managers to urge him to 
create WMAs. Ryan also suggested managers pressure their staff to contribute to WCO Global 
objectives because of managers’ own anxiety about fitting in with WCO’s priorities. He said, 
“[Management] made it very clear that they prioritized the wishes of the network and of their 
superiors.” He elaborated “there is this fear by the Moresby office that they will not fit in and 
they say this is the template, [you] need to move from where you are today.” Ryan’s comment 
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illustrates the emphasis placed on the WCO “template,” the idea that all projects should align 
with WCO Global strategies. 
This organizational pressure to align projects with a WCO “template” was not unique to 
the marine program but representative of broader pressure throughout WCO. Paul Smith, the 
former Terrestrial Manager, described a similar situation in which WCO’s Asia-Pacific Director 
told his staff to align their projects with WCO’s global template. He said this manager 
reprimanded him for trying to reassure his staff that their projects would fit in to the new 
structure: 
She started banging on about these key initiatives and [when] she left the room for 
awhile, I said, [to my team] you don’t have to worry…you have to concentrate on 
your own project and how you can deliver…and my own job and the job of others 
is to make sure that fits in with the structure. And she walked back in the room 
and she heard me and she objected.  
Paul said this manager then told him that he needed to ensure that all of his staff aligned 
their projects with WCO Global initiatives. These examples illustrate how WCO international, 
regional, and national offices placed pressure on staff to promote preferred strategies that were in 
line with WCO’s overall goals and intentionally ignored other approaches. This pressure may 
then translate into supervisors placing pressure on their staff. As a conservation organization, 
WCO Global and WCO PNG’s interest in focusing on conservation is understandable. However, 
the mismatch between WCO’s conservation goals and the community’s focus on agriculture, 
which is discussed further below, raises larger questions about how an organization decides a 
particular location can contribute to its organizational aims, a question I turn to below.  
Hearing the Undercurrents versus Ignoring the data 
The sections above illustrate varying approaches to marine conservation in PNG within 
WCO. This section presents an additional dynamic: that managers ignore data that do not support 
their desired approaches, as WCO PNG managers did when they minimized the findings of the 
Madang office’s PRA and finalized the strategic plan without marine staff input. To further 
explore this dynamic, I first revisit WCO assumptions about Madang Lagoon. I then compare 
these assumptions with field level evidence and household survey data.  
Managers may make or maintain assumptions based on a desire to ensure simplicity and 
avoid addressing complexity. For instance, WCO managers who assume increased fish catch 
benefits the community can continue to support WCO’s global marine conservation priorities as 
an appropriate strategy in Madang Lagoon. If managers recognized agriculture as the most 
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important livelihood strategy, these managers might have to reconsider whether WCO PNG can 
achieve such marine conservation aims in Madang Lagoon.22 Further, by recommending WMA 
creation to increase fish catch, WCO’s approach to marine conservation seems simple. If 
managers instead considered Madang Lagoon projects within a larger context of global fish 
consumption and the fishing industry, such a simplified approach no longer seems applicable.  
Remaining in Port Moresby enables managers to believe project activities contribute to 
broader WCO objectives. Conversely, a manager who visits Madang Lagoon and discovers 
inconsistencies between his vision and the project may then have to address these 
inconsistencies. In addition, short field visits may simply reconfirm managers’ assumptions 
because managers cannot gain in-depth understandings of community preferences or project 
activities in one to two days, as an example of WCO’s Conservation Director illustrates (see 
Chapter Three). After spending a morning touring one of the project villages with field staff and 
an afternoon on a boat visiting the conservation site, Sally returned to Port Moresby 
enthusiastically describing villagers’ interests in working with WCO on WMAs. She said she felt 
Madang field reports on villagers’ attitudes towards WCO were overly pessimistic in comparison 
with her observations. Her statement discounts the work of the Madang office in understanding 
villagers’ attitudes and priorities. 
In contrast to Sally’s perspective, Lauren Pomat, the Executive Director of a national 
conservation organization, emphasized the complexity of Madang Lagoon in a manner consistent 
with the Madang staff perspective. She described the challenges of working with different 
communities on marine conservation: “the community is so fragmented. You cannot get 
consensus, one lot say one thing and another lot say another and there is no consensus, so it is 
very hard to work in a place like Madang Lagoon.” Lauren’s comment corroborates the idea that 
one morning is too short to understand the multiple interests within communities.  
Robert Nelson, who works for a national NGO in Madang Lagoon, cautioned that NGOs 
that spend limited time in communities may not understand the dynamics:  
they drop in and stay for one hour or two hours and that is a problem because you 
need to build a relationship with the community…if you spend little time in 
community, you have to really know the dynamics in the community…if you 
spend less time…you will not hear…the undercurrents. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 WCO does not conduct any terrestrial conservation activities in Madang, which means that it does not address 
Madang Lagoon agricultural or land issues through other WCO programs.	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I asked Patrick Tanou how the Conservation Director had developed a perspective on 
Madang Lagoon that contrasted with project staff opinions. He responded,  
that is what [the managers] want to hear and you only see what you want to see 
and you only hear what you want to hear…[Sally] never talked about [the 
WMAs] to me, if she had, I would have told her [about the problems]. Yeah, of 
course the leaders would say everyone wants this and that, but when it comes to 
the individuals, it is all about livelihoods, you can’t have a WMA expected to run 
smoothly like that.  
His comments underscore the potential for managers to visit field projects and observe 
what they want to see, particularly when managers do not ask field staff opinions. This situation 
also highlights how Sally’s perspective on the importance of WMAs to community livelihoods 
differs from perspectives of the Madang staff and staff from other organizations.  
Highlighting Agriculture 
My survey data support the PRA findings that agriculture is the primary household 
occupation, while fishing remains a distant second, as shown in Table Four. However, Riwo 
households occasionally engage in fishing, usually as a supplementary occupation for additional 
protein and income. In contrast to common assumptions that most fishermen in Madang Lagoon 
are migrants, all of the households who described fishing as their primary livelihood strategy 
were born in the village. 
Table Four. Household engagement in fishing. 
Variable Respondents Percentage of Respondents 
Primary Occupation   
Agriculture 180 80 
Fishing 15 7 
Engage in fishing 172 77 
Primary fish location   
Reef/shallow 122 54 
Deep sea 47 21 
Sell fish 131 58 
 
Households reported catching up to 50 reef fish per trip. Among the households who 
fished, most typically reserved some fish for household consumption and then sold the remaining 
fish at the local market to generate cash income. The majority of households sold at least half of 
their fish catch: 51% of households (n=114) sold between 40 and 90% of their fish catch.  
As noted earlier, WCO managers promote WMAs at least partially based on the 
assumption that WMAs benefit local communities through increased fish catch. My data show, 
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however, that villagers do not perceive the WMAs as significantly increasing fish catch.23 When 
asked the effect of the management area on fishing levels, 71% of respondents felt the WMA had 
no effect or that fishing levels had decreased (Figure Four). Similarly, when asked if and how the 
marine area condition had changed in the last five years, 87% of Riwo residents did not believe 




As these data illustrate, the assumption that WMAs result in community benefits, such as 
increased fish catch, may be popular among senior level managers, but the majority of Riwo 
residents do not appear to share this assumption. Further, these data illustrate that agriculture is 
the primary livelihood strategy among Riwo households. As a whole, these data illuminate more 
quantitatively the contradictions between organizational assumptions and field evidence, a 
mismatch I explore in the discussion. I now turn to a final component in understanding WCO’s 
marine conservation efforts by considering eventual exit strategies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 I tested statistical significance and observed response variation using a chi-square goodness of fit test. The results 
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Figure Five. Effect of management area on 
marine condition  
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Changing Environments and Geographic Inertia  
As noted earlier, WCO focuses on critical global priorities and areas and Madang Lagoon 
has the potential to contribute to such priorities. However, the communities’ interest in 
agriculture, rather than fisheries, makes the potential “fit” between these communities and 
WCO’s strategies and its CTI priorities more tenuous.  
At the time of WCO’s internal debates about the marine project, public debates were 
taking place on the threat of extractive industries to Madang’s environment and on proposed 
changes to PNG’s Environment Act. Yet, despite the proposed legislation changes and 
potentially disastrous effects of industrial activities on Madang Lagoon, WCO did not address 
these larger-scale commercial and industrial issues or engage in discussions on the Environment 
Act. For instance, John Kepore, who replaced Ryan Harrington as WCO’s Marine Manager, said 
he asked WCO’s Communications Director about WCO’s position on the Environment Act when 
he started working at WCO. He elaborated “…what is happening in Madang right now, we do 
not have a clear position on all of these developments coming…what is WCO’s position?...I just 
put it on the table, do we have a position on all of these things coming up in Madang and she 
sidetracked that...” Given probable industrial impacts and local community interest in 
agriculture, this situation raises questions about how long an organization should focus on one 
location, particularly if the goals of the organization and the community diverge over time. 
Thomas McDermott, WCO’s former Country Director, framed this issue as “geographic 
inertia.” He elaborated, “once you have been based in an area, you will only move if there are 
strong enough reasons to do so… there is geographical inertia because it is expensive to move 
and reinstall and [it is also] a question of the environment and the relationships. But the danger is 
there, that you cannot afford to stay in one area forever, then you are back to the handout 
mentality, people are used to you being there…” He said geographic inertia resulted in 
organizations remaining in one location for long periods.  
Several others raised concerns about NGOs focusing on the same location for extended 
periods. Samuel Nickson, a staff member of another international conservation organization, 
explained “there are a lot of places out there that need to be protected and we cannot sit in one 
area all the time, we need strategies that would eventually get people to practice conservation 
and we would move on to other places…[my organization] has been in the Bismarck Sea for the 
last 20 years and [he shook his head] that is way, way too long, need to move on.” 
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Robert Nelson also recognized the potential problems of geographic inertia: “NGOs, 
where they are permanently based…in the community it can be good, but it can also be a 
problem, because people will see you as human cargo, they know that you are there as an 
outsider, an organization with money and they will depend on you.” Robert’s organization 
defines an exit strategy and uses specific indicators, such as independent community action, to 
evaluate when activities will be sustainable without the organization. Robert stressed this process 
is gradual: “when we are very sure that these communities can stand up, then we tell them okay, 
we are leaving you now, but if you have any problems you know where we are. We do not just 
drop communities, we go through a gradual...exit process…over several time periods.” 
Conservation practitioners in PNG also identified lack of NGO exit strategies as a barrier to 
effective marine conservation practice in PNG at a 2010 workshop (March Girls Report 2010). 
Patrick Tanou, one of the WCO Madang staff, said he felt WCO should consider an exit 
strategy for Madang Lagoon:  
WCO needs to…not step into things or start things they will not finish. We have 
to think really critically about the things we do, the kind of people we are 
involved with and the partners we have…I do not blame [the WCO staff] we work 
with, they talk about how they want the community to work with WMAs or how 
they want to see the WMAs extended in 5 to 10 years, but…We can go in but is it 
according to the peoples’ need, is it relevant?...[WCO has] been here for more 
than 10 years…but… conservation…for a place like Madang, it is not going to 
happen…Times are changing, you have to change with time and what is 
happening today and we cannot focus on the past… conservation is great, I would 
love to conserve all of Madang Lagoon…[for it to] become a big WMA but that is 
never going to happen. 
His statement suggests the vision of Port Moresby-based managers to extend WMAs and 
continue its current focus in Madang is unrealistic.  
John also expressed uncertainty about WCO’s long-term plan for Madang Lagoon, saying 
“It seems to me we are here so long as the money is there, that is the only strategy that I have 
seen.” WCO project reports provide support for John’s perspective on allowing the financial 
situation to define efforts in particular locations. One internal marine report stated that “the 
activities undertaken this quarter have very much been driven by funding opportunities that have 
arisen. Given the funding for the [specific marine] project is running out, the focus of the project 
has been on investigating funding opportunities to continue the conservation work.”  
Donor representatives also said they considered appropriate funding periods for 
organizations and projects. Jane Hopkins, a donor program officer, said her foundation asks 
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“when is enough enough” in terms of supporting organizations. She said, “Madang got to the 
point that enough was enough.” She explained her foundation felt WCO’s approaches did not 
address Madang’s large-scale threats, saying: “maybe before WMAs made sense, but over the 
years…[WCO] could not adapt to address those larger threats.” A staff member at another 
organization said, “WCO wanted to do certain things that was not [compatible with] how 
communities understand [the situation] and, you know, things went bad from there… I think that 
is one [of the problems], we go in with rigid plans and our own agenda and, second, we are not 
responsive to concerns that arise during our presence.” 
These comments suggest that a particular approach, such as WMA creation, may be 
appropriate at one time but may not be as the situation changes. For instance, WMA creation 
may have initially been an appropriate strategy in Madang Lagoon. However, as larger scale 
threats from extractive industry emerge and the community continues to rely on agriculture for 
its livelihoods, WCO’s aims and strategy no longer match the on-the-ground situation. Although 
WCO Global managers or others may view a marine conservation strategy as appropriate, given 
Madang Lagoon’s high biodiversity and location within the Coral Triangle, the on-the-ground 
realities make such a strategy a challenging one to implement and to gain community support 
for.  
This problem is also one of commensurability, where a conservation strategy that works 
in one location may be adapted in other sites without adjustment for local specificities based on 
an assumption that community positions and desires are similar around the world. As West 
points out, seeing communities this way does not allow for understanding “the process by which 
communities come into being across space and time,” becoming instead a “shared social process 
and product” (2006: 36). Such an approach also ignores the social context of human-environment 
interactions, a critical component in understanding PNG engagements with conservation. 
This section illustrates how Madang Lagoon may not be an appropriate location for WCO 
to achieve its goals, given external threats to Madang Lagoon’s marine environment and 
mismatches between WCO’s goals and community focus. However, as several staff describe, 
WCO is experiencing geographic inertia: as a result of WCO’s decade-long investment in 
Madang Lagoon, it has been easier for WCO to continue its activities and hope community 
attitudes and conservation outcomes improve because ceasing its Madang activities and focusing 
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on a more appropriate location could involve substantial time and resources. The discussion 
positions these challenges within broader literature on conservation theory and practice. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
My results illustrate three systematic differences in the beliefs and approaches of 
individual staff at WCO’s PNG and Madang offices. First, Madang staff favored a social and 
livelihoods approach while Port Moresby-based managers emphasized conservation-focused 
projects and sought to align WCO’s marine projects with identified organizational strategies. 
Such contrasting perspectives of field-based and capital-based staff underscore tensions on the 
role of “development” in conservation efforts and mirror larger debates on the relative value of 
anthropocentric versus biocentric approaches. WCO’s Conservation Director exemplifies the 
perspective of those who argue social development activities distract attention from biodiversity 
conservation. By emphasizing that marine activities should contribute to conservation goals 
rather than supporting social or agricultural needs, he represents the concern of many 
conservation professionals who advocate for prioritizing conservation. The Madang Marine 
Manager, in contrast, embodies the belief that including development priorities or tackling 
poverty as part of conservation efforts can boost local support for such areas, resulting in win-
win outcomes. Individuals who share this perspective are likely to recognize this approach not as 
a move away from conservation but as a broader, long-term approach that seeks to achieve both 
biodiversity protection and improved livelihoods.  
Second, individuals approach conservation from different temporal scales. Port Moresby 
managers focused on short-term outcomes from project activities while the Madang staff 
supported long-term approaches, a difference that merits further research. Third, staff possessed 
ontologically different beliefs about the role of WMAs in conservation: Port Moresby managers 
viewed WMAs as objectives while the Madang manager perceived WMAs as management tools.  
It is important to consider, however, that the WCO PNG preferences for conservation-
focused projects and short-term approaches and beliefs about WMAs as objectives could be 
reversed in another example or in a different organization, with field-level staff instead 
exhibiting these preferences. My point here is not to suggest that managers and staff at national 
offices will always possess these characteristics but rather that conservation professionals often 
have different beliefs and approach conservation in different ways. These differences result from 
the individuals who occupy these positions rather than from a structural reason at national or 
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local levels. More analysis on the background, experience, and factors that influence staff 
approaches is necessary to understand how such variations influence conservation projects and 
outcomes. These findings illustrate how tracking the inner workings of conservation 
organizations can illuminate individual preferences and actions. They also suggest challenges 
faced by conservation NGOs in achieving their objectives do not necessarily stem from 
prioritization of conservation over human needs or from the types of challenges Ferguson and 
others describe, which conclude interventions will fail to change dominant structures or address 
power asymmetries. Instead, the challenges described here emerge from the way organizations 
themselves recognize, incorporate, or reconcile the diversity of perspectives on anthropogenic 
and biocentric approaches to conservation. These systematic differences within conservation 
organizations have two broader implications for conservation theory and practice. 
First, disjunctures between intentions and outcomes can represent both failures and 
possibilities. For instance, some staff may welcome failures when they do not support intended 
outcomes, such as when Port Moresby managers undermined the Madang staff’s attempt to 
reorient the project. Disjunctures also provide opportunities for staff to ignore particular project 
knowledge and instead persist in their beliefs about appropriate project strategies. Similar to 
Dove’s (1992; 1994) findings on the behavior of Pakistani foresters, the persistence of WCO 
PNG managers in promoting WMAs highlights how some individuals promote particular 
strategies even when presented with contradictory evidence.  
This last point raises a second observation about how conservation practitioners may 
invite ignorance about certain project aspects. While the relationship between power and 
knowledge in environmental management has been widely studied, research on the production 
and/or reproduction of ignorance constitutes an emerging field. Matthews (2005) asserts that, 
like knowledge, ignorance can be produced and maintained, arguing the production of power and 
ignorance is both managerial and tactical. By paying attention to issues managers choose to 
ignore and what managers promote, this study sheds additional light on the effects of power 
relations in conservation decision-making.  
Individuals in organizational contexts like WCO may produce ignorance for a variety of 
reasons. One reason may be to avoid being associated with project failure, in part because 
managers and staff worry about the effects of failures on their careers. An admission that a 
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project fails to achieve its outcomes may require explanations, allocations of blame, or 
challenges to superiors, actions staff may be unwilling to take.  
Second, as the results suggest, managers may invite ignorance to ensure simplicity and 
avoid addressing complexity or inconsistencies. Managers often do not want to know about the 
complexity of local situations that “contradict pre-established global policy objectives” (Eyben 
2011: 155). Consequently, such ignorance is common among large projects and organizations, 
where the head office “frequently is ignorant of the difference between its visions of the project 
and the vision held by field staff” (Carrier and West 2009: 19). Ignoring particular data or failing 
to learn about local contexts allows individuals to continue to promote certain organizational 
interventions, as shown by Port Moresby managers who ignored data on differing community 
and WCO interests and who limited visits to Madang. Such a strategy also enabled managers to 
rework local activities into representations of success that supported broader WCO goals and 
kept WCO Global staff ignorant about the implementation challenges in the field.  
Third, producing ignorance enables individuals to avoid admitting failure or to represent 
failure in a more positive light to their supervisors or donors. For instance, van Helden (2009) 
found staff are more likely to describe how lessons learned from a project could be used to 
design improved projects rather than to admit failure (see McCallum and Sekhran 1997). 
Matthews (2005) documents a similar strategy by Mexican forest officials who control 
knowledge on forest practices to produce knowledge on failure that justifies their future 
interventions. Likewise, Heyman (2009) agrees admissions of failure are often tactical and 
designed to argue for additional projects or resources (see Li 2000). WCO’s approach also 
depends on collusion among WCO PNG staff who selectively share information and represent 
challenges as lessons learned, leaving WCO Global managers ignorant about existing tensions 
and challenges (as also described in Chapter Three).  
WCO PNG managers avoided admissions of failure by continuing to demonstrate ways in 
which WCO PNG aligned with WCO Global goals, such as by revising the strategic plan. By 
evaluating the contribution of national offices through project documents, WCO Global 
reinforces reliance on visions and documents, rather than on the ground realities. Consequently, 
WCO PNG managers had no incentive to share information about Madang Lagoon challenges 
with WCO Global. Therefore, the Madang marine project conformed to organizational goals on 
paper, if not in practice, and produced what other scholars have termed “virtual projects” (Carrier 
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and West 2009). This situation is reminiscent of Mosse’s conclusions on development 
interventions: “for policy to succeed it is necessary it seems that it is not implemented, but that 
enough people firmly believe that it is” (2003:70). Rather than admit difficulties, tensions, or 
failure, WCO managers provided evidence to show enough people, at the right levels, that they 
implemented the marine plan, a strategy that further perpetuates organizational ignorance 
because these managers did not share project challenges with WCO Global. By producing a 
strategic plan that aligned with WCO Global marine conservation goals, WCO PNG managers 
met the expectations of WCO Global managers. If WCO PNG managers had instead shared 
information about project challenges, they would have potentially opened themselves up to 
criticisms from their superiors or even placed their own jobs at risk. 
While Dove (1992) and Matthews (2005; 2011) write about the production of ignorance 
within government forest bureaucracies and forest communities, I suggest the production of 
ignorance represents a more general trend beyond these cases or the WCO offices and Madang 
Lagoon community. The production of ignorance illustrates a broad tendency among government 
bureaucrats, conservation and development staff, and others to share particular types of 
knowledge while minimizing or ignoring other types of knowledge. When these actors minimize 
or ignore knowledge, they contribute to the production of ignorance. Such tendencies may result 
from individual motivations, organizational or policy environments, or other factors that deserve 
further interrogation to better understand the relationships among power, knowledge, and 
ignorance across geographic contexts.  
In summary, the experience of this marine conservation project illustrates the multiple 
ways in which organizational mandates may diverge in practice as individuals translate goals 
into projects and then repackage activities to demonstrate contributions to organizational goals. I 
argue disjunctures between the approaches of staff based at capital and field offices have 
important consequences for the temporality, political process, and accounting practices within 
WCO’s marine conservation efforts. In this experience, the preferences of capital managers were 
promoted and included in the strategic plan while the preferences of field staff were 
marginalized. This process highlights ontological differences among individual staff and 
illustrates how managers may deliberately minimize or ignore such differences, including 
contradictory evidence, underscoring the importance of research and attention to the production 
of ignorance, rather than knowledge alone, in understanding conservation decision-making.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: Towards an environmental subjectivity in Papua 
New Guinea’s marine conservation efforts 
INTRODUCTION 
I met Anna on a Saturday morning in July 2010. I stopped at her house with Kanawi, one 
of my research assistants, as part of a household survey I was conducting in Pere village, PNG. 
She invited us to come sit on her back porch. We leaned against the wall, facing Anna and her 
eldest daughter Nellie, looking out towards the sea. She politely answered our questions, giving 
typical responses about her family’s history in the village, their participation in village activities, 
and their dependence on fishing. When we started discussing the changes that had occurred since 
the creation of a community management area, she took care to emphasize the importance she 
placed on conserving fisheries and the marine environment through the management area. Many 
other Pere households had also described positive attitudes towards fisheries and conservation, 
saying they had gradually seen increases in fish and more colorful corals, changes these 
households associated with positive management outcomes. Anna said similar things, but then 
she suddenly began to cry as she explained how worried she was for Pere’s long-term future and 
how critical conservation and fisheries management were if Pere wanted to maintain their 
fisheries-based livelihoods. Her statement indicated a concern that Pere’s way of life was 
threatened and she connected this concern with a need to conserve the environment.  
Anna is well off in Pere. Her family runs a small trade store from the bottom of their 
house that sells items such as biscuits, cigarettes, and instant noodles. The income from this 
store, combined with her daughter’s excellent fishing ability, means that the family has both 
sufficient food and cash income. While we were talking, three children approached the house and 
she invited them to share our lunchtime fish and sago.24 Afterwards, she described her concern 
that many children are now hungry since the ban on bêche-de-mer harvesting reduced the level 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Sago is a starchy staple food, extracted from the center of palm trees and beat to make a flour-like substance. 
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of income in the village.25 She estimated that she feeds three to five children a day, who she said 
know that they can always come to her for a biscuit or some extra fish.  
Anna is aware of Pere’s regional, national, and international connections. Her eldest son 
married a European woman and now lives in Europe although they still visit Pere. She spoke of 
life outside Pere, and Manus province, with knowledge and understanding. While some Papua 
New Guinean villagers may have unrealistic expectations of conservation organizations,26 Anna 
recognized many complex challenges of conservation in PNG and her community’s role in 
conservation. 
When Anna began to cry as she described the importance of fisheries for Pere’s future, 
she stressed that Pere needed to manage its fisheries and marine resources in a sustainable 
manner. All of her responses on questions about attitudes towards conservation illustrated strong 
support for conservation and management activities.  
Convictions like Anna’s form the basis for understanding individual attitudes and 
behavior towards marine conservation and the potential for involvement in particular activities to 
further shape individual attitudes and behaviors. Anna’s original support for the management 
area was based on her recognition of the need to increase fish numbers in the areas surrounding 
her village. Her emotional insistence about her belief, however, suggests the potential for such 
thoughts about the environment to become stronger over time. 
This chapter explores how individuals come to care about conservation and how their 
attitudes and beliefs translate into particular actions and behavior that support environmental 
protection. To understand Pere villagers’ beliefs and actions in relation to marine conservation, I 
examine how varying levels of participation in a marine management area shape attitudes and 
beliefs. I focus on new technologies to govern the environment that have emerged in Pere 
through NGO awareness efforts. I describe how this awareness raising introduced new terms that 
provided villagers with the tools to describe their desires and efforts in a way that also connected 
them to PNG’s international conservation community. To examine whether actions and behavior 
match stated changes in attitudes and beliefs, I use a household survey, interviews, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Papua New Guineans previously harvested bêche-de-mer, or sea cucumbers, for sale to export markets. Following 
a decline in bêche-de-mer numbers, the National Fisheries Authority implemented a three-year ban on its collection, 
beginning in 2009. The majority of Pere households said the closure affected their livelihoods, most commonly 
reporting decreased household income and financial problems, such as difficulty paying school fees. 
26 See West 2006 and Benson 2012 for examples in PNG. 
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observations. This comparison shows positive environmental attitudes alongside difficulties in 
enforcing the management area rules.  
Explaining the role of individuals in marine conservation is important for several reasons. 
Marine protected areas (MPAs) remain the primary global mechanism for conserving 
biodiversity despite concerns about their negative social impacts (West et al 2006; Christie et al 
2003) and mixed ecological outcomes (Kareiva 2006). There is an urgent need for work that 
documents successful conservation arrangements while recognizing such limitations or 
contradictions in MPA management. Further, understanding the role of local community actors is 
critical in examining how different arrangements can enhance biodiversity conservation theory 
and practice. By elucidating the beliefs, interests, motivations, and actions of Pere individuals, 
my findings shed light on community involvement in conservation efforts and subject formation 
in relation to marine conservation. Such discoveries are of importance to scholars of 
conservation and environmental governance and conservation practitioners who seek to 
understand both how to involve local communities in marine conservation efforts and how their 
involvement shapes biodiversity conservation.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter draws upon common property scholarship and literature on subject 
formation and environmentality, which share a common concern with understanding how 
individuals act in relation to the environment. A substantial body of literature on common 
property regimes demonstrates individuals who under certain specific conditions cooperate to 
manage common property resources, often in the absence of external authorities (NRC 1986; 
McCay and Acheson 1987; Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990; Baland and Platteau 1996; Ostrom et al 
1999; Agrawal 2003). Fishers around the world have successfully cooperated to develop 
institutional arrangements (Acheson 1988; Lim et al. 1995; Berkes et al. 2001; Acheson 2003) 
and studies demonstrate that community closures can increase fish abundance over time (Russ 
and Alcala 2004; Cinner et al 2006). In the Pacific, scholars illustrate the positive ecological 
effects of tambu areas, such as preserving fish catch and increasing fish reproduction (Adams 
1998; Fa’asili and Kelekolio 1999; King and Faasili 1999; Colding and Fole 2001; Thomas 
2001; Johannes 2002; McClanahan et al 2006). In North Manus, for instance, Cinner et al (2005) 
found tambu management areas contained 60 percent higher fish biomass than non-protected 
areas, promoted larger, more mature fish, and contributed to reproduction and recruitment 
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increases. Scholars have also shown that areas closed for non-conservation purposes, such as 
celebratory feasts and religious ceremonies, may still result in conservation outcomes (Aswani 
2005; Foale and Manele 2004; McClanahan et al 2006). Scholars associate low in-migration 
rates, community organization, social cohesiveness, and strong leadership with successful 
community management and enforcement of fisheries closures (e.g., Walmsley and White 2003; 
Aswani 2005; Cinner 2005; Cinner et al 2006; McClanahan et al 2006; Gutierrez et al 2011). I 
examine the presence of these factors in Pere’s marine management area. 
Second, I draw upon an emerging literature on subject formation and the environment to 
explore the formation of environmental subjects. As in the previous chapters, I draw on a body of 
scholarship on governmentality—the “conduct of conduct” (Gordon 1991: 2; Foucault 1991)—
that examines the practices through which subjects are governed and the ways governments 
attempt to produce subjects best suited to the aims of government (see Rose 1990; Taylor 1984; 
Ferguson 1990; Gupta 1998; Dean 2009; Hannah 2000; Bryant 2002). Several scholars have 
applied this governmentality framework to the environment, examining how governments or 
institutions seek to improve local populations and environments, but this analysis places more 
emphasis on government improvement schemes than on environmental subject formation. Others 
have interrogated analytics of eco-knowledge or geo-power to understand how nature comes into 
existence through particular types of knowledge, an approach that draws more on Foucauldian 
understandings of bio power than on subject formation (e.g., Luke 1999; Braun 2000; Demeritt 
2001; Rutherford 2007). 
Relationships between subjectivity and actions in the field of the environment have 
received comparably less attention (Rutherford 2007). One notable exception is Agrawal (2005), 
who develops the concept of “environmentality” to investigate how power/knowledge, 
institutions, and subjectivities are constituted and shaped by each other in community based 
forest management in India. Gabriel (2011) extends this concept to urban parks and park subjects 
in Philadelphia’s Fairmont Park. He uses archival photographs and park commission annual 
reports to illustrate the formation of park subjects and the everyday actions that constituted the 
park. He stresses that the formation of the park and park subjects was not inevitable but regularly 
produced and maintained through everyday practices such as photographs depicting men looking 
at the river, climbing on boulders, or relaxing—practices that produce images of acceptable park 
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behavior. Gabriel emphasizes that discourse “requires continual renewal and is always partial 
and open to reworking” (Gabriel 2011: 138). 
Others also demonstrate how “governing is always becoming” rather than a completed 
project (Rutherford 2007). In his analysis of the psychology of work and therapeutic 
interventions, Rose (1990) illustrates how individuals can shape themselves to improve their 
quality of life or move closer towards the individuals they wish to be. He emphasizes this 
process is not binary but that “we make, and can remake, our lives through our own choices” 
(1990: 253). Rose asserts individual attitudes and beliefs can change and re-change over time, 
bringing ambitions “into alignment with the ideals and aspirations of individuals, with the selves 
each of us want to be” (1990: 213). Agrawal (2005) also recognizes individual choice in the 
technologies of subjectivity, noting subjectivity is not merely imposed by state power but freely 
chosen by autonomous individuals who decide to act in particular ways. 
To Agrawal and many who expand upon “environmentality,” the role of the state is 
critical in shaping citizen preferences and behavior. Agrawal (2005) shows how changes in 
individual attitudes and beliefs followed institutional reforms in the Indian forest sector. 
Birkenholtz (2009) similarly concludes that attitudes and beliefs towards environmental 
protection follow state institutional change, rather than preceding it. Government policies first 
shaped population behaviors and then sought to alter their perception in Yeh’s (2009) analysis of 
a Chinese ecological construction project in Inner Mongolia. In contrast, this chapter considers 
the formation of environmental subjects in the absence of the types of state regulations most 
frequently described in scholarship on environmentality (though see Haggerty 2007). Given the 
low level of national or provincial government involvement in Pere village, as in many village 
localities throughout PNG, I investigate whether changes in individual attitudes and beliefs can 
emerge without government institutional regulation or policies.  
When analyzing subject formation and the environment, scholars have drawn attention to 
varying factors in differential attitudes towards the environment. Birkenholtz (2009) found caste 
and class influence farmers’ attitudes towards state groundwater conservation and regulation. 
Scheduled castes were much less likely to support regulations to limit tubewell construction and 
to limit withdrawal than general castes, which Birkenholtz attributes to a history of mistrust by 
the state among the scheduled castes and their fears about losing water access. Conversely, 
Agrawal (2005) found that individuals who participate in the regulation and enforcement of 
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forest rules began to care about the environment through their participation in these activities. He 
therefore proposes that regulation is not only about restraining rule-breakers but rather the 
relational and embodied basis for the formation of environmental subjects. He describes it as: 
“the source of awareness and recognition of the fragile resources on which livelihoods depend 
and the context in which practices unfold” (2005: 22-23). He concludes that differences in 
involvement and participation shaped environmental subjectivities in Kumaon and rejects more 
common assumptions that narrow social categories of caste, class, and gender shape differential 
attitudes. I draw upon this finding to formulate hypotheses about factors that shape 
environmental subjectivity.  
This study contributes to literatures on common property and subject formation by 
exploring how individuals come to care about and act in relation to marine conservation, using a 
case study from Pere village, PNG. I build upon common property scholarship by analyzing 
whether Pere village possesses the factors associated with successful community management 
and enforcement of fisheries around the world. I advance scholarship on environmentality by 
examining individual attitudes and behavior to explore whether participation and involvement in 
decision-making shape attitudes and beliefs. This chapter therefore provides insight on the 
involvement of local communities in marine conservation efforts and how such involvement 
shapes marine conservation outcomes. 
STUDY SITE AND METHODS 
This case study is based on research in Pere island, Manus province, approximately 300 
kilometers north of mainland PNG. Pere is situated to the southeast of Manus Island and is part 
of the Admirality group of islands. Pere villagers speak Titan, a language common to the 
southeast coast and coastal islands of Manus. Pere’s traditional reef tenure area is about 75km² of 
shallow reefs (Langarap and Matawai 2009). Pere is most well known through the work of 
Margaret Mead and others who followed in her path, an association which lingers today (Roll 
1980).  
Survey overview 
I conducted a household survey in Pere during July and August 2010. Prior to beginning 
my household survey, I presented my research objectives to selected community groups, 
including the five ward councilors, a group of individuals involved in the management area, a 
third mixed group of elders and other community leaders, and an open community meeting. 
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Consequently, by the time I began carrying out the survey, Pere villagers were generally aware 
of my presence and my research topic. I hired and trained five local villagers as research 
assistants so that all survey questions could be asked in Tok Pisin and Titan to ensure a high 
level of understanding.  
The survey included 164 questions grouped among 24 categories. Villagers were asked to 
consider the past five years when responding to questions on changes over time. On average, the 
survey took 1 hour, 44 minutes to complete, with total time ranging from a minimum of 30 
minutes to a maximum of 3 hours, 30 minutes. I field-tested the survey and conducted the same 
survey in two other PNG villages: Riwo village in Madang province and Nonovaul, in New 
Ireland province.27 A total of 436 villagers throughout PNG participated. 
Each household was invited to participate and households were visited multiple times to 
ensure an opportunity to speak with the household head. 164 households in Pere participated, 
representing approximately 92 percent of all households. Nine households could not be 
interviewed, either because household members were away from the village or, in two cases, 
because the household chose not to participate. 
While I use quantitative data to illustrate aggregate findings on individual attitudes and 
beliefs, I complement my survey results with qualitative data. Discussions with community focus 
groups held with youth, women, and elders, the Pere Executive Council, and other village 
leadership institutions, such as youths trained as part of the Locally Managed Marine Area 
(LMMA) network,28 provide additional data that I use to triangulate my findings. I typically 
spent 12 to 14 hours a day interacting with villagers. In addition, I interviewed conservation 
practitioners working in Pere and PNG and provincial fisheries officers in Manus and officers 
based in the capital. Other studies (e.g., Snodgrass et al 2008) have shown that survey data and 
statistical techniques can elicit important insights about environmental attitudes, beliefs, and 
practices, particularly when combined with ethnographic methods. 
Analysis 
To evaluate the relationships between variables, I used a Fisher’s exact test. The Fisher’s 
exact test is similar to a chi-square test, which tests the relationship between two categorical 
variables, but the Fisher’s exact test is a non-parametric test that does not assume that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 I included an additional 17 questions on Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) in Pere because of interest by the 
National Fisheries Authority and local NGOs. 
28 The LMMA network became the Center for Locally Managed Areas (CLMA) in 2008. 
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expected value of each cell is five or higher. The frequency of some responses in my survey was 
less than five, so the Fisher’s exact test is more appropriate. The tables below include the results 
of the Fisher’s exact test, which automatically calculates p-values. I used a p-value of 0.05, or 
95% significance. I used STATA 10 software for analysis. 
Hypotheses 
What are the factors that shape Pere villager’s attitudes and beliefs towards marine 
conservation? Previous evaluations suggest participation and involvement in village decision-
making, rather than social categories, shape attitudes and beliefs (Agrawal 2005). Consequently, 
I hypothesize the emergence of an environmental subject position is independent of social 
categories, such as gender, occupation, and religion, and predict there will be no statistically 
significant differences among these categories and attitudes and beliefs. This hypothesis 
recognizes a broader understanding of the way individuals constitute themselves beyond narrow 
social categories. 
I propose participation and involvement in village decision-making surrounding the 
management area shape positive attitudes towards the management area and marine 
conservation. This hypothesis is based on the idea that individuals who actively participate in 
fisheries and marine resources management will potentially observe positive results from their 
efforts and will then come to better understand and agree with the need to protect fisheries and 
marine resources. Conversely, if individual efforts at conservation do not result in positive 
results over time, I hypothesize individuals will be less likely to agree with the need to protect 
fisheries and marine resources and will express more negative attitudes towards the management 
area and marine conservation.  
RESULTS 
 To evaluate the factors that shape Pere villager’s attitudes and beliefs, I first describe the 
history of marine conservation in Pere to highlight independent actions taken by villagers. I then 
analyze village socio-economic characteristics to evaluate whether Pere exhibits the traits 
associated with successful fisheries common property arrangements. Finally, I analyze if and 
how involvement and participation in decision-making shape attitudes and beliefs. 
Emerging environmental actions  
Pere first initiated a tambu, or temporary closure, on its reef and traditional fishing area in 
1997 to address concerns about decreasing fish abundance and size. After an initial six-month 
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closure, Pere villagers observed increases in fish abundance and size within the tambu area. One 
villager involved in creating the closure explained, “there were turtles coming in and bigger fish 
coming in…[we saw] this idea was really working.” 29  Shortly after the creation of the 
management area, each of Pere’s five wards appointed individuals to enforce restrictions on 
fishing in the management area. One Pere resident explained this attempt: 
we have a management committee in place, so they are supposed to report the rule 
breakers to the village court magistrate, but it does not work. We went through all 
the different methods [of enforcement] under the sun. We divided the sea, like 
from the end to [an individual’s house] that was, Pere 1, you look after that piece 
of water and then we even divided the sea into five wards and it still did not 
work.30  
In the following years, as Pere continued to experiment with temporary reef closures, the 
International Conservation Organization (ICO) and the LMMA Network began to support Pere’s 
efforts and trained villagers in biological and socio-economic monitoring (Langarap and 
Matawai 2009). Monitors were then expected to regularly collect data.31 While Pere villagers had 
independently experimented with reef closures and enforcement, the involvement of these NGOs 
formalized village efforts and created possibilities for shaping environmental attitudes. The 
NGOs sought to shape Pere into a model conservation community through a series of community 
meetings on the importance of conservation. From an environmentality perspective, these 
meetings represent a technique to shape villagers’ aspirations to match NGO aims of creating an 
ecosystem-wide MPA. Pere villagers had demonstrated environmentally oriented behavior by 
creating a management area, but the involvement of ICO and LMMA introduced villagers to new 
languages, concepts, and tools.  
For example, ICO staff held a community meeting in early 2004 to explain the biological 
importance of conserving aggregating species. During the meeting, ICO staff encouraged Pere 
villagers to conserve spawning aggregation sites, emphasized the benefits of fisheries 
conservation, and cautioned that spawning aggregations could easily be overfished, resulting in 
fisheries depletion or extinction (Hamilton et al 2004). ICO introduced villagers to the Western 
conservation language of spawning aggregation sites, or “SPAGS,” through this awareness 
raising. While some Pere fishermen knew the existence and timing of these aggregations—and in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  This statement was originally in Tok Pisin.	  
30 This quote is in the original English. 
31 Monitors sent their data to the LMMA network for analysis but never received compiled results. This situation led 
to villagers’ mistrust of the LMMA network, which persists today. 
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fact, ICO depended on their knowledge for studies and reports—ICO’s presence changed how 
villagers described these areas. Pere villagers used SPAGs as a common term in their 
conservations with me. Similarly, other NGO training emphasized the importance of 
“Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management (EBFM),” providing villagers’ a new way to 
conceptualize their temporary reef closure, shifting it from a village-led closure to a critical 
component in a larger ecosystem-wide conservation effort showcased around the world.32  
The Pere Environment and Conservation Area Management Plan, developed by Pere 
villagers and local ICO staff, articulates the aspirations of Pere individuals to become individuals 
who care about and act upon the environment using new conservation language and concepts. Its 
overall goal is: “To safeguard the marine environment, maintain and restore fish populations and 
other fishery resources in Pere Environment and Conservation Area for the collective benefits of 
the current and future generations.” This management plan then describes how Pere hopes to 
achieve its conservation aims by implementing specific activities, including awareness and 
enforcement, and restricting fishing in particular areas, including in the SPAGS. Villagers 
initially expected ICO to help them implement this plan, but ICO has not provided this support.  
Ten years after Pere villagers first implemented reef closures, the Nali Sopat Penabu 
Local Level Government (LLG) Assembly formally recognized Pere’s management area in the 
“Nali Sopat Penabu LLG Environment and Conservation Law 2007,” the first environment and 
conservation law in Manus province (Langarap and Matawai 2009). It is important to note that 
this law recognized the Pere management area after the villagers created it—in other words, 
rather than the regulation coming first, as in the cases described by Agrawal (2005) and 
Birkenholtz (2009), the regulation came second in Pere. In the following sections, I consider 
whether environmental subjectivities can emerge in the absence of state regulations and the 
presence of NGO activities. I analyze village socio-economic characteristics in the next section 
to investigate the presence of factors common property scholars identify as critical for successful 
fisheries management in Pere.  
PERE VILLAGE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
The majority of Pere residents were born in Pere and have spent most of their lives in the 
village (n=110; 67%). Ten percent of respondents (n=16) were born in Old Pere, an island 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 For example, CLMA/LMMA and ICO describe Pere in publications and website text as part of their efforts in the 
internationally recognized Coral Triangle Initiative. 
	   101	  
current Pere residents lived in before sea level rise forced them to migrate to the island that is 
today considered Pere.33 Eighteen percent of respondents (n=29) were born in Manus province, 
though not in Pere, and five percent (n=9) were born outside of Manus. Several of these 
household members originally lived in Bougainville and moved to Manus during or after the 
Bougainville crisis.34 In other situations, a parent who was originally from Pere had a job outside 
of the village, such as working for the government or teaching, and the entire family lived 
outside the village or province and then returned to Pere when the family member retired. The 
average household size is five people, with size ranging from one to ten people. In general, Pere 
villagers are from Pere and expect to live in Pere for the majority of their lives, an expectation 
that I argue contributes to high levels of village involvement.35  
Pere residents depend on fishing for their livelihoods. 90 percent of households (n=148) 
said their primary household occupation is fishing. In addition, three respondents said their 
primary occupation is collecting crabs, increasing the number of households who depend on the 
sea for their livelihood to 92 percent. Five percent (n=8) of households rely primary on business, 
usually running a trade store or operating a passenger boat between Pere and Lorengau, the 
capital of Manus. Two percent (n=4) are formally employed and serve as a village pastor or a 
teacher. Many residents also depend on remittances from relatives. 
As a small island with no electricity, Pere is isolated from mainland PNG. The primary 
source of information about events outside Pere is via mobile phones. Thirty-four percent of 
respondents (n=56) said they relied on their mobile phones to hear news, usually by calling 
friends and relatives elsewhere. The next most common source of information was hearing the 
news from others who received it via their mobile phones (n=28; 17%). While 73 percent of 
households (n=120) said they read a newspaper, only nine percent of respondents (n=15) 
described newspapers as their primary source of information. Reading frequency also varied 
substantially: households most frequently read one newspaper per week (n=47; 29%), followed 
by once a month (n=27; 16%), and only one respondent said he tried to read the newspaper on a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Pere residents have inhabited multiple islands throughout their history; many residents also speculate that climate 
change may force them to move Pere to another location in the future. 
34 The Bougainville crisis arose from a war of secession between 1988 and 1998 that resulted in the formation of the 
Autonomous Bougainville Government in 2005. 
35 Demerath (2003) also highlights an acceptance among Pere villages that they will remain in their village. He 
concludes young Pere villagers disengage in higher education because “ples i stap,” indicating that village is there 
and they can always return. 
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daily basis.36 Households often shared newspapers; I observed one newspaper circulate among at 
least ten households, serving as an additional way in which villagers share communication about 
the world outside Pere. Twenty-seven percent of households own a radio (n=45) while eight 
percent own a television (n=13).37 On the whole, this data shows that Pere villagers share 
information about outside events among themselves and suggests general social cohesiveness 
among villagers.  
Participation in Pere activities is high and most residents participate in at least one local 
institution, usually church activities. Other popular activities were fisher’s associations, such as 
the Pere Fishermen’s Association and the recently formed Manus Fisheries Cooperative Society 
(MAFISCO), sports, and village committees. Residents generally describe Pere as an organized 
community. Grace, a member of the Pere Executive Council, credits conservation efforts with 
organizing the village. She said:  
conservation brought in all of these organizations, I mean Pere is one of the most 
organized communities in Manus. I think it is because during our process of going 
into conservation, management of our resources, we needed to organize ourselves 
and…in that process of organizing ourselves we also needed to organize our main 
structure, our community structure, so now everything else that comes in, we have 
all of those structures in place, all because it started from conservation… I think it 
is conservation in Pere that was one of the eye openers to all of these 
changes…and it paved the way for us to organize ourselves.38  
The majority of residents described their participation in village institutions as average, 
stating they usually spent about 24 hours per month on village activities. Forty-three percent 
(n=70) said their participation was high or very high while only eight percent (n=14) said their 
participation was low or very low. Villagers in Madang and New Ireland provinces, where I also 
conducted household surveys, also described their village participation as average (72% and 
63%, respectively). However, they defined average participation at much lower levels than in 
Pere. In Riwo village in Madang, for instance, 70% (n=113) of respondents said they spent two 
to six hours per month on village activities. Residents in Nonovaul, in New Ireland province, 
described average participation as 16 hours per month, an amount significantly lower than in 
Pere. These differences in village involvement are also evident in community days: in Pere, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The national newspapers arrive in Manus province via the Air Nui Guini flight, which arrives three to four times 
per week. Consequently, available newspapers are not always the most recent versions or may not be available the 
day an individual visits town. 
37 These televisions run on batteries or generators and typically serve as informal cinemas. 
38 This comment was originally in English. 
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weekly community day is mandatory and individuals who do not attend face social pressure and 
must pay fines. In contrast, Nonovaul’s community day is more casual and Riwo does not 
consistently organize community day. These variations underscore the high level of participation 
in Pere village activities. 
Pere residents generally felt they had a say in village decision-making. They described 
community decision-making as a bottom up process where the community holds discussions and 
the Pere Executive Council, composed of the council of chiefs and elected officials, then makes 
the final decision. Eighty-eight percent of respondents (n=145) said everyone in the village has a 
fair say in decision-making. Among the ten percent of respondents (n=17) who did not agree that 
everyone had a fair say, respondents generally said women and youth participated less. In an 
evening discussion I organized with Pere women, all participants said they were comfortable 
sharing opinions in community meetings. They cited the various women serving on village 
committees, including the education, law and order, physical planning, and sports committees. 
One woman explained, “In our community, meetings must have women attend, make decisions, 
share opinions.”39 In addition, each ward has a woman representative.  
In contrast to the high level of activity and engagement among Pere villagers in their 
local committees and other village institutions, other forms of government are noticeably absent. 
The Manus provincial government is based in Lorengau, several hours away by motorboat, and 
government representatives generally only visit for official events or purposes. Respondents said 
the LLG President (n=61; 37%) was the most frequent government visitor to Pere and said he 
attends events, such as the management area launch, or visits prior to elections. When asked 
specifically about provincial fisheries officers, 82% of respondents said fisheries officers visited 
Pere to raise awareness on fishing and fishing cooperatives or to conduct monitoring. 
Respondents most commonly said government representatives visited once a year or “not often,” 
demonstrating that government officials are not regularly present.  
Pere villagers view fisheries management as an individual and village responsibility 
rather than a government responsibility. 48% of respondents (n=78) identified individuals as the 
group who should address coastal fisheries management while 40% (n=65) ranked individuals 
second. Forty-three percent of respondents (n=71) said the village was the level best positioned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  This statement was originally in Tok Pisin.	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to address fisheries management while 48% (n=78) ranked it second. Respondents ranked 
provincial government and national government third and fourth.  
Between the training of village monitors in 2004 and July 2010, when the survey was 
conducted, villagers said local monitoring and rule enforcement decreased. Monitors did not 
actively enforce fisheries restrictions and perceptions that the management area rules did not 
work were common. While 93% of respondents (n=153) said there were management area rules, 
only 35% (n=57) said these rules were effective. Villagers said the rules were not effective 
because there was no enforcement: 35% of respondents (n=58) said enforcement was moderate, 
50% (n=82) described enforcement as low, and 9% (n=15%) said there was no enforcement. I 
return to this issue of enforcement in the discussion section, after describing the attitudes and 
beliefs of Pere villagers.  
ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS 
Agreement on protection of fisheries and marine resources  
Pere villagers strongly agree with the statement that fisheries and marine resources 
should be protected, with an average response of 4.74. General involvement in fisheries and 
beliefs about who should solve fishing problems did not result in a statistically significant 
difference in agreement on the need to protect fisheries and marine resources (Table 5). 
However, individuals involved in community decision-making were slightly more likely to agree 
that fisheries and marine resources needed protection than individuals who did not participate in 
decision-making, a statistically significant finding. This finding suggests individuals who 
actively participate in fisheries or marine resources management will be more likely to agree 
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Table Five. Attitudes towards fisheries and marine resources protection (n=164). Bold 
numbers represent statistically significant values (p-value=0.05). Questions were recorded on a 
Likert scale, from 1 (strong disagreement) to 5 (strong agreement). 
Agreement with the statement “Fisheries should be protected” 
OVERALL 4.74 
Is there a role that you and household members can play to address fishing problems? 
Yes (n=119) 4.76 
No (n=16) 4.69 
Leaders only (n=13) 4.77 
Fisher’s exact .472 
Are you involved in community decision-making related to the management area? 
Yes (n=97) 4.75 
No (n=65) 4.74 
Fisher’s exact .014 




Government (n=4) 4.75 
NGOs (n=8) 4.75 
Don’t Know (n=5) 4.0 
Fisher’s exact .224 
 
Changes in attitudes over time 
When asked if their attitude towards the management area had changed over the past five 
years, the majority of individuals described positive changes over time, with an average score of 
2.97. Individuals who said their household or leaders could play a role in fisheries management 
reported a more positive change in attitudes towards the management area over time than 
individuals who said their household did not have a role (Table 6). Further, individuals whose 
households were involved in decision-making reported more positive changes in attitudes than 
individuals whose households were not involved. These findings suggest individuals who 
participate in fisheries and marine resources management and decision-making will be more 
likely to agree with the need for protection and to report positive changes in attitudes over time, 
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Table Six. Attitudes towards the management area over time. Bold numbers represent 
statistically significant values (p-value=0.05). Attitude change was recorded on a scale from 1 
(negative) to 3 (positive) while size, speed and length were recorded on a scale from 0 
(small/gradually/long time) to 1 (substantial/suddenly/recently). 
 




OVERALL 2.97 .67 .11 .66 
Is there a role that you and household members can play to address fishing problems? 
Yes (n=119) 2.97 .67 .13 .62 
No (n=16) 2.8 .79 .07 .64 
Leaders only (n=13) 3 .46 0 .85 
Fisher’s exact .049 .121 .363 .133 
Are you involved in community decision-making related to the management area? 
Yes (n=94) 2.97 .64 .13 .68 
No (n=67) 2.96 .71 .10 .64 
Fisher’s exact .024 .127 .154 .190 
Who should solve fisheries problems? 
Community 
(n=145) 
2.97 .69 .12 .65 
Government (n=4) 2.75 .67 .25 .67 
NGOs (n=8) 3 .38 .13 .88 
Don’t Know (n=4) 3 .50 0 1 
Fisher’s exact .062 .016 .177       .055 
 
Household role in addressing fisheries problems also shows a statistically strong 
relationship with changes in attitude towards marine conservation (Table 7). Individuals who 
said their household or leaders could play a role in fisheries management reported a more 
positive change in attitudes towards marine conservation over time than individuals who said 
their household did not have a role, similar to attitudes towards the management area. Further, 
this variable showed a strong relationship with related questions about changes in attitude 
towards marine conservation over time: individuals who said their household or leaders could 
play a role in fisheries management reported more substantial changes, slightly more sudden 
changes, and more recent changes. However, involvement in community decision-making and 
beliefs about who should solve fisheries problems were not statistically significant predictors of 
attitudes towards the management area over time, though it is important to note that all groups 
reported positive changes over time. 
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Table Seven. Attitudes towards marine conservation over time. Bold numbers represent 
statistically significant values (p-value=0.05). Attitude change was recorded on a scale from 1 
(negative) to 3 (positive) while size, speed and length were recorded on a scale from 0 
(small/gradually/long time) to 1 (substantial/suddenly/recently). 
 






Length of change  
OVERALL 2.93 .64 .10 .63 
Is there a role that you and household members can play to address fishing problems? 
Yes (n=118) 2.93 .68 .11 .62 
No (n=14) 2.79 .58 .10 .42 
Leaders only (n=13) 3 .54 0 .85 
Fisher’s exact .019 .001 .029 .002 
Are you involved in community decision-making related to the management area? 
Yes (n=94) 2.91 .64 .1 .63 
No (n=67) 2.96 .65 .1 .64 
Fisher’s exact .139 .177 .231 .153 
Who should solve fisheries problems? 
Community (n=145) 2.92 .67 .10 .61 
Government (n=4) 3 .50 0 1 
NGOs (n=8) 3 .38 .13 .75 
Don’t Know (n=4) 3 .25 0 1 
Fisher’s exact .352 .152 .446 .157 
 
Categorical affiliations were not statistically significant predictors of attitudes and beliefs 
on the environment. Gender, household occupation, and religion did not show a statistically 
significant relationship with attitudes towards fisheries and marine resources protection or 
towards marine conservation over time, though men were more likely to describe gradual 
changes in attitudes towards marine conservation while women described slightly more sudden 
changes (Annex 1, Tables 7 and 8). Similarly, gender and religious affiliations did not show a 
significant relationship with attitude changes towards the management area over time (Annex 1, 
Table 3). However, households whose primary occupation was fishing or employment reported 
more substantial changes in attitude towards the management area over time, compared with 
households primarily engaged in business who reported only small attitude changes. This 
difference may be explained by the lower dependence on fisheries among households engaged in 
business. In addition, given the small number of households engaged in employment, this 
difference could result from one opinion rather than signifying a general trend.  
In summary, Pere villagers strongly agree fisheries and marine resources should be 
protected and described positive changes in attitudes towards the management area and marine 
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conservation over time. In addition, two variables were associated with more positive responses: 
involvement in addressing fishing problems and involvement in decisions related to the 
management area.  
DISCUSSION 
The emerging body of scholarship on environmentality suggests that behavior precedes 
interests, often in the context of government regulation (e.g., Agrawal 2005; Yeh 2009). In Pere, 
where government regulation did not emerge until after villagers experimented with no-take 
zones, the process has been slightly different. Villagers exhibited some behaviors that suggest 
the formation of an environmental identity: initiating a tambu area in 1997; developing a 
management plan; and attempting to monitor the area. In addition, villagers’ stated that their 
attitudes towards the management area and marine conservation became more positive over the 
past five years, suggesting individual attitudes and interests came to align with initial 
conservation behaviors, similar to what scholars of environmentality predict.  
Pere exhibits several characteristics associated with successful community management 
and enforcement of fisheries closures globally. Pere has low in-migration rates, high social 
cohesion and community organization, and strong leadership. At the same time, villagers said 
lack of enforcement makes their management area rules ineffective, a finding which suggests 
villagers have failed to transform their positive attitudes and awareness about fisheries and 
marine resources into everyday monitoring and enforcement practices, in part because 
neighboring villagers still fish in Pere’s management area. This finding underscores larger-scale 
enforcement as a critical component of successful marine governance arrangements.  
Common property scholarship provides some insight on how communities around the 
world have addressed similar challenges of enforcing fisheries restrictions among neighboring 
villages (Gutierrez et al 2011), both in terms of excluding resource users (Ostrom et al 1999; 
Dietz et al 2003) and moving from community-based resource management to more complex, 
nested institutional arrangements at multiple scales (e.g., Young 2002; Dietz et al 2003; Berkes 
2006). Scholars and practitioners also attribute self-enforcement and strong leadership with 
successful fisheries management (Jentoft 2003; Gutierez et al 2011; Abunge et al 2012).  
Pere villagers expressed varying attitudes towards self-enforcement. Many villagers felt 
individuals deserved payment for their efforts. For instance, during a meeting between the Pere 
Executive Council and the socio-economic monitors, participants stressed that money was 
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necessary for fuel to patrol the area and for flashlights and batteries to provide light at night.40 
Others strongly supported an allowance for individuals involved in enforcement efforts. A few 
villagers argued that enforcement should be prioritized even in the absence of compensation. 
After prolonged discussions, the community decided that each ward councilor would nominate 
three youth41 to act as “sea-rangers” who would voluntary enforce management areas rules as a 
service to the community. While Pere villagers planned to move forward with these voluntary 
enforcement efforts, they still hoped to attract a donor to support their efforts and it is uncertain 
how long such efforts will continue without financial support.42  
Other PNG communities have asserted that villagers should receive payment for 
enforcement efforts. In Nonovaul, for example, the management area chairman repeatedly 
insisted to me that villagers needed a boat and ranger uniforms to carry out enforcement 
activities. Villagers in Madang Lagoon expressed similar sentiments. Conservation practitioners 
are aware of this payment expectation and some NGOs have paid communities for enforcement 
activities, fueling community expectations of receiving compensation in exchange for 
enforcement.43 However, none of these marine management areas generate fees; consequently, it 
is unclear how such compensation would be sustainable over the long-term.44 I argue that this 
situation means that long-term enforcement and management of the marine area will depend on 
Pere community actions; consequently, understanding how particular environmental behaviors 
emerge is critical for the long-term sustainability of this marine conservation area and for 
conservation efforts more generally.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Prior to my research, Pere had benefitted from a Fishing Aggregation Device (FAD), which resulted in increased 
fish catch and increased fish for sale by Pere women at the Lorengau town market. As villagers describe, this 
situation resulted in jealousy among neighboring villages and youth from the closest village, M’Bunai, destroyed 
their FAD at night. Consequently, some enforcement expectations are related to the losses sustained by Pere after 
not enforcing fishing rules at the FAD. Pere villagers and their relatives in Port Moresby raised money to partially 
fund a second FAD that they deployed in September 2010, in partnership with the National Fisheries Authority. 
41 A village youth generally includes males and females up to the age of 35. 
42 Funding for the management plan has been a significant and increasing source of tension between Pere and 
NGOs. For instance, TNC and the PNG CLMA use Pere in their funding proposals but Pere villagers believe they do 
not benefit from these proposals. Consequently, several villagers want to secure independent funding. They 
submitted proposals to support the implementation of the Pere management plan to several different groups but have 
not been successful yet. 
43 See West (2006) for a detailed account of the exchange relationship expectations of one Papua New Guinean 
community, who viewed their participation in conservation as an exchange for development. 
44 I do not view ecotourism as a viable option or alternative, despite the interest of some villagers. While tourism 
may support conservation in some locations in PNG, it is unlikely to be an option in Pere given its location and the 
high cost of travel to and within PNG. 
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Rose suggests that governmentality takes shape through a complex assemblage of 
technologies that shape “aspiration of individuals with the selves each of us wants to be” (1990: 
213). Pere villagers have an image of what they would like to become but struggle to align their 
aspirations with their everyday actions. They have a vision that their beliefs (support for fisheries 
and marine conservation) will be transformed into actions (effective management and rule 
enforcement, resulting in increased fish catch). One strong supporter of conservation in Pere 
explained this challenge: “Pere is a model of conservation and yet we’re not succeeding and we 
have had conservation for a long time and yet we’re still figuring out how to do the enforcement 
and the rules.” This villager makes positive statements about commitments to conservation but 
follows each one with “yet.” This syntax mirrors the space many Pere villagers find themselves 
in: they express positive attitudes and beliefs on the environment and yet these beliefs have not 
translated into sustained enforcement practices.  
Another representative comment comes from an individual who was originally trained by 
the LMMA network as a monitor. He explained, since the creation of the management area: 
the marine resources really have changed. The results are increase of fish and 
others, lalai, pis lama. When I saw this improvement in our marine areas, it really 
motivated me to work closely with LMMA so that my community will continue 
to enjoy a quality of life in a healthy island environment. Everyone in the 
community supports the [management area] because they saw some positive 
changes...I became interested in conservation in 2007…because the work of 
conservation brings value and recovery to our land and reef. One of the things that 
discourages me most is about the ‘monitoring’. We have monitored the tambu 
areas a couple of times but I haven’t gotten the reports yet. I don’t know how the 
condition at the conservation area (monitoring) is going. Another thing is we have 
come to a halt. I don’t know who or what is stopping us from functioning.45  
This comment that he is discouraged because Pere villages have “come to a halt” 
illustrates the struggle individuals may face in becoming environmental subjects and underscores 
that positive attitudes alone have not produced a collective behavioral change in which Pere 
villagers embrace enforcement as an everyday practice.  
Pere’s enforcement struggles mirror a wider challenge faced by the conservation 
community in PNG. Conservation organizations initially focused on creating marine 
management areas; after successfully creating these areas through a variety of mechanisms 
(wildlife management areas, LMMAs, local conservation legislation, etc.), many organizations 
and communities have encountered challenges in implementing and enforcing management 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 He gave me this written statement in English. 
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areas.46 A program officer with one foundation funding marine conservation in PNG identified 
enforcement as a major challenge:  
We are grappling with [the issue of enforcement in] the programs we are 
supporting. Over the past decade, people focused on working with communities, 
more or less well, setting up protected areas, getting monitored…[now] they are 
all at a stage where they are at a point that enforcement is a key issue and [they 
are considering] what to do next and we are grappling with it, what can we do on 
the enforcement side. 
This statement indicates enforcement, implementation, and management as common 
challenges faced by both the Pere community and the NGO and donor communities. More 
broadly, it illustrates another key finding of this chapter: that individuals may intend to achieve a 
particular outcome, such as the effective management of a marine protected area, but may still 
fail to achieve their intended outcome. This finding underscores how good intentions alone do 
not result in achievements, suggesting yet another way in which gaps between intentions and 
achievements emerge. At the same time, by continuing their efforts, Pere villagers may still 
achieve un-intended outcomes over the long-term that may be better than the ones that they 
originally imagined. 
Despite the challenges they have encountered in aligning their intentions and 
achievements, Pere villagers have persisted in their marine conservation efforts. In a leader’s 
meeting in late July 2010, Pere leaders discussed visiting nearby villages to conduct conservation 
awareness. They recognized the importance of engaging neighboring villages in their efforts 
because the fish near Pere traveled outside Pere boundaries, particularly during spawning 
periods. The village chief emphasized that other villages “get the benefits of our conservation so 
they must also protect the fish that belong to all of us.”47 The village magistrate agreed, saying 
“neighboring communities all use our fishing areas so they must all be clear that we have a 
tambu in the area so that they do not break the tambu.”48 After a general discussion on the 
importance of villages supporting Pere’s conservation efforts, participants debated how to raise 
awareness among neighboring villages. Participants decided Pere representatives would share 
their experience in creating a management area with neighboring villages and inform them about 
Pere’s restricted fishing area. Pere’s chief concluded, “when they know that we are committed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The LMMAs in Kimbe Bay, West New Britain are likely an exception; however, the communities surrounding 
these LMMAs do not fish. 
47	  This statement was originally in Tok Pisin.	  
48	  This statement was originally in Tok Pisin.	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conservation, they will all be happy to work towards conservation too.”49 Another villager 
stressed wider cooperation among Pere and other Titan villages as essential, stating “if the Titan 
people say we look after, so it is not just Pere, if the entire Titan community [is] managing that 
and looking after it and it becomes a wider circle of enforcement, and I think that will work…I 
am convinced it will be all right.”50 
Grace, a member of the Pere Executive Council, presented these plans at a marine 
conservation workshop in October. A conservation practitioner who attended the meeting later 
described her reaction to Grace’s presentation to me: “Grace is [giving a presentation], talking 
about [conservation], about EBFM, and just spitting it out. And I am just thinking…this is 
crazy…Grace talked about Pere communities leading the way and helping other communities to 
do EBFM...” This individual felt this description of Pere communities leading the way was a 
“savvy” claim that would not be implemented but was intended to show off or position Grace to 
receive financial support from the attendees, reminiscent of the ways Tsing (1999), Li (2000), 
and Hirtz (2003) argue local people may articulate specific indigenous identities to engage with 
and benefit from conservation.  
After witnessing internal discussions about fisheries and marine conservation among 
many Pere community members, including meetings on their plans for this awareness raising, 
however, I argue this claim represents more than mere posturing or an attempt by Pere to mold 
themselves into ideal villagers to benefit from conservation. Pere depends on fishing for their 
livelihoods; consequently, while they may have ambitious ideas and may encounter difficulty in 
implementing some of their proposed ideas, their statements indicate their commitment to 
conservation and awareness and a recognition that their success as a village depends on broader 
support from neighboring villages. A desire to protect the marine environment or to share this 
commitment with other communities, whose actions and behavior directly influence fisheries 
outcomes in Pere, is not in contradiction with financial concerns or material self-interest. Rather, 
Grace used this new language and the concept of EBFM, which she learned through NGO 
trainings in Pere, to engage with the meeting attendees in the language they spoke amongst 
themselves, hoping it would lead to desired support and help Pere achieve the ideals set out in 
the management plan.  
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  This statement was originally in Tok Pisin.	  
50	  This statement was originally in Tok Pisin.	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Anna’s personal story in the introduction is a reminder of the convictions that underlie 
statements about environmental attitudes and an illustration of larger processes of change in 
Pere. She felt strongly about conservation in Pere because of her concerns about the village’s 
future and the positive changes she observed. To be too hasty in judging Grace’s presentation as 
an example of an individual merely seeking to gain from conservation misses a wider point: 
some individuals in Pere may, and likely do, position themselves to benefit from Pere’s 
environmental commitment. But to characterize their attempts at management in this way 
ignores the subtle transformation of environmental subjectivities, individuals who have come to 
care about the environment and who are trying to think and act in new ways and use new 
languages and tools to do so.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The commitment of Pere villagers to marine conservation is evident in their statements 
about fisheries and marine resources protection and their actions to create a management area 
and a management area plan. These data do not claim that Pere villagers’ participation in the 
creation of a management area or their continued efforts will result in this management area 
achieving its aims over the long-term nor that communities who follow a similar process will 
achieve comparable results or experience similar changes in beliefs or actions. Still, Pere 
villagers have come to care about and think about conservation. As these individuals act in 
relation to the environment and identify and position themselves in new ways, they have also 
struggled to enforce management area rules. Their renewed commitment to voluntary 
enforcement represents an important first step in forging new environmental behaviors, but it is 
not yet clear if enforcement will become an everyday practice among Pere villagers or if 
implementation gaps will persist. As I suggested earlier, long-term enforcement and management 
of the marine area will depend on Pere community actions, which makes the emergence of such 
environmental practices critical for the area’s long-term sustainability. 
In comparison to Agrawal (2005), who shows how Kumaoni villagers come to care about 
forests and manage them effectively, this chapter illustrates that Pere villagers care about the 
environment and are trying to manage it, succeeding in some ways and facing challenges in 
others. Both Agrawal and Birkenholtz (2009) point to the importance of state regulations in 
changed practices among villagers. In Pere, where the government has a limited presence, legal 
recognition of environment and conservation came after villagers created a management area 
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with the help of NGOs, a finding that raises questions about whether formal regulations are 
necessary to support attitudinal and behavioral changes. Pere’s experience offers a window into 
how individuals come to act on their beliefs and the hurdles individuals may encounter when 
translating their beliefs into actions. Their struggle also illustrates transformation to 
environmental subjectivity as a process, similar to the ways Rose (1990) and Gabriel (2011) 
describe how subjectivity can change and be re-made over time.  
In summary, this chapter illustrates strong beliefs and attitudes towards marine 
conservation alongside implementation gaps. For Pere, enforcement of management area rules is 
likely to be critical in effectively conserving and managing fisheries and marine resources. The 
high dependence of Pere villagers on fishing for their livelihoods, as well as an expectation that 
most villagers will spend the majority of their lives in Pere, are two factors likely to motivate 
villagers to identify solutions to enforcement challenges. As Pere villagers develop and modify 
their efforts to enforce village rules, it will be important to analyze if differences emerge in 
reported attitudes and beliefs towards the environment in relation to differential roles in 
enforcement. If Pere villagers are unable to resolve their enforcement challenges, it is possible 
that some individuals may become more negative about the management area and marine 
conservation over time. Still, the long history of common property offers reasons for optimism 
and serves as a reminder that many communities around the world have worked through some of 
the challenges facing the Pere community. As such, they offer hope for Pere villagers.   
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Supplementary material 
Table Eight. Attitudes towards fisheries and marine resources protection (n=164). 
Questions on attitudes towards the environment were recorded on a Likert scale, from 1 (strong 
disagreement) to 5 (strong agreement). 
 
Agreement with the statement “Fisheries should be protected” (1=low, 5=high) 
OVERALL 4.74 
GENDER  
Male (n=135) 4.77 
Female (n=29) 4.62 
Fisher’s exact .277 
OCCUPATION  
Fishing (n=151) 4.71 
Business (n=8) 4.75 
Employment (n=4) 4.75 
Fisher’s exact 1.0 
RELIGION  
Catholic (n-19) 4.74 
ECOM (n=74) 4.65 
SDA (n-10) 4.8 
WiNeisen (n=52) 4.79 
Other (n=9) 4.67 
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Table Nine. Attitudes towards marine conservation over time. Bold numbers represent 
statistically significant values (p-value=0.05). 
 

















2.93 .64 .10 .63 
GENDER     
Male (n=132) 2.95 .65 .07 .62 
Female (n=28) 2.86 .59 .22 .70 
Fisher’s exact .310 .629 .032 .411 
OCCUPATION     
Fishing (n=148) 2.93 .65 .10 .63 
Business (n=8) 3 .50 0 .63 
Employment (n=3) 3 .67 0 .67 
Fisher’s exact .471 .606 .374 .540 
RELIGION     
Catholic 2.95 .72 .05 .63 
ECOM 2.96 .57 .07 .64 
SDA 3 .60 .30 .80 
WiNeisen 2.86 .76 .10 .54 
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Table Ten. Attitudes towards the management area over time. Bold numbers represent 
statistically significant values (p-value=0.05). 
 

















2.97 .67 .11 .66 
 
GENDER     
Male (n=134) 2.96 .66 .11 .65 
Female (n=28) 3.0 .71 .14 .75 
Fisher’s exact .527 .862 .808 .600 
OCCUPATION     
Fishing (n=150) 2.97 .69 .12 ,67 
Business (n=8) 2.86 .14 0 .57 
Employment (n=3) 3 .67 0 .67 
Fisher’s exact .109 .013 .177 .175 
RELIGION     
Catholic 3 .68 .05 .79 
ECOM 2.92 .62 .10 .64 
SDA 3 .60 .30 .70 
WiNeisen 3 .80 .10 .59 
Fisher’s exact .812 .195 .361 .535 
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CHAPTER SIX: Conclusions 
Conservation organizations have become larger, better funded, and more organized over 
time. However, at the same time that these organizations have increased their capacities and their 
resources, global biodiversity continues to decline. This mismatch between larger, more 
professional organizations and declining biodiversity suggests a gap between increased capacity 
and conservation outcomes and between organizational aims and accomplishments. My 
dissertation explores gaps between plans and outcomes (Ferguson 1990), between policy and 
practice (Mosse 2005; Lewis and Mosse 2006), and between intentions and achievements 
(Carrier and West 2009) to examine the inner workings of conservation at multiple scales. I 
examine how organizations, conservation professionals and local community actors shape 
conservation processes and outcomes. In doing so, my dissertation represents the first multi-
scaled analysis in the Pacific on marine conservation organizations, conservation professionals, 
and local communities.  
My dissertation highlights several factors that contribute to disjunctures between 
intentions and achievements: heterogeneous attitudes and behavior among individuals within an 
organization; personal choices and motivations of conservation professionals that shape their 
decisions; the ways in which individuals come to care about the environment; the challenges that 
emerge from governance-at-a-distance management strategies; organizational failure to measure 
progress and reflect upon outcomes; the relationship between donor, organizational and 
managerial pressure to report success; and the production of ignorance. Below, I briefly 
summarize these findings and illustrate how they collectively contribute to understanding how 
disjunctures between intentions and achievements emerge and persist. 
By analyzing the organizational pressures that shape the actions, assumptions and 
motivations of conservation professionals, I illustrate the heterogeneity of beliefs that exists 
among WCO managers and staff and show how actors attempt to reconcile these heterogeneous 
beliefs when implementing marine conservation projects. My findings illuminate four systematic 
differences among WCO managers and staff that result from the individuals that occupy these 
positions, rather than from structural differences at international, national and local levels. First, 
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my findings show how individual attitudes and behavior towards implementing M&E vary 
among WCO offices. WCO Global managers and staff recognized M&E as an important 
organizational practice and said they welcomed critical reflection and description of project 
challenges. In contrast, WCO PNG managers did not treat M&E as an important everyday 
practice and discouraged critical reflection among their staff by actively eliminating such 
language in staff reports. Second, managers and staff expressed different preferences for 
conservation or development components of their projects, which resulted from the different 
ways in which these individuals conceptualized such terms. Madang staff favored a social and 
livelihoods approach while Port Moresby-based managers emphasized conservation-focused 
projects. Third, my findings illustrate how individuals approach conservation from different 
temporal scales. Port Moresby managers (and some WCO Global staff) focused on short-term 
outcomes from project activities while the Madang staff supported long-term approaches. Fourth, 
staff possessed ontologically different beliefs about the role of WMAs in conservation: Port 
Moresby managers viewed WMAs as objectives while the Madang manager perceived WMAs as 
management tools. These differences illustrate how the attitudes and behavior of individuals 
within the same conservation organization can vary widely, which in turn has implications for 
the types of projects different managers and staff prefer and even for the ways in which 
managers and staff prioritize M&E practices or relationships with local communities. Such 
differences contribute to disjunctures between intentions and achievements and tensions between 
managers and staff on the focus of projects. Moreover, the challenges that result from the 
heterogeneity of beliefs in WCO emerge from the way organizations themselves recognize, 
incorporate, or reconcile the diversity of perspectives on anthropogenic and biocentric 
approaches to conservation. 
Second, my dissertation illustrates the personal choices and motivations of conservation 
professionals by advancing development scholarship on the social lives of professionals within 
the field of conservation. I highlight several personal choices that shape conservation 
professionals’ actions and decision-making, including personal preferences to be based in 
headquarter or capital locations rather than in field locations, particularly as individuals gain 
experience and grow older. Such choices mean that managers remain distant from the 
implementation of conservation projects, which contributes to continued disjunctures between 
intentions and achievements. More broadly, this situation illustrates how such gaps and 
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inconsistencies can become “the normal state of affairs” (Carrier and West 2009: ix) rather than 
unique tales of a particularly difficult project or an exceptional situation of a project with 
unintended effects. This analysis raises questions about how conservation organizations can 
address the challenges that result from such choices and their implications for conservation 
practice more generally. Further, this analysis also underscores the potential insights for 
conservation practices and outcomes that can emerge from studying the social lives of 
environmental professionals.  
Third, my dissertation expands on studies of environmentality by exploring how 
organizations shape the attitudes and behavior of conservation managers. For instance, I show 
how managers shape the behavior of their staff, such as when conservation managers place 
pressure on staff to produce positive reports and these staff then begin using such language. 
Similarly, I reveal ways in which organizational priorities shape individual’s actions, such as 
when managers at WCO PNG sought to align all of WCO PNG’s activities with WCO’s broader 
aims. Collectively, these examples illustrate how organizations shape attitudes and behavior and 
also how individual actions shape conservation processes and outcomes.  
My findings also illustrate how individual attitudes and interests came to align with initial 
conservation behaviors, similar to what scholars of environmentality predict. In Pere, legal 
recognition of environment and conservation came after villagers created a management area 
with the help of NGOs, a finding that suggests formal, government regulations are not always 
necessary to support attitudinal and behavioral changes. My examination of the emergence of 
environmental attitudes and behavior among Papua New Guineans in Pere village highlights 
enforcement as a persistent challenge for communities like Pere but also for the conservation 
community more broadly. This finding illustrates how good intentions (in this case, strong 
support for the management area and marine conservation) alone do not result in achievements 
(here, effective management and monitoring), suggesting yet another way in which gaps between 
intentions and achievements emerge. At the same time, by continuing to pursue their efforts to 
manage their local marine area and to engage neighboring communities and NGOs in their 
efforts, Pere villagers may still achieve un-intended outcomes over the long-term that may be 
better than the ones that they originally imagined, resulting in marine management that is 
potentially more effective.  
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Fourth, my dissertation shows how individuals represented themselves in a particular way 
to engage external actors and attract benefits, similar to findings from post-structural political 
ecology that illustrate how local communities may position themselves in particular ways to 
engage with and benefit from conservation and development programs. For instance, my findings 
show the ways in which Mbuke villagers positioned themselves as committed conservationists 
and ideal targets of conservation programs while continuing to act in a manner that was 
inconsistent with WCO’s vision of conservation. In contrast to the ways in which ICO sought to 
shape the attitudes and behavior of Pere villages, WCO managers relied on assurances from field 
staff about the community’s environmental convictions and did not attempt to shape Mbuke 
villagers’ attitudes or behavior through community education programs on conservation or other 
tools. At the same time, not all changes and conservation actions in villages result from such 
strategic positioning; in Pere, villagers adopted conservation language with the intent of 
furthering their conservation aims. These findings underscore village-level complexities and 
illustrate how assumptions about projects or project communities can contribute to emerging 
gaps between intentions and achievements before projects even begin.  
Fifth, I show how the challenges that WCO managers encountered when they made 
assumptions about the environmental convictions of Papua New Guineans is also related to a 
“governance-at-a-distance” management style, defined as a management style in which 
managers rely on email, phone, and other “distance” forms of communication to stay up to date 
and informed about field-based projects. I highlight several challenges that result from such a 
strategy, including the ways in which this strategy results in disjunctures between managers’ 
intentions and project achievements. Further, as noted above, insights on the personal choices 
and motivations of individual conservation professionals show their preferences for office jobs, 
rather than field positions, an insight that suggests that governance-at-a-distance management 
styles are likely to persist. 
Sixth, my dissertation highlights the challenges faced by WCO in implementing M&E 
strategies. My findings show how WCO failed to maintain an overarching set of assumptions, 
beliefs, and values at its international and national offices, which resulted in an overall 
organizational failure to define and measure progress and reflect upon outcomes. By failing to 
effectively measure, much less address, how its outputs contribute to larger outcomes, WCO 
missed an opportunity to use M&E to learn from its activities and improve organizational, 
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management or project effectiveness. This finding has broader implications for conservation 
practice, as suggested by the comment of the WCO manager who described WCO’s 
accomplishments as “small and medium sized wins” that may not contribute to larger 
conservation successes. While it is possible that conservation programs and projects may achieve 
significant accomplishments without orienting their tasks and defining intended outcomes up 
front, organizations are more likely to achieve their broader objectives when they connect project 
activities to their mission and objectives. Further, for an organization to learn from its experience 
and then change or modify its approach, the organization must also be open to adjusting its 
assumptions about approaches and strategies to conservation. 
Seventh, conservation scholarship on donor-NGO relationships tends to emphasize the 
influence of donors on conservation priorities and NGO accountability to donors. My findings 
did show some ways in which staff felt that donors shaped WCO priorities, such as in the case of 
WCO managers who pressured Madang staff to focus on WMAs because of a promise WCO had 
made in one of its project proposals. At the same time, I found that organizational and 
managerial pressure to report success is greater than donor pressure, as shown through examples 
of how managers place pressure on their employees to demonstrate success and discourage 
critical reflection among their staff, a finding that expands understandings of NGO-donor 
dynamics. This type of behavior hinders M&E processes in particular and conservation practice 
in general because information provided to donors or others may not accurately reflect projects, 
which limits the ability of conservation organizations and donors to evaluate how efforts 
contribute to outcomes or to learn from mistakes to potentially design improved conservation 
projects. Further, I also suggest that, because NGOs’ often compete for funding, NGOs face an 
additional disincentive to report on their challenges and failures, even if donors say they are 
receptive to more honest reporting. This pressure to remain competitive with their peers is 
another contributing factor in explaining donor-NGO relationships.  
Finally, my dissertation suggests how disjunctures between intentions and outcomes can 
represent both failures and possibilties. For example, when managers or staff do not support 
intended outcomes, they may welcome failure or cultivate ignorance about certain aspects of a 
project. My findings highlight several reasons why managers or staff may invite ignorance about 
a particular project or field site, including to: 1) ensure simplicity and avoid addressing 
complexity or inconsistencies; 2) avoid admitting failure or to represent failure in a more positive 
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light to supervisors or donors; and 3) avoid being associated with project failure and the potential 
effects of such failure on their careers. I suggest the production of ignorance represents a more 
general trend beyond the WCO offices and communities that I describe in this dissertation. 
Instead, I propose the production of ignorance illustrates a broad tendency among government 
bureaucrats, conservation and development staff, and others to share and promote particular 
types of knowledge while minimizing or ignoring other types of knowledge. Such tendencies 
may result from individual motivations, organizational or policy environments, or other factors 
that deserve further interrogation to better understand the relationships among power, 
knowledge, and ignorance across geographic contexts.  
Each of these findings suggests ways in which conservation achievements vary from 
intentions, resulting in conservation projects and outcomes that differ from imagined and 
intended effects and showing how conservation professionals and local communities do not 
always behave as expected. My point is not just that the intentions of marine conservation efforts 
in PNG vary from their achievements but that they almost always do. My dissertation therefore 
presents the perspective that the anomalous is ubiquitous; such gaps and inconsistencies are not 
exceptional anomalies but rather the norm. 
Further Analysis and Future Research  
This section brings together the multiple themes that contribute to understanding how 
organizations, conservation professionals and local community actors shape conservation 
processes and outcomes at international, national and local levels. It turns to the broader 
implications of these findings for conservation practice to explore how insights from marine 
conservation efforts in Papua New Guinea can shed light on conservation efforts globally. 
My dissertation analyzes how individual actors transform organizational policies and 
intentions into projects and actions by examining the everyday experiences of conservation 
professionals. By including insights from multiple levels, my dissertation illustrates the everyday 
processes and social relations through which policies and projects develop and are contested, 
negotiated, reworked or supported by managers, staff or communities. These findings illustrate 
how conservation action happens across distance and operates at multiple scales, from the 
international and national level, where policy and project design most frequently takes place, to 
the field and community level, where project implementation occurs. These multiple scales then 
create opportunities for field staff to reorient projects, as the Marine Manager did in Madang, or 
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for managers to repackage projects in a more favorable light, as the national manager did with 
staff reports. By illustrating the multiple levels at which gaps emerge and persist, I show how 
gaps between intentions and achievements occur not only at a theoretical level but also stem 
from the daily attitudes and behavior of conservation professionals and local communities. 
My dissertation uncovers many challenges in marine conservation efforts throughout 
PNG, ranging from organizational challenges in monitoring and evaluating conservation 
outcomes to professional tensions in approaches to conservation. These challenges suggest that 
WCO’s incentive structure does not ensure a mechanism for staff to share complex information 
or project challenges. Further, the experience of WCO illustrates some of the misalignments in 
incentives that face international conservation organizations. Because WCO PNG must fundraise 
to support its activities, they must send positive messages that demonstrate an overall picture of 
success to their donors, to their supervisors at WCO Global, and even to their colleagues in other 
organizations. WCO PNG faces similar incentive-related challenges within the WCO network; 
because WCO PNG is one of many national offices around the world that is affiliated with the 
WCO network, WCO PNG experiences pressure to be seen as a successful national office within 
WCO. Consequently, WCO PNG must convey to WCO Global that it is in alignment with WCO 
Global priorities.  
Collectively, the multiple challenges highlighted in my dissertation also suggest that 
WCO’s current approaches to addressing environmental challenges throughout PNG are not 
sufficient to achieve WCO’s goals and objectives. However, it would be a mistake to assume that 
these challenges are unique to WCO; instead, I suggest that the challenges faced by WCO are 
representative of larger challenges faced by the conservation movement as a whole and 
underscore a lack of fit between some of the operating modes of large conservation organizations 
and effective conservation on the ground. 
There is growing consensus that current approaches to addressing 21st century 
environmental challenges are not sufficient and that new approaches, solutions (Biggs et al 2010) 
and transformations (Westley et al 2011) will be necessary. Biggs et al summarize this 
perspective by saying: “There is increasing agreement that more adaptive, integrated, 
collaborative ecosystem-management approaches, interlinked at multiple scales, would improve 
society’s ability to sustainably manage complex social–ecological systems” (2010: 8). This 
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scholarship suggests the need to better understand factors that could facilitate transformations or 
encourage the emergence of new approaches in conservation practice and theory.  
Understanding governance-at-a-distance is particularly important within this context 
because governance-at-a-distance is characteristic of all large, international conservation 
organizations and is likely to persist in the future. Therefore, an important next step in 
understanding this phenomenon will be in understanding when such a governance-at-a-distance 
strategy works and when it does not work, with the aim of identifying the patterns and types of 
strategies that lead to better outcomes. 
Governance-at-a-distance allows for possibilities within the gaps between intentions and 
achievements. Both the WCO Madang staff and the WCO Manus staff were initially able to take 
advantage of WCO’s governance-at-a-distance strategy by running their marine projects in a 
different way than the WCO PNG managers intended. The WCO Madang staff, for example, 
began to focus on a social and development component, which had not been approved by WCO 
PNG managers. The Madang office employed this strategy for several months before WCO PNG 
managers eventually became aware of this shift in project direction and stopped the Madang staff 
from continuing to implement this approach. In this example, WCO’s governance-at-a-distance 
management strategy allowed the WCO Madang staff greater autonomy and flexibility in their 
project approach, although this autonomy was only temporary. If the Madang office had shifted 
the project approach to one that better aligned with the preferences of individual managers at 
WCO PNG, it is possible that WCO PNG managers would have supported this shift, suggesting 
how gaps can be productive in introducing new approaches. 
The emergence of gaps between intentions and achievements may also produce un-
intended effects that are better than the ones initially imagined. In Pere village, for instance, 
where villagers originally envisioned creating a locally managed marine area but have faced 
challenges in enforcing the management area rules, this gap between their intentions and 
achievements could result in unintended but positive outcomes. Because of their challenges in 
enforcement, Pere villagers have had to consider additional strategies to conserve their area, such 
as including neighboring communities and engaging with the NGO community. Over time, these 
originally unintended strategies may end up contributing to an outcome that is better than the 
ones originally imagined by Pere villagers. 
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In summary, my dissertation portrays international conservation organizations as they are 
incessantly shaped, through internally varied and contradictory processes and misaligned 
incentives structures, by the donor communities or local communities whose priorities must be 
reconciled with the ecological outcomes that would, in a simpler world, be straightforward 
indicators of success or failure. 
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Appendix A: Policy Recommendations 
As noted in the preface, one of my aims in this dissertation was to present a nuanced 
analysis that closes the gap between conservation advocates and critics by including 
recommendations aimed at improving the practices of environmental institutions and the 
relationships among conservation actors. This dissertation has produced a number of findings 
that may be of interest to conservation practitioners responsible for designing and managing 
conservation programs and projects as well as for donors who fund such programs. While these 
recommendations may seem overly simple or obvious to some, my experiences suggest that 
anomalies between project intentions and project achievements in marine conservation efforts in 
PNG develop because of such simple fissures and addressing their underlying causes is a 
complex task.  
First, my dissertation illustrates how WCO failed to communicate its aims and intended 
norms on M&E to its employees throughout its multiple offices, which resulted in different 
attitudes and behavior towards implementing M&E policies. M&E represents one mechanism 
through which WCO could coordinate its different offices, projects, and programs to ensure that 
it focuses its efforts on activities that will address key conservation challenges and contribute to 
broader organizational goals. However, as my findings show, such coordination is unlikely to 
occur in the absence of high-level leadership and effective communication on the importance of 
M&E to employees at all levels. Further, some managers placed pressure on their employees to 
produce reports that emphasized success and minimized discussion of project challenges. If an 
organization or managers want to implement M&E as a process to measure organizational 
outcomes and highlight areas for improvement, managers need to encourage critical reflection 
among their staff in order to have a basis for understanding and evaluating conservation 
progress. Otherwise, as I suggest, the practice of M&E is unlikely to accomplish accountability-
focused or improved-focused M&E. 
Second, my dissertation underscores how managers based in the capital often lacked an 
understanding of field realities, which was perpetuated by governance-at-a-distance management 
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strategies and short field visits where managers sought to confirm their prior assumptions. To 
address this challenge, I propose two recommendations: 1) visit the project to observe what is 
going on and 2) ensure that staff feel included in the organization. I propose managers visit 
projects during their initial development, when there is still time for adaptive management, and 
visiting more frequently. If WCO managers had visited Mbuke earlier, they might have observed 
how villagers’ conduct varied from what Samuel described in his reports or identified the need to 
add a community awareness component to the project. Further, managers could reverse the 
directions of some of the trips in their budget; rather than paying for Samuel to visit the WCO 
PNG office, WCO PNG managers could use this money to visit Samule in Mbuke, where they 
would be able to directly observe the Mbuke project. In addition, my findings suggest that 
managers are more likely to learn about field sites and the attitudes and behavior of project staff 
and local communities when they spend longer periods of time at the project site, ask project 
staff questions and remain open to observations that may contradict prior understandings or 
assumptions. 
Third, my findings show how senior staff often made strategic project decisions without 
involving field staff, which resulted in field staff who felt excluded from such decision-making 
processes. Field staff expressed their frustration about then having to implement plans that they 
had not contributed to or commented upon. Consequently, I propose that conservation 
organizations involve all levels of staff in strategic planning exercises to ensure that field level 
perspectives are incorporated in strategic plans and project workplans. Further, in light of my 
findings on the ways in which senior and junior staff, expat and national staff and others may 
communicate and share opinions in different ways, I suggest mangers and staff also need to 
remain attune to such differences to help minimize communication challenges.  
Fourth, I highlight how staff expressed varying senses of connection to the organization. 
Given the nature of conservation work, governance-at-a-distance management strategies will 
likely persist and some staff will always be located far from headquarter or national offices. Still, 
conservation organizations can minimize the social distance experienced by these staff by taking 
steps to include them, make them feel valued as part of the organization, and ensure they 
understand the broader goals of the organization. Similarly, individuals, particularly those 
located in more remote offices, expressed varying understandings of how they as individuals 
contribute to the overall work of the organization. By communicating with field level staff about 
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the overall organizational goals and how particular project activities contribute to this vision, 
managers can help to ensure that staff understand how they contribute to the organization. 
Conversely, when supervisors do not communicate or emphasize the organization’s main 
objectives or positions to their staff, employees are less likely to understand or contribute to 
advancing the overall goals of the organization. 
Conservation organizations could also take even bolder steps by re-considering the role 
of local, field-based staff and promoting training or professional development options that would 
contribute to the types of capacity building opportunities that Thomas McDermott, WCO’s 
former Country Director, described when he coined a “make myself redundant” management 
strategy. In describing this management strategy, Thomas suggested that his goal was to make 
his own role in WCO PNG’s office redundant by building the capacity of Papua New Guineans 
to do his job. Another step could be to consider staff rotations among the different levels of 
WCO, similar to the types of international training programs that private companies run in which 
staff who show leadership potential and initiative participate in courses that involve spending 
time at the corporation’s multiple offices and levels, with the goal of ensuring that these staff 
understand the multiple levels of the company and how it operates and can then return to their 
home office with an improved understanding of how the company works. Similarly, while senior 
staff are likely to have field experience, some may not or may need a “refresher.” Rotations of 
senior staff at field offices could similarly provide updated or improved understandings of 
current conservation challenges at the local levels. 
My findings also show how conservation organizations may experience “geographic 
inertia,” a situation in which an organization has been based in an area for a long period of time 
and is likely to continue working in the area, even if it no longer makes strategic sense for the 
organization’s objectives. Further, my findings highlight how the interests of an organization and 
a community may diverge over time, which can result in a field site that no longer represents an 
ideal location to implement the organization’s activities. These findings underscore the 
importance of conservation organizations defining exit strategies and of continuing to evaluate 
whether a particular site is an appropriate location to achieve its objectives.  
These recommendations represent a few of the suggestions that emerged from my 
examination of the inner workings of a large conservation organization implementing marine 
conservation projects in PNG, which I suggest are broadly applicable to other conservation 
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organizations. Again, although they may seem obvious or simple, my experience suggests that 
managers often do not implement such recommendations—either because they become too 
wrapped up in their day to day work, being “busy being busy,” or perhaps because they have 
other motivations than seeking to ensure conservation works well. At the same time, some of the 
challenges identified in this dissertation can not be easily solved, underscoring how disjunctures 
between intentions and achievements are likely to persist. West reaches a similar conclusion in 
her analysis, writing “to achieve conservation as conservation practitioners see it, one cannot 
have development as Gimi see it” (2006: 217), a point which emphasizes that some gaps cannot 
be bridged through simple recommendations or even recognition of challenges. Therefore, while 
this section includes some suggestions for conservation professionals to improve conservation 
practice, it is also important to recognize the complexity of conservation practice and to 
understand places and situations in which such suggestions will not work. Finally, as the title of 
my dissertation suggests, the anomalous is ubiquitous—even if organizations or managers 
implement these recommendations, gaps between intentions and achievements are always likely 
to persist. 
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